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This document – an appendix to the DEMOS H2020 working paper "The Populist 
Challenge of Common EU Policies: The Case of (Im)migration" – includes seven 
country reports (i.e. France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovakia) 
that analyse immigration policy as one of the major conflict area between populist and 
non-populist forces (movements, parties, governments) as well as EU institutions. In 
this context, the reports examine the policy discourse and responses in the selected EU 
Member States and look at the challenges in implementing common EU policies. The 
reports cover the period from 2015 to 2018. They all follow a similar structure, starting 
with the background information on the size and character of migration in the covered 
country, following with the analysis of political discourse at the national level and 
political actions taken by decision-makers (including legal changes). Each report 
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One of the major conflicts between populist and non-populist forces (movements, parties, 
governments) as well as the European Union (EU) institutions is manifested in the area of the 
EU immigration policy. The national reports presented here assess how the influx of migrants 
(mostly from the Middle East and North Africa region) into the EU has been used as a policy 
conflict ground within the EU (both between the populist and non-populist governments as well 
as among different political forces within EU Member States). In this context, the reports 
examine the policy responses in the selected EU Member States and look at the challenges in 
implementation of the common EU policies (e.g. the temporary and exceptional relocation 
mechanism from Italy and Greece to other Member States for persons in clear need of 
international protection as well as proposal for mandatory and automatic relocation system for 
such persons).  
The reports cover the period from 2015 to 2018, this is a period conventionally labelled as the 
European migration crisis and its aftermath. The territorial scope of the reports is limited to the 
EU Member States and includes the following countries: France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland and Slovakia. This diversity is not accidental as the project aimed to cover both 
old and new Members, as well as the frontline and final destination countries. All the reports 
were prepared as a part of the H2020 project entitled “Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of 
Populism in Europe” (DEMOS) (grant agreement no. 822590).   
The authors of the national reports used a combination of different methods, ranging from 
content analysis to traditional legal approached (i.e. dogmatic analysis). Their enquires were 
based on the examination of political (party) programmes, press releases of the governments 
and EU institutions, statements of party/movement leaders, legal and quasi-legal documents, 
and national and EU case law. All the experts also extensively relied on the secondary sources, 
such as official reports and academic analyses. 
The national reports tend to follow the similar structure: they all start with the background 
information on the size and character of migration in the covered EU country. This is followed 
by the section which looks how the problem of migration was framed in the political discourse 
of the domestic parties during the covered period. In this context, a special attention is given to 
the populist parties. The subsequent section examines how the political postulates were 
translated into specific actions, including legal changes. Each report concludes with the brief 
synthesis (summarizing the main findings) and extensive bibliography. 
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Country Report Prepared for the DEMOS Project  
Author: Viktor Szép, CSS Institute for Legal Studies, Budapest, Hungary  
 
1. Introduction 
According to Eurostat, 2.4 million immigrants entered the EU27 in 2018. In total, 21.8 million 
people were non EU27 citizens on 1 January 2019 which represent almost 5% of EU27 
population. In addition to non-EU citizens, 13.3 million EU citizens were living in one of the 
EU27 Member States with citizenship of another EU Member State. Baltic states, especially 
Latvia and Estonia host the highest number of recognised non-citizens (mainly from the former 
Soviet Union). In relative terms, the highest share of non-nationals resided in Luxembourg 
accounting for 47% of its total population (Eurostat, 2020b). In absolute terms, however, France 
was the third biggest receiving country with regard to non-nationals (with 4.9 million) after 
Italy (5.3 million) and Germany (10.1 million) on 1 January 2019 (Eurostat, 2019b). These 
people in France, representing approximately 7% of the total population (Ministère de 
l’Intérieur, 2019a), were born foreigners abroad, may have French nationality and live in 
France. Most of them has come from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia which is explained by the 
historical, cultural and economic ties between France and Maghreb countries (European 
Commission, 2020). 
French statistics also reaffirm that 7% of the total population is foreigner while 9% is immigrant 
in France. Half of the immigrant population of working ages (15-64 years) arrived in France 
before 1998. Those who arrived at the age of 15 or over in France, half of them said to be 
emigrated for family reasons. The immigration population is, in general, now more educated 
than ever, partly due to the fact that they are now taking part in French higher education system. 
While immigration is not new to France, the countries of origin are quite different now than in 
the 1970s: whereas 66% of the immigrants came from the European continent in 1975, 
especially from Spain and Italy, European immigrants fell to 35% in 2015. Nowadays, 
approximately half of the immigrants have African origins which is equivalent to around 2.7 
million people. More than half of the immigrants with African origins have come from the 
Maghreb countries while immigration from the sub-Saharan Africa is a more recent 
phenomenon. Finally, around 20% of immigrants come from Asia and America, 15% and 5% 
respectively (Insée, 2019). 
The Office of Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office francais de protection des 
réfugiés et apatrides, OFPRA) registered the following number of asylum requests between 
2015 and 2018: 79,914 (in 2015, mostly from Syria, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and 
Haiti) (OFPRA, 2016), 85,244 (in 2016, mostly from the same states as in 2015) (OFPRA, 
2017), 100,412 (in 2017, mostly from the same states as in 2015 and 2016) (OFPRA, 2018a) 
and 122 743 (in 2018 mostly from Afghanistan, Albania, Georgia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire). 
The number of asylum requests in 2018 is approximately the double of two other peaks in 
French history in 1990 (61,422) and 2004 (64,614). The median age of asylum seekers is 31 
years composed mostly of men (65%) (Fine, 2019). The number of decisions to grant protection 
status (refugee and subsidiary protection, excluding accompanying minors) taken by OFPRA 
and CNDA stood at 19,506 in 2015, 26,499 in 2016, 31,964 in 2017 and 33,330 in 2018 
(Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2020a). In 2019, the number of asylum requests increased to almost 
178,000 which was explained by the inclusion of requests governed by the Dublin procedure 
(which is not responsibility of the French authorities, such as OFPRA). Afghanistan (10,258), 
 
 
Bangladesh (6,198) and Georgia (5 760) occupied the top positions in asylum requests in 2019 
(Vie Publique, 2020). 
The following number of visas, most of which are short stay or transit visa, were granted 
between 2015 and 2018: 3,197,505 (2015), 3,074,601 (2016), 3,420,396 (2017) and 3,571,388 
(2018) (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2019b). Chinese citizens remain the first country of origin of 
visa holders (757,500), followed by Russians (486,706) and Morocco (346,032) (Vie Publique, 
2020). Approximately 1,5 million EU citizens have been working in France since 2015 (1.49 
million in 2015, 1.52 million in 2016 and 2018 while 1.55 million in 2017), mostly coming 
from Portugal (approx. 550 million), Italy (apprx. 190 million) and the UK (approx. 150 
million) (Insée, 2020). The following number of first residence permits were issued by France 
for employment (economic, professional) reasons between 2015 and 2018: 20,969 (2015) 
(European Commission, 2016b), 23 076 (2016) (European Commission, 2017a), 27,556 (2017) 
(Eurostat, 2018) and 33,808 (2018) (Eurostat, 2019a). The rest of the residence permits, 
however, were mostly granted for family or study reasons. In addition, the Ministry of Interior 
estimates that the talent passport, intended to attract highly qualified people in force in 
November 2016, was issued to 12 465 people in 2017, 15,859 in 2018 (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 
2019b) and 35,200 in 2019 (Vie Publique, 2020). Furthermore, France granted 113,600 
citizenships in 2015, 119,200 in 2016, 114,300 in 2017 and 110,000 in 2018 (Eurostat, 2020a). 
Although France has long time established its own migration and integration policies, the new 
wave of migration in 2015 was an example of an almost unprecedented level of pressure for the 
country as well as for other EU Member States. France, led previously by François Hollande 
and now Emmanuel Macron, principally supported the Commission’s proposal to relocate 
people in clear need of international protection and shared the idea that Europe needs to take its 
global responsibility seriously in this crisis. At the same time, mainly due to domestic political 
factors, the French government emphasized that it cannot take unlimited number of refugees 
but was willing to comply with its EU law obligations in the field of EU Migration and Home 
Affairs. 
 
2. Immigration as a political issue 
2.1. Political context 
2.1.1. The positions of major domestic parties (2015-2018) 
Few topics have generated as much heated political debates as the question of migration in 
Europe. It is not only a characteristic of French politics but was also present during the Brexit 
debate or before the election of Donald Trump. Since the late 1970s, the question of migration 
has been a controversial political issue in France and remains a key policy challenge nowadays 
(Wolff, 2017). In 2012, for example, before and during the presidential debate, the situation of 
immigrants in France was a central theme. Back then, Nicolas Sarkozy sought to divide by two 
the number of annual admissions, a political objective deemed impossible according to his 
socialist rival, François Hollande (Le Point, 2012). The question of migration, especially after 
2015, continued to be a highly debated political issue and was considered as one of the major 
policy challenges of France. In particular, Marine le Pen put the question of migration in the 
heart of her political campaign with proposals tightening immigration rules (Le Point, 2017). 
Nothing better proves that migration remained a key political issue is that during the 2017 
presidential election debate – which lasted for 3 hours – only 15 minutes was devoted to French 
foreign policy whereas questions related to immigration and security dominated the debate and 
were discussed in lengthy (Robert, 2017). 
 
 
Not surpassingly, the crisis of 2015 yet again brought the question of migration at the top of 
French political agenda.  In view of the dramatic scenes unfolding in the Mediterranean Sea in 
early 2015, the EU leaders recognized that new policy tools needed to be adopted at both 
European and national levels. Asked by the French government (Hollande, 2015a), a special 
meeting of the European Council was convened in April 2015 in order to tackle the tragedy in 
the Mediterranean. EU leaders unanimously agreed to strengthen EU presence at sea, to fight 
traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and 
responsibility, including the set up a voluntary pilot project on resettlement across the EU 
(European Council, 2015). In his declaration, former French President François Hollande said 
that the humanitarian situation was unacceptable and that Europe could not remain indifferent 
regarding the events in Libya (Hollande, 2015a). The former French President also emphasized 
that “Europe cannot be responsible for everything” but added that the EU was stepping up its 
efforts in the Mediterranean while France itself also took its part because “this is her honour 
and duty” to save human lives (Hollande, 2015b). 
In May 2015, the European Commission, based on Article 78(3) Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, proposed to the Council to relocate over a period of 24 months 24,000 
applicants from Italy and 16 000 applicants (in total: 40,000 applicants) in clear need of 
international protection.1 Former interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve, in a common position 
written with its German counterpart, welcomed the proposal of the Commission to create this 
temporary redistribution mechanism (Ministere de l’Intérieur, 2015). In June 2015, each 
Member State leader agreed that this temporary and exceptional relocation should be adopted 
in a timely manner (European Council, 2015a). 
The French government intention to welcome people in need for international protection was, 
however, constrained by the National Rally (Rassemblement National (RN) – formerly known 
as Front National (FN)) – given that Manuel Valls needed to calculate how government actions 
might influence the political support of the extreme right-wing party. This political reality was 
later exacerbated by the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris after which former Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls announced that France simply could not take unlimited number of 
refugees. This policy line contradicted with Germany’s vision of non-ceiling the number of 
refugees that the country was willing to take in. Manuel Valls insisted, sticking to earlier 
pledges, that France could not take in more than 30 000 refugees and, if pushed to welcome 
more, the chances would have been higher that the reputation of National Really grew. This 
special political situation was understood by Germany which refrained itself to criticize French 
policy actions of maximizing the number of refugees (Webber, 2018: 164-166). 
The National Rally rejected the proposals to distribute migrants arrived in France (Front, 2015). 
Le Pen contrasted the policies pursued by France with Denmark and praised the actions taken 
by the latter’s government for its announcement of breakdown of its rail links with Germany to 
fight against the migrant flow. She called on the French Socialist Party and the UMP (Union 
pour un mouvement populaire) to propose and enact similar legislation in France (Le Pen, 
2015b). Le Pen also emphasized that she wanted to see a downward trend (possibly to zero) in 
the number of legal entries into France. She also stressed the importance of strengthening the 
national borders, the systematic return of illegal immigrants to their home countries and the end 
of all social incentives for illegal immigration. The National Rally also accused the centre-right 
UMP that it had allowed the entry of 2 million foreigners of which around 10% were given 
French citizenship (Domard, 2015). 
                                                     
1 Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the 
benefit of Italy and Greece, COM/2015/0286 final - 2015/125 (NLE). 
 
 
In general, National Rally MPs rejected the permanent relocation mechanism proposed by 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. According to the National Rally, the European 
Union was determined to impose an immigration policy contrary to the will and sovereignty of 
people. The extreme-right wing party claimed that only States have the right to decide whether 
foreigners are allowed to stay in another country and that the system of immigration should 
have to be reformed so that people are welcomed only on exceptional basis (Bay, 2015). Others 
emphasized that it was not racist or xenophobe to fear of massive migration. Instead of 
welcoming foreigners, as the EU and Germany suggest, support should be brought where 
people under threat live (Lebreton, 2015b). The EU was not seen as the solution to the problem 
but it was part of the problem (Lebreton, 2015a). French socialists and centre right parties were 
accused of hypocrisy for supporting an EP resolution on making the submission of complaints 
against European border guards easier (Lebreton & Goddyn, 2015). The extreme right party 
refused to accept the mechanism of relocation as proposed by the Commission and, instead, 
sought to restore the national borders, put an end to all forms of laxity in the face of illegal 
immigration, drastically reduce legal immigration and reaffirm French identity (Bay, 2016). 
The National Really saw the centre right and left in the European Parliament to pursue the same 
policies despite having sometimes anti-migration rhetoric (Aliot, 2016). 
Former President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was also president of the right-wing party Les 
Républicains (LR), also disagreed with the proposal of the Commission to distribute the 
migrants between EU states and declared that: “there is no more money, no more jobs, no more 
housing […] but they considered that the solution to the problem of migration was not to reduce 
but to relocate”. He compared this proposal with an exploding pipe in a family house where 
water “spills into the kitchen. The repairman arrives and says, I have a solution: we will keep 
half for the kitchen, put a quarter in the living room, a quarter in the parents’ room and if that 
is not enough there remains the children’s room” (Liberation, 2015). Sarkozy even 
contemplated to suspend the Schengen I. zone and to create a Schengen II. in which states can 
only join after they undertook several reforms and adopted a common migration policy (Réaux, 
2015). Sarkozy’s stance was criticized by the Government and was called on to use words which 
respected the human dignity of people in clear need of international protection. 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, founder of the Left Party (Parti de gauche (PG)), was also highly critical 
of the proposal of the Commission to relocate the migrants amongst EU Member States. His 
main argument against the relocation mechanism was that it failed to tackle the root causes of 
migration which had been manifold: wars, economic distress and climate change. Although 
Germany accepted to welcome 800,000 refugees, it will not be able, according to Mélenchon, 
to welcome the same amount of people in the coming years. Moreover, he believed that 
Chancellor Merkel was not a philanthropic politician but someone who worked for the 
fundamental interests of Germany by inviting skilled people in the German labour market. 
Mélenchon further argued that it was nearly impossible to distinguish between economic 
migrants and people in real need for international protection showing that the policy proposed 
by the Commission was poorly designed (Mélenchon, 2015). 
Due to the intensifying pressure on EU borders, the French government decided to take further 
steps. In particular, former President François Hollande, together with his German counterpart, 
took the leadership in September 2015 and, in a joint letter, called on the Commission to 
propose a permanent and mandatory mechanism of relocation regarding persons in need for 
international protection (Hollande & Merkel, 2015). In a press conference, François Hollande 
further clarified that the relocation must cover persons coming from Syria referring to the moral 
obligation of saving lives. Former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, in his speech in the National 
Assembly (Assemblée Nationale), echoed Hollande’s views by declaring that the EU had a 
historical responsibility in the management of the migrant crisis and firmly stated that the right 
 
 
of asylum was a fundamental right. According to the former Prime Minister, France was under 
moral obligation to welcome those who had been persecuted for their ideas. Among others, he 
agreed with the Commission on the need to welcoming and relocating persons in need for 
international protection. France agreed to take 24,000 persons in two years (Valls, 2015). Later, 
Manuel Valls clarified that France was willing to accept 30,000 but “no more than that” while 
also emphasized the need to differentiate between persons asking for asylum and economic 
migrants avoiding a situation in which “everybody comes [in Europe]” (EurActiv, 2015). 
It is hardly surprising that migration continued to be a central political topic in the 2017 
presidential election. With presidential elections of 2017 coming closer, the debate on 
immigration intensified in France. In a closing ceremony of a summer school organized by the 
FN, Marine Le Pen declared that France had a puppet government and that France was not 
anymore a State; instead it became a vassal State of other great powers. She argued that this is 
an economic migration and thus creates burdens for the country. Le Pen sought to repeal the 
law of the soil, state medical aid for irregular foreigners and the free movement provided by the 
Schengen Agreement. She saw direct links between migration and the increased terrorist attacks 
in Europe (Faye, 2015). Horrified by the migrants around Calais, she proposed the suspension 
of Schengen Agreements, drastic reform of the right of asylum and immediate expulsion of all 
illegal immigrants (Le Pen, 2015a). 
The program of the FN included the “divide by 20” promise meaning that the party sought to 
reduce, within five years, the number of legal migrants from 200,000 to 10,000. The President 
of the party declared that only those could qualify as a legal migrant who are well educated and 
whose competences are greatly needed in certain French economic sectors while also foresaw 
the prohibition of family reunification (Mathiot, 2015). In the run up of 2017 presidential 
election, the question of identity and migration dominated Le Pen’s campaign (Faye, 2017). In 
her programme, Le Pen devoted five points related to the question of migration: (1) restoring 
national borders and leave the Schengen area; (2) making impossible the naturalization of 
illegal foreigners; (3) reduce legal immigration to an annual of 10,000 people and putting to 
end the automatic family reunification as well as the automatic acquisition of French nationality 
by marriage; (4) repealing the law of the soil; (5) and returning to the “original spirit” of the 
right of asylum which can only be granted following a request by French embassies and 
consulates in the country of origin (Le Pen, 2017). 
François Fillon sought to limit and reduce migration to France. He called for changing the 
Constitution by fixing a quota on how many residence permits could be issued. He also sought 
to renegotiate, at EU level, directives on migration to regain ‘migratory sovereignty’. The right-
wing politician would have limited family and accommodation allowances to those residing in 
France for 2 years or more (Wolff, 2017). François Fillon, in his presidential programme, had 
five key points with regard to migration: (1) reducing legal migration to the absolute minimum 
by, for example, establishing in the Constitution that the number of migrants is maximized 
every year, (2) making migration no longer a burden by, for example, paying family allowance 
or housing benefits only to those who reside in France for more than two years, (3) putting an 
end to illegal migration and the misuse of the right of asylum, (4) refounding the Schengen 
Treaty, and (5) giving French nationality only to those who clearly assimilated (Fillon, 2017). 
Macron openly supported Angela Merkel’s open-door policy and considered the welcoming of 
refugees as a moral duty. He considered as a duty to offer asylum to those who are persecuted 
and ask for international protection while the EU’s role was to help treat the causes of migration. 
In this context, France must take its fair share in welcoming refugees. Macron added, however, 
that those who do not qualify the essential criteria, must be returned to the border. Macron set 
out 4 objectives: (1) integration should be in the centre of policy by mastering the language and 
knowing the values of the Republic, (2) promoting an immigration of knowledge implying, for 
 
 
example, giving so-called “talent passports” to highly qualified people and invite them to work 
in France; (3) assuming fair share in welcoming refugees while taking back those are not acted 
to the border and (4) protecting European borders (En Marche, 2017). 
Benoît Hamon, supported by the Socialists and Greens, took also a more liberal stance on 
immigration. He sought to give the right to vote to foreigners in local elections and would have, 
if elected, increased the pace of integration of asylum seekers. Hamon was in favour of giving 
opportunities, especially jobs, to foreigners and allow them to learn French. He also foresaw 
the elimination of the Dublin system given its failure to distribute asylum seekers in a fairer 
way. Instead, he was in favour of a system of redistribution which reflects the capabilities of 
EU Member States to welcome asylum seekers (Wolff, 2017). 
In the second round of the Presidential election, Emmanuel Macron won the presidency who 
received 66.1% of the votes whereas his counterpart, Marine Le Pen received 33.9% of the 
votes in 2017 (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2017). This win by Macron has had significant impact 
on how France has handled EU migration crisis since 2017, as demonstrated by the next 
subsection (2.2). In general, Macron was in favour of welcoming people in need of international 
protection and was honouring its EU law obligations. However, France – contrary to Germany 
– was more vocal in expressing its limit on how many asylum seekers it can welcome, partly 
due to political reasons. 
2.1.2. Relevance of different arguments used for or against immigration in the political 
and public debate 
At political level, moral and economic reasons were both considered. François Hollande, for 
instance, put the emphasis on the moral obligations of France to take in refugees. The former 
president argued, for instance, that “it is the vocation of France to welcome those who are 
persecuted for their ideas or exposed to risks for their integrity. The French government […] 
will not question [...] the right […] for all those who […] undergo violence or oppression” 
(Valls, 2015). In other speeches Hollande emphasized that the “humanitarian situation is not 
acceptable” (Hollande, 2015a) and “[Europe] must be able to offer answers to everything [and] 
France must itself take her share and even more than her share, because that is her honour and 
her duty”. Hollande further emphasized that the main objective is “a humanitarian objective: 
[…] saving human lives” (Hollande, 2015b). Socialists, in general, emphasized the collective 
gain of immigration and a chance for France while recognized that the number of economic 
migrants should, in some ways, limited and the fight against illegal migration (Commin, 2016). 
His successor, Emmanuel Macron, shared this idea and declared that France needs to approach 
the question of migration in a human but effective way: “we must as quickly as possible give 
asylum to those who need our protection with the desire to integrate those who have the right 
to asylum much more effectively, with French courses and a more effective employment 
policy” (NouvelObs, 2019). While Macron also emphasized that France has a moral obligation 
to welcome persons in needs he strongly declared that “France cannot welcome everyone if it 
wants to welcome well [persons in needs]” (LePoint, 2019). 
Marine Le Pen’s main argument against immigration – which is widely shared by the French 
population and is reflected in different public surveys – was that immigration creates downward 
pressure on wages and leads to increased unemployment while the immigrants take the jobs of 
French people (Mathiot, 2011). The leader of the populist right wing party argued that 1% 
increase in immigration leads to a 1.2% drop in wages (Mathiot, 2011). Another argument made 
by Le Pen, which is also widely shared by the public, was that migration brought the new 
terrorist attacks in Europe: brining thousands of men from countries in conflict, in which ISIS 
and other terrorist organizations exist, without serious checks on arrival, was a matter of 
concern. Le Pen also argued that the rights and equality of women would also be question due 
 
 
to migration (Le Pen, 2016). Identity related questions were also raised by the leader of National 
Rally: “the ghettos, inter-ethnic conflicts, community claims and politico-religious 
provocations are the direct consequences of massive immigration that undermines our national 
identity and brings with it an increasingly visible Islamization” (Commin, 2016). 
Sarkozy, former president and one of the leading figures of the right-wing political party, 
seemed to be in between the two camps. Sarkozy argued that the question was not about closing 
the borders (as Le Pen suggested) or opening them (as suggested by Hollande/Macron) but to 
take the question seriously and make distinction between political and economic migrants 
(Sarkozy, 2015). The ambivalent position may be summarized by the following statement made 
by Sarkozy: “immigration is an asset but can also be a problem”. Sarkozy basically agreed with 
the Front National’s proposals to lower the number of legal migrants. Sarkozy also sought to 
make family reunification conditional on knowledge of the French language and restrict social 
benefits for foreigners (Commin, 2016), both proposals echoed by public opinion polls. On the 
one hand, Sarkozy firmly rejected the Le Pen’s inhuman approach and emphasized the Christian 
roots of the French society. By saying that “each life has its value”, Sarkozy wanted to 
emphasize that France needs to take a humanitarian approach. On the other hand, he also 
emphasized the importance of French identity (Sarkozy, 2015). 
A public survey conducted in 2017 by Ipsos on the attitude in relation to immigration and the 
migration crisis found that 85% of French people believed that the number of immigrants 
increased while only 14% agreed with the statement that the impact of immigration has a 
positive impact on France. 53% believed that there were too many immigrants in France and 
55% also believed that they were putting pressure on the public services. 46% agreed that 
borders must be closed and only 12% believed that France was effective in its management of 
the crisis, and 11% that the EU was effective. The ratio of French people who believed that 
terrorists mix with migrants is high (75%) (Ipsos, 2017). 
Another public survey conducted in 2017 by IFOP (Institut français d'opinion publique) found 
that 85% of the French population perceived that immigration increased of which 62% believed 
that that immigration highly increased. In addition, a large part of the population (56%) 
negatively experienced the impact of immigration on the country and only 16% believed that it 
had positive effect on French society. The argument that immigration benefits the country’s 
cultural life is overwhelmingly rejected (51% of the population rejects this statement of which 
nearly a third firmly rejects). 85% agrees with the statement that a refugee who wants to live in 
France should also learn the French language. Beside culture and identity related arguments, 
the majority (55%) also rejects the economic argument that immigration brings new talents and 
opportunities. There is only 20% that believes in the positive impact of immigration on the 
cultural and economic life of the country while about a quarter of the population neither agrees 
nor disagrees with these statements (Ifop, 2017). 
It is also remarkable how certain arguments made by the National Rally in the last 30-40 years 
are echoed in the public opinion. For example, the idea that immigrants receive public aids and 
use public services even if they have made no contribution in back is supported by 65% of the 
population. 51% also believes that immigrants are considered as priority compared to 
established residents in terms of public aids. Another argument of the FN based in which French 
people face difficulties in finding jobs due to immigrants is also supported by 40% of the 
population while 56% agrees that immigrants are often ready to work for lower salaries than 
French workers (Ifop, 2017). 
2.2. Policy in action 




Based on the two decisions providing for the relocation of 160,000 asylum applicants were due 
to be relocated from Italy and Greece over a two-year period (by September 2017). Article 12 
of the two legally binding Decisions foreseeing the relocation of 160,000 applicants provided 
that the Commission would publish a report every 6 months on the implementation of these 
Decisions. Based on the decisions, 39600 asylum applicants from Italy and 66400 from Greece 
(in total: 106,000) were due to be relocated from these countries by September 2017 while 
further 54,000 were assigned to be relocated from Italy and Greece before September 2016. In 
line with their opt-outs, the UK and Ireland were not bound by the Council Decisions but the 
latter decided to opt-in and took applications from both Italy and Greece. In addition, Dublin 
Associated States, such as Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland expressed their willingness to 
take part in the relocation scheme (European Commission, 2016a). 
The overall performance of France in terms of implementation of EU policies was relatively 
high compared to other Member States. The relocation process and implementation of EU 
policies started very slowly and showed a continued unwillingness by the majority of the 
Member States to fully comply with their EU law obligations. By early 2016, only 937 people 
were relocated from Italy and Greece (European Commission, 2016a). By early 2017, between 
15% and 18% of the planned relocations were implemented by EU Member States. Some of 
them complained that the low implementation rate was partly due to the fact that certain 
applicants were non-eligible for relocation. As can be seen from Figure 1, France relocated the 
most asylum seekers (2,696 relocations) until early 2017 followed by Germany (1,349), the 
Netherlands (1,274), Portugal (922), Finland (919), Spain (745), Romania (558), Ireland (241), 
Lithuania (229), and Luxemburg (226). Three Member States (Austria, Hungary and Poland) 
decided not to resettle any asylum-seekers (Guild et al., 2017). By mid-2017, this number did 
not grow considerably but France took, in accordance with its EU law obligations, a few 








Figure 1. EU Member States and two associated countries that relocated the most refugees 
until early 2017  
 
Source: (Guild et al., 2017) 
 
 
The nominal numbers may not be well suited to measure whether EU Member and Associated 
States have complied with their obligations to relocate asylum seekers. Table 1 shows the 10 
best performing states in terms of relative relocation. Apart from non-EU Member States, the 
top 3 best performing EU countries were Malta, Finland and Latvia (Guild et al., 2017). 
 
Table 1. The 10 best performing (Member) States in terms of relative relocation until early 
2017  
Member State Relocated Responsibility Percentage 
(Lichtenstein) 10 10 100% 
Malta 80 131 61,1% 
(Norway) 493 995 49,5% 
Finland 919 2078 44,2% 
Latvia 197 481 41% 
Luxemburg 226 557 40,6% 
Ireland 241 600 40,2% 
Lithuania 229 671 34,1% 
(Switzerland) 368 1080 34,1% 
Portugal 922 2951 31,2% 
Estonia 78 329 23,7% 
Slovenia 124 567 21,9% 
Netherlands 1274 5947 21,4% 
Source: (Guild et al., 2017) 
 
By 31 May 2018, more than 34,000 asylum seekers were relocated although the rate of 
implementation remained uneven between EU Member States. In nominal sense, France 
remained in the forefront (with 5029 relocations representing 25.5% of its full commitment) 
but was preceded by Germany (with 10825 relocations representing 39.3% of its full 
commitment). As shown by Figure 2, they were followed by Sweden (with 3,048 relocations), 







Since then, no major steps have been taken in relocation and the Commission emphasizes the 
voluntary nature of that mechanism. It, however, proposed financial support for those Member 
States willing to take part in the relocation activities. In the meantime, the asylum requests 
remain high (around 500,000 applications were lodged in the EU in 2019) whereby France, 
Germany, Spain, Greece and (before Brexit) the UK received the more representing more than 
72% of the total. France and Germany the remain the main destination countries for asylum 
seekers (European Commission, 2019a). 
2.2.2. Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
The Asylum Procedures Directive provides that EU Member States are under legal obligation 
to register applications of people for international protection between 3 or 6 working days after 
the application has been made.2 This timeframe was not respected in some cases, in particular 
by France where identification and registration procedures took more time than prescribed. In 
certain cases, asylum seekers were required to wait more than two months before given an 
appointment at the Prefecture and thus remained undocumented not entitled to receive any 
allowances (FRA, 2018). 
The Asylum Procedures Directive also provides that the examination procedure of asylum 
requests must be concluded within 6 months after the application has been lodged.3 There were 
signs that EU Member States, in particular France, sought to accelerate these procedures and 
tried to comply with EU law obligations. However, the acceleration of procedures led to poor 
quality interviews and decision-making capability of French authorities (FRA, 2018). 
The Reception Conditions Directive provides that asylum seekers and returnees must be placed 
in specialised detention facilities.4 However, some EU Member States, including France, 
provided only inadequate conditions in certain detention and/or pre-removal facilities (FRA, 
2018). The Return Directive regulates, among other things, the detention of migrants in an 
irregular situation, including the limited possibility to detain children. It emphasizes that 
children should be detained only as a last resort and if no other, less coercive measure exists. 
In some EU Member States, a high number of children were detained (e.g. in Bulgaria or 
Greece), whereas in others (e.g. in France) children were detained under poor conditions and 
were placed in pre-removal detention without individual assessments. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which came into direct effect in 
2009 in the EU, provides that unaccompanied children are supposed to make full use of their 
right of asylum, including the access to information or legal representation. In certain parts of 
France, children were refused to tell their age but other Member State authorities (e.g. in 
Hungary or Italy) also refused to give children the benefit of the doubt concerning their age 
(FRA, 2018). 
The Commission, within the framework of infringement proceedings, sent a formal letter of 
notice to France (as well as for 17 other Member States) for failing to communicate national 
measures taken to fully transpose two Directives, in particular the above mentioned Asylum 
Procedure Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive in September 2015 (European 
Commission, 2015). Based on the annual reports of the European Asylum Support Office, no 
                                                     
2 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection. 
3 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures 
for granting and withdrawing international protection. 
4 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for 




infringements proceedings were launched against France which means that it is currently or has 
successfully transposed the Directives into national legislations (EASO, 2018, 2019). 
 
3. Immigration as a legal issue 
The legal and policy framework on migration has evolved considerably in the last couple of 
decades. While French policy-makers have always sought to limit migration, the country 
received on average 100,000 applicants per year, including students or persons asking for 
family reunification. In the 1990s, the Pasqua Laws – named after the former interior minister 
Charles Pasqua – sought to limit this number and achieve a downward trend (possibly to zero) 
in the number of legal entries into France. It thus prohibited foreign graduates to accept 
employment offers, augmented the time for family reunification and refused to issue residence 
permits to foreign spouses who had resided in France illegally. While attempts were made in 
the late 1990s to increase the legal pathways to migration, the early 2000s saw an opposite trend 
whereby increased border controls and expulsions characterized the asylum system (Fine, 
2019). 
The High Integration Council defined, for the first time in 1991, integration as both a process 
and policies. It is a process because all the people living in France are called to participate in 
the construction of a society based on the respect of shared values. It is also a set of policies 
which aim to commit migrants to respect the principles on which the French republic is founded 
and to learn the French language. In 2014, the government further clarified the definition of 
integration and decided to distinguish between newcomers whose reception and integration are 
the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior while foreigners permanently settled in France 
fall under common law policies (European Commission, 2020). This means that they will be 
treated as any other French citizen and thus specific measures for refugee populations are 
regarded as unnecessary tools (Fine, 2019). 
The current institutional and legal architecture of migration policy is a complex system, 
including old and newly created entities with sometimes overlapping responsibilities and recent 
laws adapted to the new migratory situation. The Ministry of Interior (Ministère de l'Intérieur) 
is responsible for migration and asylum policies in France while it also oversees, together with 
the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, the issue of visas, the entry of foreign nationals 
and stay. It also steps up against illegal migration and fights against illegal employment 
(Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2020b). Two new officials were appointed by the Minister of Interior 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs: an ambassador for migration in mid-2017 responsible to 
better control migration flows and an interministerial delegate in early 2018 to evaluate the 
reception of refugees and integration policy (European Commission, 2019b). 
The law of 29 July 2015, which was adopted as part of the reform process of the right of asylum, 
implemented several EU practices (such as acceleration of asylum seeker process, improved 
distribution of the asylum seekers on the territory, improved housing conditions and provided 
better financial assistance to families). It also established the first-contact orientation platforms 
(Structure du Premier Accueil des Demandeurs d’Asile, the SPADAs, run by NGOs, whereby 
applicants must pre-register themselves after which they are sent to OFPRA to proceed with 
the asylum application (European Commission, 2019b). OFPRA, working under the authority 
of the Ministry of Interior, is in charge of the application of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 relating to the status of refugees and decides on the asylum and statelessness requests 
(OFPRA, 2018b). 
With regard to the implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the 




applications and to improve the conditions for receiving asylum seekers. Activity levels in 
accordance with the Dublin Regulation rose considerably due to increased secondary 
movements in 2017 (European Commission, 2018). In 2018, French policy-makers decided to 
continue with the reforms of the asylum system. Despite criticism by UNHCR and civil society 
organizations, France adopted the Law of 10 September 2018 on migration and asylum5 which 
allegedly decreases radically migrants’ rights and access to asylum, e.g. in the field of judicial 
protection (Fine, 2019). French policy-makers set out three main objectives by adopting this 
new piece of national legislation: (a) revising integration policy, (b) accelerate the process of 
asylum applications and better distribute applicants across the country while reducing the 
possibility to register applications at the one-stop shop as well as (c) improve the effectiveness 
of the removal policy (European Commission, 2018). From an EU law perspective, the Law of 
10 September 2018 implemented the EU’s Students and Research Directive which aims to 
attract talented foreign nationals with simplified immigration rules.6 
In 2018, French policy-makers decided to introduce new reforms in view of the new situation 
on Europe’s borders. Created by the law of 7 March 2016, the main instrument used by France 
to integrate foreigners is the so-called Republican Integration Contract (Contrat d'Intégration 
Républicaine (CIR)).7 Codified by L. 311-9 of the Code Governing the Entry and Residence of 
Aliens and the Right of Asylum, it is concluded between the French state and non-European 
foreigners who seek to settle permanently in France. After signature, the applicant is under legal 
obligation to participate in training with a view to integrate him/herself in the French society 
and is called upon to respect the values of French society (Service Public, 2019c). Trainings 
include civic and language courses, including to learn about French institutions, fundamental 
freedoms, citizenship, history of France and European integration as well as French language 
(OFII, 2020). If someone seeks to receive a resident card, he/she will be asked to achieve level 
A2 in CEFRL language exam and adhere to the principles of the French Republic (OFII, 2020). 
In general, the laws of 7 March 2016 and 10 September 2018 introduced new policy tools in 
the reception and integration of third country nationals (TCNs). In general, TCNs are required 
to possess a valid travel document and a valid visa in order to be able to enter into French 
territories. They are also obliged to evidence whether they have accommodation, documents 
verifying their conditions of stay and sufficient financial means. Short stay visas, if received, 
are limited to 90 days while long stay visa or residence permit allow its holder to reside in 
France more than three months. Temporary residence permits, on the other hand, can only be 
used for a stay no longer than one year and can only be issued to persons with sufficient own 
resources, internships, employment, private of family reasons (European Commission, 2019b). 
Asylum seekers, in principle, cannot ask for citizenship whereas refugees have access to it once 
they receive their protection status (Fine, 2019). The conditions to acquire French citizenship 
are manifold. One has to be adult and lived in France for at least 5 years. This minimum length 
of residence is not required, however, if someone has a refugee status, has lived in a 
francophone country, done a military service in France or done exceptional services to France 
(Service Public, 2019a). In 2017, 114,300 people received French citizenship which represents 
a 4.1% decrease compared to 2016. The main cause behind this decrease was that less people 
asked French nationality due to reason of marriage (Insée, 2019). 
                                                     
5 Loi n° 2018-778 du 10 septembre 2018 pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d'asile effectif et une intégration 
réussie. 
6 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, 
pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. 




French policy-makers also decided to increase the reception capacities within the framework of 
the national reception programme (Dispositif national d’accueil): the latter’s capacity was 
double compared to 2012 to reach almost 85,000 places available for asylum seekers, mostly 
located in Ile-de France, Auvergne-Rhone-Alpes and Grand Est. In addition, it was also decided 
to create 200 places in reception and assessment centres (centres d’accueil et d’évaluation des 
situations) per region and establish appropriate accommodation for people covered by the 
Dublin Regulation. Despite increased reception capacity, however, is insufficient to 
accommodate all asylum seekers. 
The law on asylum in France, in principle, excludes the possibility to work as an asylum seeker 
until applications are validated. The Office of Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(Office francais de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, OFPRA) must, in accordance with the 
law on asylum, rule on the asylum application within nine months before asylum seekers could 
apply for any job. Even if a positive decision has been made, however, this group of people 
face many administrative and legal obstacles to get an employment in France. 
On the other hand, refugees are allowed to apply for different positions once they receive their 
protection status. After this official status has been given, the person is entitled the right to a 
10-year residence permit (except in cases of threat to public order or situation of polygamy). 
Refugees aged between 16 and 25 are asked to register with the so-called Local Missions 
(Mission Locale). Refugees over 25 years old are also allowed to benefit from the Active 
Solidary Income (Revenu de Solidarité Active) which provides people without resources a 
minimum level of income. Those who are beneficiaries of the Active Solidary Income must 
register themselves at Pôle Emploi which is an organization responsible for the support of 
unemployed people (Service Public, 2020b). However, the refugee status can be removed if 
someone is willing to be placed under the protection of the country of origin, if a refugee 
receives the nationality of the country or the circumstances justifying the refugee status have 
ceased to exist. The French legal system also allows individuals to be rejoined by family 
members (especially spouse, children under 19 years old, adopted children and children who 
are under parental authority) (France terre d’asile, 2020). 
Nonetheless, refugees face difficulties on the labour market due to the length of administrative 
procedures, inadequate language skills, lack of professional experience in France and the 
recognition of foreign diplomas as well as the lack of social networks. In addition, some 
employment opportunities are limited to French people, especially in the field of civil service 
or lawyers or are conditional upon a diploma (Fine, 2019). Furthermore, national statistics show 
that the unemployment rate of foreigners from outside the EU was 2,8 times higher than that of 
French people. Approximately 6% of the French workforce are foreigners who are 
overrepresented among workers (11% are foreigners) and underrepresented among the 
intermediate professions (3%) and managers (5%). 
In the field of economic migration, the Law of 7 March 2016 transposed an EU directive on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-
corporate transfer.8 It introduced important changes in welcoming third-country nationals and 
strengthened the reception of talented and skilful people (European Commission, 2019b). The 
same legal instrument was used to transpose another EU directive on the harmonisation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of non-automatic 
                                                     
8 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry 




weighing instruments.9 In general, third country nationals are required to have a valid travel 
document and a valid visa in order to legally enter the territory of France. Long stay visas are 
only required if an applicant seeks to reside more than three months. French authorities further 
require proof of accommodation, documents on the conditions of stay and proof of financial 
means. Temporary residence permits are issued for a maximum duration of one year and can 
be asked by applicants with their own financial resources. It can be extended for four additional 
years if the conditions of issuance of temporary permit are still met (European Commission, 
2019b). Furthermore, French authorities may give a “talent passport” to any non-European 
individual who is highly qualified and is willing to create a company or is ready to invest in 
France (Passeport talent, 2020). 
Third-country nationals, in order to be able to work in France, are required to obtain a permit 
in the form of a visa, a residence permit or a dedicated authorization. The work permit, issued 
by the Regional Directorates for Companies, Competition, Consumption, Work and 
Employment, however, is not necessary if the afore mentioned talent passport is received. The 
latter allows any individual to exercise a salaried professional activity without work permit. The 
requirement to obtain a work permit is also needless if a third country national seeks to carry 
out a professional activity for three months in a sector needed for the French economy 
(European Commission, 2019b). 
While France remains the most welcoming EU Member State, it takes its fight against irregular 
migration rather seriously.  Foreigners willing to come to France must be authorized to do so 
as previous sections have shown. Without a valid residence permit, a foreigner may be 
identified as an irregular migrant and will be required to return to his/her country of origin. If 
he/she denies returning voluntarily, French authorities will force him/her and will place him/her 
under an administrative detention centre. The latter was established by the law of 29 October 
1981 and now 25 of them exist across the country. They are not considered as prisons because 
the deprivation of liberty is not based on judicial but rather on an administrative decision and 
is not coercive. According to Article L. 551-1 of the Code for Entry and Residence of Foreigners 
and the Right of Asylum (Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile 
(CESEDA)), a person can only be placed or kept in detention for a strictly limited time period 
and, in principle, valid for five days which can amount, in certain cases, to 20 or 45 days. In 
France, the average length of detention is around 11 days (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2014). 
In 2018, 24 496 people were kept in detention which represents a drop from previous year 
(26 003). There were political attempts, especially after the Marseille attack committed by an 
illegal migrant who should have been placed in detention, to increase the numbers in detention 
centres. However, according to critiques, the challenge for the French government does only 
lie in the places but also related to time: some of the detainees are released before the end of 
the maximum period enabled by the law either because the judge considers that the procedures 
were poor or because they consider that the constraint of confinement is simply 
disproportionate. Overall, however, the measures taken by the French authorities have resulted 
in an increase in evictions but not in a dramatic proportions. In 2018, 15,677 people were 




                                                     
9 Directive 2014/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of non-automatic weighing 




Figure 3. Non-EU nationals having received, in 2018, an obligation to leave the territory 
 
Source: Dumitru, 2019 
 
The term “irregular migrants” may not only be applied to people living in France without 
authorisation but also to individuals who live in France for years and then become “sans-
papiers” (people without official papers). For instance, foreign students are simply not allowed 
to work more than 60% of the legal working time. If they exceed this threshold, they risk the 
refusal to renew or even withdraw of their residence permit and become “sans-papiers”. Figure 
3 shows that France expelled the greatest number of people from its own territory. Its main 
expulsion instrument is the so-called the obligation to leave French territory (L’obligation de 
quitter le territoire français (OQTF)) which is decided by the prefect and requires an individual 
to leave France within 30 days or without delay in more limited situations (Service Public, 
2019b). An individual may also be banned to return to French territory (L’interdiction de retour 
sur le territoire français (IRTF)) which is also decided by the prefect. In both decisions, appeals 
are possible and can be cancelled by a judge or repealed by the administration. Individuals 
disrespecting these decisions may face criminal sanctions (Service Public, 2020a).  
 
4. Synthesis 
France, often considered as a land of welcome (terre d’acceuil), has always been exposed to 
the question whether to accept requests of stay on its own territory. However, from a historical 
perspective, France was clearly amongst first countries to recognize the importance of the right 
of asylum leaving the impression that it has always been willing to welcome people under 
persecution. Of course, this principle has not always been applied coherently and, as this report 
has showed, France was willing to limit the rights of foreigners multiple times, including their 
rights to apply to and take vacant positions. It was nevertheless willing to welcome refugees 
and sought to integrate them in its society by requiring them to accept the values of the Republic 




The EU, including France, however, faced a dramatic situation in 2015 and was forced to enact 
measures of cooperation in the field of migration and home affairs. The French government did 
not only support the proposals of the Commission to relocate people in need for international 
protection but, in fact, it played a major role, together with Germany, in promoting policy tools 
that enhance Europe’s capabilities in the field of migration policy and distributes refugees 
across the EU on the basis of (economic) performance of the Member States. Emmanuel 
Marcon as well as his predecessor, François Hollande, emphasized the responsibility of France 
in welcoming people in clear need of international protection but made clear that the country 
has its own limits determined mainly by domestic political factors. 
Within this context, it is hardly surprising that France was willing to play a key role in the 
migration crisis when it faced an almost unprecedented level of pressure on its migration policy. 
In fact, France was amongst the best performing EU Member States by relocating high numbers 
of people in clear need of international protection from Greece and Italy. The French 
government saw the two Council Decisions as part of the solidarity measures that were taken 
at EU level with the primary aim to alleviate the (unforeseen) burdens on two Mediterranean 
(and other) Member States. At the same time, the French government was constrained by 
domestic political factors: it feared that the extreme right would have considerably grew if it 
had declared an open and unlimited access to its welfare system to every single asylum seeker. 
In fact, it emphasized multiple times that the country was on the edge of its capabilities and that 
it simply could not take in everybody. 
The legal system was also affected by and adjusted to the new situation. In particular, French 
policy-makers decided to reform the process of the right of asylum by speeding up the timescale 
for asylum requests, balanced the distribution of the asylum seekers in the country, improved 
the housing conditions and created new financial opportunities for families in clear need of 
international protection. The legislative process, however, was not without criticisms: NGOs, 
in particular, raised their voices for the lack of judicial tools available for asylum seekers whose 
rights were allegedly undermined by the new national measures. At the same time, the French 
government took care of foreigners whose skills are necessary in different French (business) 
sectors and created the “talent passport” for all those individuals who could contribute to the 
French economy in a meaningful way (in the interest of France). 
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1. Background information  
Germany has a population of 80,159,662 (July 2020 est.). The country is the most populous 
country in Europe, and particularly the far western part of the industrial state of North Rhine-
Westphalia attracts larger and denser populations. Roman Catholic make up 27.7%, Protestant 
25.5%, Muslim 5.1%, Orthodox 1.9% other Christian 1.1% (other 9% and none 37.8%) the 
country’s religion. Regarding the population, it is composed by the following ethnic groups: 
German is far the biggest with 87.2%, followed by Turkish with 1.8%, Polish with 1%, Syrian 
1% and other 9% (2017 est.). The net migration rate10 is 1.5 migrant(s)/1000 population (2020 
est.) that puts Germany on the 54th place on the world list (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). 
In 2015, Germany and the Russian Federation hosted the second and third largest numbers of 
international migrants11 worldwide (12 million each) (United Nations, 2015). Germany, the 
second top destination for migrants, has also observed an increase over the years, from 8.9 
million in 2000 to 13.1 million in 2019 (IOM, 2020). Germany remained the main OECD 
destination country in 2016, with over 1.7 million new international migrants (more than double 
the levels registered in 2000, but with a decrease compared with more than 2 million in 2015) 
arriving that year (IOM, 2020). The fifth-highest remittance-sending country in both 2016 and 
2017 was Germany (with total outflows of USD 20.29 billion and 22.09 billion, respectively) 
(IOM, 2020). Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to 
families or communities in their countries of origin. 
The country has been the most popular destination and host countries for asylum seekers in 
Europe in recent years, admitting approx. 1.5 million asylum seekers between 2014 and June 
2017, with the vast majority of asylum seekers arriving between July 2015 and February 2016. 
And as over 1.2 million first-time asylum applications were lodged in the EU member states in 
2015, Germany counted being the first destination country. The arrival numbers of asylum 
seekers in Germany, culminating in a maximum of 890,000 registered entries and 441,899 
asylum applications in 2015. As the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees fell behind in 
the registration and application procedures, the number of asylum applications continued to 
increase in 2016 (around 722,000 first time applications), even though the number of arriving 
asylum seekers dropped since the closure of the Balkan route in March 2016 (Glorius, 2018). 
By the end of 2017, 970,364 people were recognized as refugees under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention (compared with 121,837 in Britain and 337,143 in France). An additional 222,683 
claims for formal asylum were filed in 2017, and 185,853 more in 2018 (Tridafilos, 2019). 




                                                     
10 The net migration rate indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of population change. The net 
migration rate does not distinguish between economic migrants, refugees, and other types of migrants nor does it 
distinguish between lawful migrants and undocumented migrants. 




Table 1. Top ten country of origin of asylum seekers 2015-2018 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Syria 158 657 266 250 48 974 44 167 
Other 78 265 120 022 60 531 41 502 
Albania 53 805 14 853   
Kosovo 33 427    
Afghanistan 31 382 127 012 16 423 9942 
Iraq 29 784 96 116 21 930 16 333 
Serbia 16 700    
Not known 11 721 14 659 4067 4220 
Eritrea 10 876 18 854 10 226 5571 
Mazedonia 9 083    
Pakistan 8 199 14 484   
Iran  26 426 8608 10 857 
Nigeria  12 709 7811 10 168 
Russian 
Federation 
 10 985 4884 3938 
Turkey   8027 10 160 
Somalia   6836 5073 
Source: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/zahlen-zu-asyl/265710/demografie  
 
Germany listed Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as safe countries of origin in October 2015, 
and with the introduction of border controls along the Balkan route and the cooperation 
agreement with Turkey the arrival of asylum seekers significantly dropped.  
 
Table 2. Asylum seekers by age groups 2015-2018 
Age group 2015 2016 2017 2018 
0-15 26% 30% 39% 44% 
18-24 25% 24% 19% 15% 
25-29 15% 14% 11% 10% 
30-34 11% 10% 9% 9% 
35-39 7% 6% 6% 6% 
Other 16% 16% 16% 15% 
Source: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/zahlen-zu-asyl/265710/demografie 
 
Table 3. Gender/age breakdown of the total number of applicants 2015-2018 




Men 69% 66% 60% 57% 
Women 31% 34% 40% 43% 
Source: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/zahlen-zu-asyl/265710/demografie  
 
The largest number of refugees in Germany came from the Syrian Arab Republic (532,065), 
Iraq (136,463) and Afghanistan (126,018). These were followed by Eritrea (55,334), Iran 
(41,150), Turkey (24,036), Somalia (23,581), Serbia and Kosovo (9,155), 8,119 (Russia), 7,454 
(Pakistan), 6,453 (Nigeria) in 2005 (BMI, 2016). Still, in 2018, Germany was the only European 
country among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries. In 2018, Germany continued to host the 
largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and the fifth largest in the world. 
According to the results of the micro-census in 2016, more than 18.6 million people living in 
Germany (22.5% of Germany’s population) had a migration background. That includes nine 
million foreign nationals (10.9% of the population) as well as 9.6 million Germans (11.7% of 
the population). In absolute terms, Germany has by far the largest foreign-born population (10.1 
million). With over 13 million migrants in 2019, Germany had the largest foreign-born 
population of any country in Europe; the number of immigrants in the country increased by 
nearly 3 million between 2015 and 2019. 
The largest groups came from Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the 
Syrian Arab Republic;(IOM, 2020) followed by Turkish or Polish descent (15.1% and 10.1% 
respectively) and the Russian Federation (6.6%). 
 
Table 4. Germany Refugee Statistics 2015-2018 
Date Refugees Granted 
Asylum 
Annual % Change 
2015-12-31 316115 45.69 
2016-12-31 669482 111.78 
2017-12-31 970302 44.93 
2018-12-31 1063837 9.64 
Source: https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/DEU/germany/refugee-statistics  
 
The regional distribution of the population with migration background varies. The old West 
German states, especially the city states of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin, as well as the federal 
states of Hesse, Baden-Wurttemberg and North Rhine Westphalia have a high percentage of 
persons with a migration background: immigrants and their descendants represent more than 
26% of the population of these states. In contrast, the share of persons with migration 
background is less than 7% in all the “New Länder” (BPB, 2018). 
In 2016, there were a total of some 10 million foreign passport holders living in Germany. 18.6 
million persons had a migrant background, including immigrants, foreigners born in Germany, 
and persons who had a parent who was either an immigrant or a foreigner. The group thus 
accounts for over 22% of the total population. 9.6 million persons with a migrant background12 
                                                     
12 According to the definition applied by the Federal Statistics Office, a person is considered someone with a 





were German passport holders; of them, 42% have been German citizens since birth. A further 
33% themselves immigrated to Germany as (late) repatriates; the remaining 25% have taken 
German citizenship. In 2016 alone almost 110,400 foreigners acquired German citizenship 
(Deutschland.de, 2018). Regarding citizenship, the major reasons not to naturalise are 
restrictions on dual nationality in Germany.13 
 
2. Immigration as a political issue 
2.1.  Political context 
2.1.1. The positions of major domestic parties (including the parties in the government) 
on the problem of immigration and their evolution, relevance of the immigration issue in 
the national elections (2015-2018) 
In 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to leave German borders open to war refugees, 
mainly coming from Muslim countries, as a humanitarian necessity. It not only changed the 
ethnic, cultural and religious fabric of places and spaces of arrival, but also triggered an 
increasingly polemic discussion on security, identity and belonging within German society, 
which was also reflected by the election results of the parliamentary elections of 24 September 
2017 (Glorius, 2018). The surge in asylum applications in 2015–16 played a key role in spurring 
the success of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD)14 party in regional elections in 2016 
and the 2017 federal election. The AfD benefited from this emerging discontent, performing 
well in several regional elections in the spring of 2016. An anti-immigrant social movement 
called PEGIDA,15 which had been holding regular rallies in Dresden since 2015, also drew 
increasing support for its positions. The success of the AfD in the 2017 Bundestag election, in 
which it won 12.6% of the popular vote and 13% of the chamber’s seats,16 signaled to many 
that Germany had entered a new, troubling stage in its handling of immigration and diversity. 
The success of the AfD and far-right populist movements such as PEGIDA is undeniable, they 
were riding on the populism-wave, and the comfortable consensus that marked the years 
between 2005 and 2015 is over. Differences over matters of migration and integration between 
Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and Seehofer’s Bavaria-based Christian Social Union, 
the so-called ‘sister parties’, have weakened Merkel’s latest governing coalition since it was 
formed in March 2018 (Triadafilopoulos, 2019). Seehofer has made irregular migration a policy 
priority. In June 2018, he gave Merkel an ultimatum to find a bloc-wide solution to the question 
of migrants and refugees or face the possible collapse of her government (Deutsche Welle, 
2018). 
Once the refugee crisis broke out in the summer of 2015, the AfD further stressed its strong 
antimmigration position and criticized the welcoming asylum policy enacted by Chancellor 
Merkel. Moreover, the party gained a strong erelectoral support in East Germany, for instance, 
claiming 27% of the vote in the state of Saxony. Following the elections, the Union parties, the 
FDP and Alliance 90/The Greens started negotiations about a so-called ‘Jamaica coalition’. 
However, the negotiations failed by the end of the year, and no new government was formed in 
2017. Subsequently, CDU/CSU and SPD started coalition talks, which led to another ‘grand 
                                                     
13 At least one parent must be a German citizen or a resident alien who has lived in Germany at least 8 years. 
14 The AfD was founded in February 2013 as a single-issue party, criticizing the Euro, and more generally the 
European Union. In the federal election of 2013, the party gained 4.7% of the vote, reaching a near-success in such 
a short time since its founding, but missing the threshold of 5% to enter the parliament. After the election, the AfD 
began shifting its focus from the Euro crisis to the pressingissue of immigration. 
15 Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West. 
16 The AfD won 91 seats in the Bundestag, marking the first time an extreme right-wing party secured such 




coalition’ in March 2018. All parties represented in the Bundestag took a stance on migration, 
integration and asylum in their electoral programmes, and their views on specific measures and 
steering concepts differed markedly. These were following: 
a) Family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection  
It was one of the issues on which the debate focused. On 16 March 2016, the right to family 
reunification had been suspended for benefciaries of subsidiary protection. Originally, this 
suspension was to remain in place until 16 March 2018. The key question was now whether the 
suspension was to be prolonged beyond March 2018 or replaced by an alternative solution. The 
SPD was against a prolongation, the CDU/CSU supported a prolongation of the suspension, the 
AfD called for a permanent stop to family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection), while The Left demanded a resumption of family reunification for beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection. The Alliance 90/The Greens also supported “unbureaucratic family 
reunification” for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.  
A potential cap on the number of refugees which would be accepted in any given year was 
another key issue during the election campaign. The CSU repeatedly called for a limit of 
200,000 persons within the humanitarian admission per year during the election campaign. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) refused this and the CDU did not plan to introduce such a 
cap. After the elections, the two parties agreed on a common line and formulated that ‘a total 
of 200,000 admissions per year on humanitarian grounds (refugees and asylum seekers, 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, family reunification, relocation and resettlement, minus 
forced and voluntary returns of future beneficiaries of protection) shall not be exceeded’ while 
at the same time a commitment ‘to the right to asylum in the Basic Law and the Geneva 
Convention and to our  obligations under EU law to process any application for asylum’ was 
made. Alliance 90/ The Greens were against a cap. This cap and the discussion about family 
reunification were key issues during the negotiations about a potential CDU/CSU, FDP and 
Alliance 90/The Greens coalition after the elections; and they failed to agree.  
b) Integration policy 
In their electoral programme, the CDU/CSU called for binding agreements on integration 
measures: in case of a refusal to co-operate or non-compliance with the law there should be 
consequences “up to the loss of the right to stay”. The SPD’s electoral programme put education 
at the centre of integration policy and that “the necessary refugee integration measures have to 
be borne exclusively by the local authorities”. In this regard, in 2017, additional Länder 
introduced so-called residence obligations, which forces particular groups of beneficiaries of 
protection as well as certain other status groups to take up residence at a specific place (positive 
residence obligation) or restricts taking residence in specific places (negative residence 
obligation). The AfD demanded that immigrants with a permanent right to stay “assimilate”, 
saying that it was their duty to “adapt to their new home and to the German predominant 
common culture, not the other way round”. The FDP’s electoral programme claimed that 
current integration courses were only an “official minimum standard” and did not “meet the 
requirements of our modern immigration society any more”. The party called for a “new, 
modular integration programme which offers individualised support across several levels”. The 
Left emphasised that integration was a mutual process which was a task for both immigrants 
and society as a whole. Alliance 90/The Greens criticised in their electoral programme that the 
‘inhumane tightening of the asylum law in the last few years’ hampered integration. Among 
other things, the party called for an integration law, for access to integration courses regardless 
of the residence status and for decentralised refugee accommodation. 




For young migrants, a lot depends on the question whether they are legally adults or not. Their 
age has an impact on whether they are entitled to specific support for children and youths, 
whether child-specific bans on removal apply etc. That is why the question of how age is 
assessed has repeatedly been discussed in the last few years. By end 2017, the debate was 
fuelled once again by a media report which claimed that many unaccompanied minors lied 
about their age and by a murder in Kandel, where a jogger was killed by a refugee who had 
been registered as an unaccompanied minor, but was later found to be of age in a court ordered 
medical report. Several politicians called for a law to make medical age assessments obligatory. 
Expert associations have rejected these calls and pointed out that it is difficult to determine a 
person’s age and that errors are common. A heated debate focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of medical age determination methods and on the existing rules. Thomas de 
Maizière, who was minister of the interior at the time, demanded at the beginning of January 
2018 that Book VIII of the German Social Code be amended accordingly and that standardised 
procedures be developed. 
2.1.2. Relevance of different arguments used for or against immigration in the political 
and public debate 
The 2015 migration flows changed the ethnic, cultural and religious fabric of places and spaces 
of arrival, and generated debates on security, identity and belonging within German society. 
Asylum migration remained at the centre of the migration policy debate in 2016. Over the 
course of the year, the political, societal and administrative focus shifted gradually towards the 
integration of recognised refugees into society at the local level and voluntary and forced returns 
of those persons whose asylum applications had been rejected. At the start of 2016, the 
migration policy debate was shaped by the incidents during the new-year celebrations of 
2015/16 in Cologne and other German cities, where hundreds of women had experienced sexual 
assaults. Among the suspects were foreign as well as German nationals; among the non-German 
suspects there were numerous refugees (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2017).  
This was followed by a number of legal initiatives, including the Act on the Faster Expulsion 
of Criminal Foreigners and Extended Reasons for Refusing Refugee Recognition to Criminal 
Asylum Seekers or the Act on the Introduction of FastTrack Asylum Procedures (Asylum 
Package II). The latter introduced the possibility of fast-track procedures in special reception 
centres and restrictions to family reunification for certain beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. 
The adoption of the Act was preceded by controversial discussions both within the government 
coalition and broader society. Especially the restriction on family reunification was widely 
criticised by civil society groups and by the opposition (Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees, 2017).  
In 2016, the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States and the Turkish Prime 
Minister signed an agreement (EU-Turkey Agreement) which provides for the return to Turkey 
of all third-country nationals who irregularly entered the EU from Turkey and are not in need 
of protection, and for the admission of Syrian refugees from Turkey in the EU Member States.  
The agreement was criticised strongly by the opposition and by parts of German and European 
civil societyy (Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte (DIM), 2016; Elkenberg/Keßler, 2016; 
Deutschlandfunk, 2017). When in 2016 the border crossings along the Balkan route were 
successively closed, parts of the government welcomed this, whereas the chancellor stressed 
the importance of a European solution over the unilateral closing of borders (CDU/CSU 2016a; 
Zeit Online 2016). The EU-Turkey Agreement and the closure of the Balkan route led to a 




The integration of refugees was an important issue and numerous integration measures were 
introduced at the Federal, Land and local level. The civil society supported increasingly the 
asylum seekers and refugees in 2016. The entry into force of the Integration Act on 6 August 
2016 presented important positive changes in the integration for asylum seekers and for persons 
whose deportation has been suspended. However, several provisions, especially the 
differentiation according to the prospect to remain were subject to controversial debates. 
In autumn 2016, return policy increasingly became a central point of discussion within the 
migration policy debate, for example through the conclusion of an agreement with Afghanistan 
aimed at easing both forced and voluntary return procedures and as a result of which several 
collective deportations have taken place since December 2016. This was criticised by pointing 
out that Afghanistan is not a safe country for forced returns. The focus on return was reinforced 
through the attack on the Christmas market in Berlin on 19 December 2016 (Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees, 2017). According to the Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de 
Maizière, the preceding failed attempts to deport the person who later committed the attack 
were the reason to prepare a bill to improve the enforcement of the obligation to leave the 
country. The bill was adopted by the Federal Cabinet on 22 February 2017 (Jansen, 2016). 
Among other things, it foresees the examination of personal data from the smart phones of 
asylum seekers without their consent and the option to oblige them to remain in reception 
centres for a prolonged period of time (Kölner Stadtanzeiger, 2017; Jansen, 2016).  
The public and political debate following the attack can be seen in the context of individual 
attacks, assaults and other crimes perpetrated by or attributed to asylum seekers which sparked 
a broad and controversial debate. On the other side, the country also experienced a high degree 
of rejection and attacks on asylum seekers in 2016.  
The high number of newly arrived asylum seekers within a comparatively short space of time 
placed a huge burden on established administrative structures, accommodation at initial 
reception facilities, registration, the asylum procedure as well as the administrative courts that 
have had to deal with a significant increase in appeals against asylum decisions, follow-up 
accommodation and timely participation in society (Grote, 2018). Public discourses developing 
around the migration topic are also highly selective, often stereotypical, and tend to mingle 
various topics that are currently at stake in order to arrive at simplified solutions. This is the 
case in the recent debate on refugee migration in Europe, which relates to debates on culture, 
identity, security, criminality and religion and is increasingly instrumentalised by right wing 
parties, who collected a considerable share of votes during the last parliamentary elections 
throughout Europe (Glorius, 2018). Reforms to immigration, integration and citizenship 
policies introduced since the late 1990s have withstood the backlash. Although public opinion 
is not as favourable as it was before or during the 2015 refugee crisis, majority of younger 
Germans and residents of large cities and towns remain committed to diversity 
(Triadafilopoulos, 2019).  
There was unparalleled civic support for refugees which often enabled housing and supplies for 
the refugees since the public structures seemed to have been temporarily overstrained, 
considering the sheer number of asylum seekers. At the same time, violent acts against refugees 
and their accommodation facilities also increased significantly. Studies conducted by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation about the welcoming culture in Germany confirm this trend: Germany 
as an “open and mature society shaped by immigration” in 2015 and 2016, but scepticism 
towards immigrants has also grown. The study also shows that a society shaped by immigration 
is largely being viewed as normal by the younger generation. The future assessment of 
immigration will also depend on the successful integration refugees into society. Experiences 




employed within five years of arriving in Germany Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 
(BPB) (2018).  
2.2. Policy in action 
2.2.1. Assessment of the governmental position on immigration, together with the 
information on its evolution (2015-2018) 
The central point of the coalition agreement that the government intends to avoid any loss of 
control in the future: it aims at reinforcing efforts “to govern and to limit” migration towards 
Germany and Europe “so that a situation like in 2015 is not replicated” (Thym, 2018).  
Merkel opted to keep Germany’s borders open in late August 2015 as other countries in the 
region were closing theirs, declaring, “We can do this” (Wir schaffen das). At the end of August 
2015, according to article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation, Germany decided to examine asylum 
claims of Syrian citizens, without sending them back to the country of first entry. 
Germany was effectively committing to a permissive asylum policy. Some days later, she 
further stressed that there would be no legal limit to the number of refugees Germany would be 
accepting. Her message resonated around the world, signalling migrants the possibility to 
successfully seek asylum in Germany. Thus, the temporary asylum policy change (i.e., the 
suspension of the Dublin procedures), coupled with Merkel’s speech, constituted a “pull” effect 
for asylum seekers and migrants. Over one million asylum seekers entered Germany in 2015, 
leading to 476,649 applications for asylum that year and another 745,545 in 2016. But as of 21 
October 2015, Germany put the standard Dublin procedures back into place 
The years since 2015 undoubtedly have seen a strengthening of anti-immigrant sentiment 
among segments of the German population and the political class. This shift in the public mood 
has led to some important changes in policies: measures introduced to reassert control over 
migration flows have sharply reduced annual admissions of asylum seekers (Triadafilopoulos, 
2019). 
At the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016 that left 12 people dead. It was carried out 
with a truck by a failed Tunisian asylum seeker who had not been deported after his application 
was rejected. The grand coalition government responded to these developments by moving to 
reestablish control over Germany’s frontiers, reforming asylum policy, and redoubling efforts 
to process a massive backlog of asylum applications and speed the integration of those granted 
protected status. Rejectected were sent back to their countries of origin. Germany spearheaded 
a 2016 EU deal with Turkey aimed at stopping the flow of refugees to Europe. The Turkish 
government pledged to better control its coastlines and accept rejected asylum seekers in 
exchange for 6 billion euros (to help it meet the needs of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees it was 
sheltering) and the possibility of visa-free travel for Turks in the EU. These measures sharply 
reduced the number of asylum applications in 2017 and 2018. 
The peak of the refugee crisis in Germany was reached in the second half of 2015. The 
government enacted a permissive asylum policy, while the German Chancellor encouraged a 
welcoming culture, possibly further increasing arrivals. Starting from June 2015, the number 
of registrations in the EASY system was increasing at a higher pace than the number of asylum 
applications. After Merkel’s speech at the end of August, the German share of extra-EU first-
time asylum applications increased sharply (BAMF, 2017). 
The fact that the aspect of asylum is dominating political debates and the calls for limiting 
refugee migration are growing obscures the fact that Germany will have to continue to rely on 
immigration from abroad due its demographic development. The gradual opening of Germany 




more liberal immigration laws by the German industry have led to a reduction of migration 
barriers and a paradigm shift in migration policies. For some years now, representatives from 
politics and business have been discussing the development of a "welcome and recognition 
culture" in order to positively influence this decision. What is intended, is to increase Germany's 
attractiveness for potential (qualified) immigrants. The objective is to support a development 
of the state into a true "home" for migrants and their descendants. Initially, the term referred 
primarily to the influx of specialists but has been increasingly connected to the refugee issue 
since 2015 (BMI, 2016). 
During the summer of 2018, a fierce debate on how to counter “secondary movements” (to 
Germany) of potential asylum seekers took place inside the German government. The 
discussions nearly put an end to the parliamentary group between the CDU and the (Bavarian) 
CSU, which had existed with a very short interruption in 1976 since 1949. The CSU opted for 
full controls at the German-Austrian border and the refusal of entry for all persons that are not 
in the possession of valid documents for an entry to Germany. In this regard, German law should 
be applicable and so no Dublin procedure would be necessary. The CDU and in particular 
Chancellor Angela Merkel preferred a “European solution” in cooperation with the other 
Member States based on agreements under Article 36 of the Dublin III Regulation.17 This 
provision allows for Administrative Arrangements, one signed with Greece, one with Spain 
only for the purpose of “the exchange of liaison officers” and the “simplification of the 
procedures and shortening of the time limits relating to transmission and the examination of 
requests to take charge of or take back applicants.” 
As a compromise, the so-called “Asylkompromisse”, it was decided to extend the “fiction of 
non-entry” that applies to the (non-Schengen) transit zones (Transitzentren) of international 
airports to this border area. This fiction of non-entry should allow for controls on German soil 
and the refusal of entry would (legally speaking) push the person that had already reached 
German soil outside the territory into a perceived no man’s land between the controlling officer 
and the Austrian border. This effect might be called a “border spell” as the persons – unlike in 
the non-Schengen zone of an international airport – have already legally and physically crossed 
the border between the two states and had previously already entered the Schengen territory. 
According to its construction, the zone lies between the controlling officer and the physical 
Austrian border, and would be transformed by the refusal of entry into a non-Schengen territory 
and an EU Law free zone, where German national law and not the SBC or the Dublin III would 
be applicable (Hruschka, 2019). 
The German economy being Europe’s largest is a leading exporter of machinery, vehicles, 
chemicals, and household equipment. Germany benefits from a highly skilled labor force, but, 
like its Western European neighbors, faces significant demographic challenges to sustained 
long-term growth. Low fertility rates and a large increase in net immigration are increasing 
pressure on the country's social welfare system and necessitate structural reforms. Also, it is 
unsurprising Germany and Sweden are the favoured destinations. It is not financial assistance 
that attracts people per se, but some guarantee that the state will support them and enable them 
to become active members of society (Dimitriadi, 2016). 
Economic immigration, especially for highly skilled foreigners, remains a top priority. New 
policies, most notably the Integration Act of 2016, have been introduced to assist in the 
labormarket integration of refugees, an unheralded move that aims at both harnessing the influx 
of refugees for economic purposes and avoiding the mistakes of the past by making economic 
and social integration public-policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Skilled Immigration Act marks 
an important step towards the normalisation of German migration policy. Since the new law is 





limited to skilled labour migration, we can expect future governments to adopt bills playing 
with the “immigration” metaphor, and they may be eager to prevent European legislation from 
limiting their room for manoeuvre decisively. The Skilled Immigration Act shows that 
demographic change and the shortage of skilled labour in some labour markets is gradually 
resurfacing as an alternative reference point, for which the political dynamics are different, 
since the general public and most political parties tend to support moderately generous entry 
rules. Moreover, there can be feedback loops between the rules on labour migration and the 
debate on asylum (Thym, 2019). 
2.2.2. Challenges in implementation of the common EU migration policies in the relevant 
country 
There is an important debate about migration for economic purposes by third-country nationals. 
German debate on migration are safe countries of origin, dual citizenship or the upper limit, 
which both supporters and opponents employ as a symbol to demonstrate their general approach 
towards migration, asylum and integration policy.  
The so-called ‘upper limit’ became popular at the height of the “refugee crisis” to signal that 
uncontrolled immigration should come to an end (although the political justification shifted 
towards the administrative, social and financial limitations of integration efforts in the 
meantime). It was often associated with a possible rejection of the border, although the CSU 
never spelt out clearly what the upper limit concept might involve in practice.  
Reform of the Dublin Regulation has important legal and practical repercussions. Germany’s 
minister for the interior, Horst Seehofer, had famously dubbed the Western Balkans route the 
“reign of illegality” during 2015/16, thereby indicating that Germany’s open borders policy and 
“the wave-through approach” were contradicting the spirit of European rules: no more than 
10% of all surrender procedures initiated by domestic authorities were ‘successful’.  
During the crisis, asylum procedures were infamously lengthy and resulted in massive delays 
and quality deficits despite considerable efforts on the part of the federal asylum office to hire 
new staff and to increase efficiency. Moreover, swift asylum decisions are to be accompanied 
by more efficient return procedures, which is hardly surprising given that roughly half of all 
asylum applications are being rejected, if no protection status under German or European law 
is granted. As a result, there are more and more people in Germany which are obliged to leave 
the country, but do not do so, since German authorities are notoriously ineffective in complying 
with the EU law obligation for an effective return policy. 
The coalition agreement voiced explicit support for a “fair distribution mechanism” (which, in 
practice, would entail that less asylum seekers end up in Germany than under the Dublin III 
regime). Moreover, it reaffirmed that the primary responsibility of the state of entry shall be a 
‘paramount consideration’, while adding, somewhat ambiguously, that an unlimited jurisdiction 
of the state of entry cannot be the answer. 
It supports further harmonisation of asylum procedures and reception conditions, including the 
Commission’s proposal that full social benefits shall only be available in the Member State 
responsible under the Dublin rules.  
Moreover, there are abstract references to Frontex as a “veritable border police”, cooperation 
with UNHCR, IOM and countries of origin or transit, relocation and resettlement (depending 
on the number of entries via the asylum system) as well as the root causes of irregular migration 
– although the coalition agreement shies away from giving us detailed information of what that 
they want to do in practice. Finally, the government states that intra-Schengen border controls 
are “justified” for as long as the external EU borders are not “protected” effectively, thereby 




There was a lively and highly politicised debate over family reunion in Germany, which, for 
legal reasons, concentrated on those with subsidiary protection, since the EU legislature had 
laid down a generous regime for refugees under the Geneva Convention in the Family 
Reunification Directive by exempting the latter from the economic self-sufficiency, 
accommodation and integration requirements most third-country nationals (and German 
nationals) have to comply with. As a result, the Bundestag cannot change family reunification 
rules for Convention refugees. The political desire to curtail family reunification rules 
concentrated on those with subsidiary protection as a result. While German immigration law 
had originally applied the “ordinary” regime for third-country nationals, including the financial 
self-sufficiency requirement, the Bundestag had aligned rules for all beneficiaries of 
international protection in August 2015. These generous new rules were suspended a few 
months later at the height of the “refugee crisis” for a two-year period. In contrast to the heated 
debate on family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, other family migration 
issues do not feature in the agreement. The CDU did not insist on its earlier call for a revision 
of the Family Reunification Directive nor did the grand coalition revisit the long-standing 
debate on language requirements as a precondition for family reunification with third-country 
nationals or Germans. Of course, these questions may resurface during the next Parliament, but 
for the time being the grand coalition seems to be exhausted from discussions on subsidiary 
protection. 
2.2.3. Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
Some EU Member States, including Germany, argued that the operation ‘Mare Nostrum’ was 
an important pull factor for human smugglers and irregular immigrants, and served as a "bridge 
to Europe" as emohasised by the German interior minister de Maizière. The number of arriving 
refugees became a priority of the government, which sought to increase cooperation especially 
with Turkey to this end (Bundesregierung 2016f). On 18 March 2016, the Heads of State and 
Government of the EU Member States and the Turkish Prime Minister signed an agreement 
(EU-Turkey Agreement) which provides for the return to Turkey of all third-country nationals 
who irregularly entered the EU from Turkey and are not in need of protection, and for the 
admission of Syrian refugees from Turkey in the EU Member States (see Chapter 4.3.3). The 
agreement was strongly criticised.  
In February and March 2016, the border crossings along the Balkan route were successively 
closed by the neighbouring States. Parts of the government welcomed this, whereas the 
chancellor stressed the importance of a European solution over the unilateral closing of borders. 
Together with the EU-Turkey Agreement, the closure of the Balkan route led to a substantial 
decrease in the number of new arrivals from March 2016. In autumn 2016, return policy 
increasingly became a central point of discussion within the migration policy debate, for 
example through the conclusion of an agreement with Afghanistan aimed at easing both forced 
and voluntary return procedures and as a result of which several collective deportations have 
taken place since December 2016. This was criticised by representatives of the opposition, by 
welfare associations and by volunteers working with refugees who have repeatedly pointed out 
that Afghanistan is not a safe country for forced returns (see Chapter 7.3) The reasons for failed 
deportation attempts can be varied, but they include ongoing appeal processes, a lack of 
cooperation with authorities in the countries of origin of the migrants affected and also failed 
asylum seekers going into hiding. 
Furthermore, there has been a total ban on deportations to Syria due to the ongoing security 
situation there, meaning that even failed asylum seekers pegged for deportation would not be 




In 2016 only 272 people have been relocated from Greece and Italy out of the 120,000 that was 
originally agreed upon. Germany has presented the hotspots as a prerequisite for relocation, 
however, despite Italy having three hotspots, relocation numbers remain extremely low. This is 
partly due to the unwillingness of member states to put themselves forward for the challenge 
and partly due to flaws in the system (Dimitriadi, 2016).  
At the end of 2019, Germany has proposed an automatic relocation scheme for asylum seekers 
in which their applications would be examined at the EU's external borders. Key aims were to 
scrap the Dublin regulation under which asylum claims are dealt with in the country of first 
arrival. To reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the document calls for an 
initial assessment of asylum applications at the external border, a new regime for determining 
which member country is responsible for examining an application, and measures to stop 
asylum seekers moving illegally from one country to another. There is no new proposal on 
returning people to their home country, which is a key issue as less than half of rejected migrants 
are successfully returned. In the German plan, EASO, the EU agency for asylum, would be 
responsible for the asylum claim and would determine which member state is responsible for 
examining the asylum application. Regarding access to the welfare state: “accommodation and 
social benefits would be provided only in the member state responsible” but “social benefits 
should be funded EU-wide as far as possible” and “paid according to an index which would 
ensure that benefits are at an equivalent level across the EU, independent of the member state” 
(Barigazzi, 2019). Such an automatic relocation scheme is designed to be permanent and not 
merely used in a crisis, with several Member States regarding it that could make migration seem 
attractive. 
 
3. Immigration as a legal issue 
3.1. Brief description of the applicable legal framework in a relevant country together 
with the analysis of its actual implementation 
In 2019 there was an extensive reform of German asylum and migration legislation. Seven laws 
were enacted as part of the so-called “migration package” in July 2019 and introduced 
numerous changes to the Asylum Act, the Residence Act, the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act. 
The core of these changes were the Skilled Workers’ Immigration Act and the Act on 
Temporary Suspension of Deportation for Training and Employment. The Skilled Workers’ 
Immigration Act is to “create a legislative framework for selective and increased immigration 
of skilled workers from third countries.” The Act on Temporary Suspension of Deportation for 
Training and Employment, on the other hand, was passed to provide certain foreigners, whose 
deportation has been temporarily suspended, with legal certainty regarding their residence 
status and create the prospect of a long-term stay. 
a) Asylum Act 
The right of asylum is enshrined in Article 16a of the Basic Law of 1949 as a fundamental 
right. It is the only fundamental right which is applicable only to foreigners. The admission 
procedure for asylum seekers is governed by the Asylum Procedure Act. Asylum seekers 
whom border authorities permit to enter the Federal Republic of Germany or who are found 
in the country without a residence permit are transferred to the nearest reception centre of 
the relevant state. Using the nation-wide system for initial distribution, they are assigned 
to reception centres of the individual German states according to a formula defined in the 
Asylum Procedure Act (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020). The 
Germany-wide “EASY” distribution system is used to determine which German state is 




The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees provides counselling and legal assistance to 
asylum seekers. This is regulated in a new provision, but there are concerns with regard to the 
quality of these new counselling arrangements as it raises questions over the independence and 
potential conflict of interests. Thus, ECRE insists both on the role and the importance of NGO 
counselling to adequately inform asylum seekers, as it ensures a fair and efficient asylum 
procedure. Another important change relates to the access to employment of asylum seekers, 
the bill foresees that an asylum seeker is entitled to employment. In addition, “arrival, decision 
and return” (AnkER) centres were established in August 2018. The main purpose is to centralise 
all activities at one location and to shorten the asylum procedure, which is a concept that was 
already applied in the “arrival centres” across Germany and in “transit centres” set up in three 
locations in Bavaria. Most Federal States have not participated in the AnkER centres scheme. 
At the end of 2019, only three Federal States had agreed to establish AnkER centres, in most 
cases simply by renaming their existing facilities so that in many cases all that had changed was 
the label on such centers (Knight, 2019). 
b) Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act 
One of the main 2019’s amendments to the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act is the extension of 
the waiting period for applicants to access “normal” social benefits, thereby delaying the access 
to benefits of an additional 3 months. Individuals residing in these centres are considered as 
constituting a “community of destiny” in which it is wrongly presumed that they will conduct 
common activities (e.g. buying groceries, cooking together etc.) which allow them to save costs. 
Another radical change is that persons who have already been granted international protection 
in another EU Member State, and whose obligation to leave the territory is enforceable, are 
excluded from all social benefits after a transition period of two weeks (Asylumineurope, 2019).  
c) Residence Act 
The main changes to the Residence Act relate to the enforcement of the obligation to leave the 
federal territory. Overall, the introduction of the ‘Orderly Return Law’ substantially facilitates 
the use of “custody pending departure” under Section 62b with the aim to enforce deportations. 
The ‘Orderly Return Law’ is to make it harder for rejected asylum seekers to avoid 
deportation by reducing the barriers to imposing detention for deportees. The ‘Orderly Return 
Law’ which officially is called the ‘Second Law for the Improved Execution of Deportations’ 
was introduced on August 21, 2019. It was designed to give more power to authorities to apply 
sanctions against those who do not comply with the lengthy deportation procedures in Germany. 
Under the new law, people who are a flight-risk can now be detained prior to their deportation. 
Furthermore, the law allows authorities to start proceedings against migrants and refugees who 
lie on their asylum applications. 
Also, new type of detention was established that can be described as ‘detention to obtain 
participation’, whereby foreigners can be detained when they fail to comply with their 
obligations to cooperate and to clarify their identity.  
The rules on pre-removal detention have also been modified and the risk of absconding 
(Fluchtgefahr) becomes the focal point allowing the authorities to detain a person for the 
purpose of deportation. Overall, these measures make it easier to integrate and deport migrants. 
The seven laws are a mixture of softer measures, like easier immigration and better job 
opportunities, and tougher deportation rules. InfoMigrants explains what the laws mean for 
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Germany. 
Another law of the new policy package is to make it easier to integrate skilled non-European 
foreigners into Germany’s labor market. This pertains both to foreign citizens who have applied 




Benjamin, 2019). “Skilled workers” within the meaning of the Skilled Workers’ Immigration 
Act are university graduates and highly qualified workers from third countries outside of the 
EU who have a domestic, a recognized foreign, or an equivalent foreign university degree 
(skilled worker with academic background) or who have completed domestic or equivalent 
foreign qualified vocational training (skilled worker with training). Those skilled workers may 
immigrate to or remain in Germany in order to look for a job and work in their area of expertise, 
provided they possess the required German language skills and have means of subsistence (US 
Library of Congress, 2019). 
3.2. Existing and potential conflicts between national law and legal practice of a 
relevant country and applicable EU rules 
Since August 2018, asylum seekers can also be denied entry at the Austrian-German land border 
if the authorities are able to demonstrate within 48 hours that they have already applied for 
asylum in Greece or Spain. In these cases, the transfer to the concerned Member state is not 
based on the Dublin Regulation but on administrative arrangements between Germany and 
these countries. Between August 2018 and October 2019, only 40 forced returns took place on 
the basis of these agreements and the Administrative Court of Munich raised serious doubts 
about the legality of the new procedure in a decision of August 2019.  
The authorities continued to face criticism for their failure to carry out deportations as a total 
of 32,482 returns or Dublin transfers which had been scheduled in 2019 did not take place. The 
government was unable to state the reasons for the failure of deportations in the overwhelming 
majority of cases. Nevertheless, the focus in the political debate remained on deportations 
which supposedly failed as a result of absconding. As a result, a reform was carried in August 
2019 to improve the enforcement of the obligation to leave the country. The new measures 
include: (i) increased powers for law enforcement authorities to access apartments for the 
purpose of deportation; (ii) new criteria to order detention based on an alleged risk of 
absconding – such as the refusal to cooperate in obtaining travel documents or the non-
compliance with instructions of the authorities; (iii) a new ground for detention to enforce the 
‘obligation to cooperate’ with the authorities; and (iv) the possibility to hold pre-removal 
detainees in regular prisons until June 2022 (Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, 2020). 
Germany along with several Member States, agreed in individual cases to voluntarily take in a 
certain number of rescued refugees in distress at sea. The Dublin III Regulation provides the 
legal basis for doing so. Opposition parties and civil society actors welcomed the willingness 
of the Federal Government but criticised that the actual transfer of refugees rescued in distress 
at sea to Germany frequently takes too long. Moreover, they argue that distribution is based on 
the Königstein key and not on the willingness of the cities and municipalities to admit them. 
Significant problems were noted in the context of family reunification of asylum seekers living 
in another European state (such as Greece and Italy) with family members in Germany pursuant 
to the provisions of the Dublin regulation. Several issues are also reported in family 
reunification procedures with family members trying to join a beneficiary of protection in 
Germany. This includes a lack of coordination among the relevant authorities, an increase in 
the number of pending family reunification procedures, and waiting periods that can reach up 
to a year or more. The length of family reunification procedures raises particular concern when 
it comes to unaccompanied children, as German courts have argued that their right to family 
reunification may end once they become adults. Nevertheless, courts have also repeatedly urged 
the authorities to prioritise family reunification procedures of unaccompanied minors who are 
about to turn 18 years old. 
Another serious matter of concern, which violates the current Return Directive, is the place of 




regular prisons instead of specialised institutions, although detainees will be held in premises 
separate from inmates.  
In July of 2017, stricter regulations for those with exceptional leave to remain and for people 
classified as “potential dangers” were implemented through the Law for Better Implementation 
of the Obligation to Leave the Country. It stipulates that people who pose a “danger for life and 
limb of third parties” can be more easily detained prior to deportation and be monitored through 
an electronic ankle bracelet. In the future, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugee may 
also export data from laptops and mobile phones to determine the identity and origin of an 
asylum applicant. Critiques pointed out that all refugees coming to Germany were being treated 
like potential criminals and subjected to increasing disenfranchisement (ECRE, 2019a). In 
addition, everyday circumstances will serve as an indicator of a risk of absconding, such as the 
fact that a person has paid money to come to Germany or that they made false statements at 
some point, even if these have later been corrected. This is a blatant shift to the disadvantage 
of those affected and also contradicts the principle that detention should only be used as a last 
resort (ECRE, 2019b). 
Germany concluded Administrative Arrangements with Portugal (under Article 36 Dublin III 
Regulation), Greece and Spain. Such agreements exist between Germany and Austria and – 
concluded in September 2018 – between Germany and Portugal. Some of the criticism are that 
the application of such constructions within the Schengen area presupposes the existence of 
(quasi) permanent border controls. Such controls are not only violating the main principle of 
the Schengen acquis the free movement within the Schengen area (Hruschka, 2019). Also, it 
should not be considered as a “gentlemen’s agreement”, nor as an administrative arrangement 
under Article 36 Dublin III Regulation but rather as a binding bilateral treaty whose provisions 
establish obligations that go beyond the scope of obligations established under the Dublin III 
Regulation. This contravenes EU law which does not allow legislation at national level or 
bi/multilateral inter-se agreements in policy areas of shared competence. In fact, through such 
agreements, Germany cooperates with Member States serving as a key point of entry in the EU 
by creating a “Quasi-Dublin” system creating obligations that go beyond the scope of the 
Dublin III and limitations that are not foreseen in the Regulation (EDAL, 2018).  
Regarding asylum law, recognition rates differ strongly. It is exclusively a responsibility of the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, which makes the initial decision about asylum 
applications. One notices considerable differences if one extrapolates the decision to the ‘länd’ 
where they are made (Riedel & Schneider, 2017). The case officers are not only influenced by 
the credibility of individual requests but preferences and moods that prevail in the land guide 
their decisions thus decentralised decision making on asylum requests has in all likelihood a 
considerable discriminatory potential (Schneider & Riedel, 2017). 
The airport procedure (at the airports of Frankfurt/Main and Munich) in Germany has severe 
deficiencies in practice: asylum seekers have reduced procedures without comprehensible 
information and adequate interpretation, applicants with special procedural needs such as 
pregnant women or persons with disabilities are subjected to lengthy interviews with the BAMF 
without benefitting from “adequate support” guaranteed to them by the recast Asylum 
Procedures Directive, the entire airport procedure is without effective access to means of 
communication or remedies against arbitrary detention (ECRE, 2019c).18 
 
4. Synthesis 





The German migration policy is Janus-faced. On one hand, we can observe that immigration is 
a permanent feature in the German society. Germany can look back on a long history of 
migration. This is underlined by the fact that Germany is a country of immigration, migration 
is not a new phenomenon, there were several waves towards Germany. On the other hand, the 
state steadily builds up the new direction of its migration policy and the focus is strongly on the 
liberal approach regarding the necessary migration of missing labour power and on integration. 
The focus in more on restrictive measures and on the reduction of arrivals, and on the integration 
of refugees. Germany gradually developed from a country that accommodated guest workers 
to a country with regulated immigration.  
Altough Germany is one of the most prominent advocate for harmonising several aspect of 
migration policy, whith introducing the Skilled Immigration Act, the direction of not to leave 
migration policy reform to supranational harmonisation got clear. Regarding the 2015 events 
and the later elections, it is clear that questions regarding social integration have increased 
significance. Immigration and its several elements were the single most important issue for the 
German population during the election and this could have played a role in the increasing of 
support for AfD. The German society is familiar with immigration but the sudden, huge 
number, and the culturally more distinct migrants from previous immigrants created a ground 
for anxieties. In the past, immigrants were from similar culture, and in the case of Turkish 
“Gastarbeiter”, there were in the country for the purpose of work laid down in bilateral 
agreements. The welcome culture was strongly affected by the terror attacks, crimes made by 
immigrants, and the stabil sense of everyday security furthermore weakened with the arson 
attacks on refugee accommodations and anti-immigrant demonstrations. Most of the violent 
acts took place in the ‘poorer’ East Germany and there is a link between these events and the 
vote shares for extreme right and populist right-wing parties. Questions of national identity and 
the place of Islam got significance in the public discourse. Thus, debates around religion, 
society, economy, welfare system, national security and national identity in Germany became 
grounds on which populism started to recruit and thrieve.  
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1. Background information 2015-2018 
Migration19 to Greece is not a recent phenomenon. A country that has been on the receiving 
end of irregular migrants from Albania throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Greece emerged 
as a transit state for asylum seekers from 2004 onwards (Dimitriadi, 2018). It has since received 
continuously mixed migratory flows that ebb and flow, in parallel to a consistent presence of 
third country nationals with legal status.  
1.1. Legal Migration 
The stock of migrants legally residing in the country as of August 31, 2019 (Triandafyllidou & 
Gemi, 2019) stood at 552,485 (see Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1. Stock of foreign population in Greece, 2019  
 Size of immigrant stock  % of total resident population  
Total TCN population  552,485*  5.2  
Total EU28 countries’ citizens 
(non-Greeks)  
63,900**  0.6  
Total immigrant stock  616,385  5.8  
Total population in Greece  10,722,300***  100.00  
Source: Triandafyllidou & Gemi, 2019, compiled by the authors 
 
The foreign population of third country nationals since 2015 has remained relatively stable with 
EU nationals experiencing a slight decrease over the years (see Table 1 below). According to 
the Ministry of Migration Policy’s statistics on resident permits, on August 31, 2019 the stock 
of migrants legally residing in Greece stood at 552,485. 
                                                     
19 The term migrant is used to denote both asylum seekers and economic migrants and is reflective of the mixed 





Source: Reports prepared for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts, 2015-2019.  
 
1.2 Irregular Migration 
The ‘long summer of migration’ (Kasparek & Speer, 2015) unfolded in 2015 but its origins lie 
in the Arab Spring of 2011. As the situation in Syria and the neighbourhood continued to 
deteriorate, Syrians fled first to Jordan and Lebanon and by 2013 increasingly to Turkey. A 
complex mix of factors pushed forward the Syrians to Europe (see Crawley et al., 2016; Squire, 
et al., 2017). 
In 2015 alone, 856,723 irregular arrivals entered through the Greek maritime border (UNHCR, 
2020). Of those, 88% originated from the top ten refugee-producing countries, with Syrians 
constituting almost 60% of incoming numbers, followed by Afghans (20%, ibid). Arrivals 
differed from previous years. There were more families, women with children and 
unaccompanied minors than in previous years. The peak of arrivals was the autumn of 2015. 
Indicatively, Lesvos received 120,000 migrants in October 2015. Since then, arrivals fluctuated 
with a steady increase noticeable in the land border post 2016, which is outside the EU-Turkey 
Statement framework.   
 
Table 1. Registered irregular arrivals 2015-2018   
Previous years Sea arrivals Land arrivals Dead and missing 
2018 32,494 18,014 174 
2017 29,718 6,592 59 
2016 173,450 3,784 441 
2015 856,723 4,907 799 
Source: UNHCR Operational Portal: Refugee Situations: Greece, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179  
 
The top three nationalities of these irregular border crossings were mainly Syrians, Iraqis and 
Afghans for the sea border and Syrians, Turkish, Pakistanis for the land border (Frontex, 2018). 
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nationality closely followed by the Afghans until 2018. In 2019, Afghanistan overtook Syria as 
the main country of asylum applicants in Greece (see Table 1). 
 
Chart 1. Asylum applications 2015-2019 
 
Source: Greek Asylum Service, 2019, compiled by the authors  
 
The presence of Turkish nationals was also relatively new. In the aftermath of the attempted 
coup in July 2016 in Turkey, Greece has been one of the main recipients of asylum applicants 
from Turkish citizens with most applications accepted.  In 2018, 4,834 asylum applications 
were received. 
 
Table 1. Main nationalities of asylum applicants, 2019 
Top Countries of Origin  Asylum Applications  
Syria  10,856  
Afghanistan  23,828 
Iraq  5,738 
Pakistan  7,140  
Other nationalities 29,725  
Source: Greek Asylum Service, 2019 
 
Asylum, and irregular migration overall, were between 2015-2018 a priority for the government 
but also critical issues for all political parties in Greece. Coupled, with the financial crisis, the 
‘European refugee crisis’ affected Greece in an unprecedented manner.   
 
2. Immigration as a political issue 
Immigration has been politicized since the 1990s in Greece. A frame of analysis for 
politicisation draws from de Wilde who understands politicisation as an increase in 1) salience 
and 2) diversity of opinions on specific societal topics. Salience is defined as the importance 
attributed to an issue (De Wilde, 2011; Pasetti Garcés-Mascareñas, 2018). Polarisation means 
there are different attitudes to the issue and the ‘solutions’ proposed. The two do not coexist 
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necessarily. For example, a topic may have salience and polarisation in the parliamentary 
discourse but only salience in the media and public opinion polls.  
According to Triandafyllidou, contrasting political discourses have to be understood in relation 
to the positioning of each country as a “frontline or final destination”, past experiences of 
hosting migrants (or lack thereof) and current challenges including Euro-scepticism 
(Triandafyllidou, 2018). Thus, it is the national factors that drive responses to the refugee crisis.  
A survey undertaken by Bansak et al. (2016) with 18,000 citizens from 15 European countries 
found that most respondents had preferences for asylum seekers with higher employability, 
severe vulnerabilities and with a Christian cultural background. According to their analysis, 
Christian asylum seekers are preferred over Muslim asylum seekers. From 2016 onwards, 
ethnicity and religion play a key role in the debates taking place in various capitals across 
Europe, including Athens. The presence of a growing Muslim population brought to the 
forefront once more the issue of (or absence of) integration and multiculturalism. For countries, 
like Greece, whose dominant discourse has been of a homogeneous nation and with little 
attempt at integration, the arrival and stay of the migrants raised additional societal challenges. 
The political context reflected but also fed the growing social discontent with Europe’s 
management of the refugee crisis.  
2.1.The positions of major domestic parties (including the parties in the government) on 
the problem of immigration and their evolution, relevance of the immigration issue in 
the national elections (2015-2018) 
Unlike other EU Member States, Greece was already in ‘crisis’ in 2015. The question of the 
bailout agreement, the referendum and the second elections of September 2015 posed a far more 
existential issue for Greece than the refugees.  
Two elections took place in 2015. The first was held in January 2015. SYRIZA won the popular 
vote, with New Democracy coming second and Golden Dawn third. The socialist party of 
PASOK, the centrist party of POTAMI, the Independent Greeks (ANEL) also won seats in the 
Parliament. SYRIZA (coalition of Radical left) formed a coalition government with the ANEL. 
The two parties represented the opposite ends of the political spectrum. 
In July 2015, a referendum was held on the bailout agreement. Despite the result of the 
referendum and the ‘no’ vote, the government accepted the proposed bailout package resulting 
in a loss of confidence vote in Parliament. An early parliamentary election took place on 20 
September 2015. Migration was a key issue but not the main priority, with the economy 
dominating. The coalition government of Syriza-ANEL remained in power, with the centre-
right party of New Democracy (ND) becoming the main opposition party, while the far-right 
Golden Dawn (GD) continued to be the third political force in the country. Other parties that 
won parliamentary seats were the centre-left coalition of PASOK and Democratic Left 
(DIMAR), the centrist Potami party and the centrist Enosi Kentroon party (EK) that entered the 
Parliament for the first time, as well as the Communist party (KKE) (Ministry of Interior, 2018).  
Both Syriza and ANEL are considered populist parties, despite representing two opposite ends 
of the political spectrum. Whereas SYRIZA’s populism conceives of “the people” to reflect the 
economically and politically marginalised Greeks that are being excluded by the elites 
“ANEL’s populist discourse adds clearly nativist and socially conservative overtones, defining 
“the people” as a community with specific cultural boundaries” (Aslanidis & Kaltwasser, 2016: 
5). Syriza campaigned on an anti-austerity and anti-systemic platform, which was portrayed as 
a clash between the established and corrupt elites versus the Greek public. In that sense, the 
party adopted a straightforward populist stance domestically, though as Aslanidis & Kaltwasser 




ANEL was a populist far-right wing party which was born as a split from New Democracy 
(Malamidis & Dimitriadi, 2018). ANEL, like SYRIZA, emerged in the 2015 elections as an 
anti-systemic party, anti-austerity, with a clear anti-Semitic and Islamophobic stance. The party 
employed a conspiratorial rhetoric with the enemy being the “Other” (the Americans, Merkel, 
the Turkish consulate, etc.; Georgiadou, 2019). Although ANEL had milder xenophobic 
positions compared to other parties (e.g. Golden Dawn), these became rather salient when the 
issue of citizenship for second generation migrants was at stake (Georgiadou, 2019: 204-207) 
in the summer of 2015. Though the two parties significantly differed in their approach to 
migration they shared the same definition of the establishment and the ‘elite’, which was not 
limited only to the domestic establishment, but also international institutions and actors seeking 
to impose economic policies on the Greek public.  
2.1.1. The discourse on migration of the coalition government (SYRIZA-ANEL)  
On migration, its position was antithetical to that of the previous government of New 
Democracy. SYRIZA prioritized (at least officially) the end to detention of undocumented 
persons and the end of the ‘sweeps’ instituted under the previous government. The party sought 
to shift the dominant rhetoric and refused to speak of λαθρομετανάστες [illegal immigrants] 
encouraging instead the usage of the term undocumented or irregular (παράτυποι).  
As the European refugee “crisis” unfolded, SYRIZA’s discourse sought to portray Greece as a 
hospitable country, “We showed them that Greece is a hospitable country and that the Greek 
people is a hospitable people. We proved that we have a surplus of ethics and values as both 
country and people. Let’s generously give this surplus of love today.” (CNN Greece, 2016) 
Drawing on references from ancient Greece, the notion of philoxenia (hospitality) and the 
experience of Greece with refugees, an official discourse was grafted and maintained until 
2017. Prime Minister Tsipras lay the blame on Europeans, for the continuation of the Syrian 
civil war (i.e. Europe’s unwillingness to intervene) but mostly for the absence of European 
solidarity between Member States but also with the refugees: “I feel ashamed as a member of 
this European leadership, both for the inability of Europe in dealing with this human 
drama...[certain European countries] shed hypocritical crocodile tears [...] for the dead children 
on the shores of the Aegean” (in reference to the death of Aylan Kurdi in August 2015, Reuters, 
2015).  
The ‘blame game’ became the core theme of the political debates between parties in Greece 
during the period in question, which is characterised initially by little discussion on migration 
despite the unfolding tragedy on the islands of east Aegean. However, there was a purpose to 
laying the blame at Europe’s door. The Euro-crisis was linked with the migration crisis, with 
the former utilised as a bargaining chip to gain more financial assistance for Greece (Nestoras, 
2015). It was also useful domestically to portray Greece as standing up to its European partners 
and defending the European norms and values.  
SYRIZA’s position in the refugee crisis resembled its position in reference to the Greek debt 
crisis. The government wanted a radical renegotiation of Greece's debt to its European creditors, 
and a radical overhaul of the European asylum policy. Emphasis was placed on 
humanitarianism instead of detention and deportation. However, the promised policy shift 
failed completely as it was largely symbolic and did not account for the rapidly increasing flows 
throughout 2015 (Skleparis, 2017). In a surprising move, SYRIZA supported the EU-Turkey 
Statement of March 2016. In the face of it, the Statement was antithetical to the government’s 
discourse on migration. However, the government was supportive of the agreement. Former 
PM Tsipras repeatedly stressed that “Turkey plays a major part, a key role in the current 
[migration] developments” and he concluded by saying that Greece would be supporting an 




Greece” (Statement of the Prime Minister of Greece, 2016). SYRIZA underscored that with 
this agreement, Turkey is recognised as a problematic partner on the issue of irregular migration 
for the first time (Hellenic Parliament IZ, 2016).  
In March 2016, the Bank of Greece published data suggesting that in 2016 alone, the cost of 
managing the migration crisis would exceed EUR 600 million (Kathimerini, 2016). This 
emergency assistance comes in addition to EUR 509 million already allocated to Greece under 
the national programs for 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2016). The financial assistance 
was a powerful incentive for the coalition government to mend bridges with its European 
partners. From 2016 until 2018, the official discourse of SYRIZA changed. Germany was no 
longer the ‘enemy’. It was replaced by Hungary and the Visegrad four, who refused to 
participate on the intra-EU relocation scheme (2015-2018), erected fences and barriers which 
resulted in the closure of the Western Balkan route and who argued against immigration and 
multicultural societies (Reuters, 2015).  
ANEL’s position on immigration varied. It took an opposing stance to the Citizenship Law 
(Law 4332/2015, 9 July 2015) proposed but maintained a far more low-key presence and 
rhetoric on asylum and irregular migration. One of the main pledges of the Syriza party during 
the campaign was the amendment of the citizenship law for the second generation born in 
Greece. The bill would allow for children of migrant origin, born and/or raised in Greece to 
acquire Greek citizenship. ANEL rejected the bill. This was not entirely unexpected considering 
the far-right basis of the party. The opposition stemmed from its support of jus sanguinis as a 
way of acquiring citizenship, i.e. one had to be born Greek and descend from Greek parents. 
One of ANEL MP’s argued that “When it is time for action and you don’t have enough money, 
you should make a choice: to choose the Greek citizens and not the migrants for your policy 
allowances” (Hellenic Parliament, Plenary Session 2015). Within ANEL the perspective that 
the European elites sought to reduce the national element from the Greek society, was 
prominent. This would be achieved by integrating in the society a group of citizens without any 
cultural or national orientation. Instead, the European “elites will reserve the jus sanguinis – 
their citizenship, their autonomy” (ibid). Overall, the party stood against multiculturalism, 
particularly as regards the integration of migrants practicing the Muslim faith long before the 
refugee crisis emerged.  
A different approach in regard to the refugee crisis was adopted, for two reasons. On the one 
hand, both parties had to reach consensus maintain the coalition government. On the other hand, 
the leader of ANEL, Panos Kammenos, became Minister of Defense, and the ministry in turn 
undertook the responsibility for the organization and set up of reception spaces in the mainland 
and the hotspots for arrivals. In other words, ANEL was responsible for implementing a 
significant part of the SYRIZA policy on migration. There was also a certain usefulness to the 
differences of the two parties. While SYRIZA sought to influence European policy and extend 
the financial assistance to Greece for the refugees, ANEL often reminded EU partners that, “[i]f 
Europe leaves us in the crisis, we will flood it with migrants, and it will be even worse for Berlin 
if in that wave of millions of economic migrants there will be some jihadists of the Islamic State 
too” (The Telegraph, 2015; The Independent, 2015). Both partners were utilizing Greece’s 
position as a front-line state to yield concessions from the European partners, with ANEL 
catering to the domestic audience while SYRIZA wooed the European partners. By 2017, 
ANEL and SYRIZA converged in supporting the EU-Turkey Statement, a position they 
maintained until the end of the coalition government.  
 




New Democracy (ND) was the main party in opposition. ND is the conservative party of 
Greece.  Throughout 2015, New Democracy, as most parties, remained focused on the 
economic crisis and the bailout agreement. By early 2016, migration re-emerged as a focal issue 
in the party’s discourse. ND had supported the Statement, though it had found it to be complex 
and with points that required clarification, particularly in regard to the restriction of arrivals to 
the hotspots to enable returns to Turkey (Hellenic Parliament Plenary session, 2016). ND had 
proposed a threefold strategy: the need to create closed type of pre-departure centers for 
irregular migrants, the strict and effective separation of refugees from migrants and effective 
border controls (EfSyn, 2016). This would be further explained in the proposal for a national 
migration strategy the party released in June 2016. The 40-page document outlines the key 
priorities and opens with security: “Security is the first and primary aim of a migration policy. 
Social and economic security of citizens is the fundamental obligation of the State and it is a 
prerequisite for everything else: acceptance of the ‘other’, the protection of human rights of 
migrants and the realization that many of them are refugees fleeing from war zones” (own 
translation of the author) (Naftemporiki, 2016).  
Building on this, the plan suggests an end to squats, extensive document checks across the 
country, return of refugees to their countries of origin once the root causes of their movement 
is resolved, and the construction of different facilities for those who apply for asylum from 
those who are “illegal economic migrants”. Border controls are also the focus of the proposal, 
alongside the speed up of the asylum process and strict control over the NGOs operating on the 
ground (ibid). The overall strategy had positive as well as negative elements.  
ND also opposed the citizenship bill proposed by SYRIZΑ, though in the end it voted in favour 
of most the articles. New Democracy’s shadow defence spokesman Vassilis Kikilias referenced 
a front-page article in right-wing Estia newspaper, claiming that “the government has added 
43,000 foreign voters to the electoral register for the Athens A’ district, while it steadfastly 
refuses to give the vote to expatriate Greeks.” The article claimed that by granting citizenship, 
SYRIZA sought to increase its electoral appeal amongst the new voters (Malamidis & 
Dimitriadi, 2018). Aside from concerns that the citizenship bill would be used to garner votes 
for SYRIZA, objections were also raised in regard to how citizenship would be granted. ND 
objected primarily to two articles in the bill (Article 1 & Art 10). The party’s spokesman noted 
the draft law was not fully in line with the Constitution, however the biggest objection to the 
law regarded minor children acquiring citizenship upon enrollment in Primary School. ND 
expressed concerns that their parents would enroll the children and once citizenship was 
acquired, they would leave for other EU Member States. The party wanted citizenship to be 
offered after the nine-year mandatory education was completed. Thus, the approach differs 
significantly from ANEL. Though both seek to define who is Greek and who should have access 
to citizenship they differ in the way they framed the debate.  
Throughout 2017 and 2018, the criticism towards the coalition government on the handling of 
the hotspots and the returns to Turkey increased.  In 2016 the situation in Athens had 
deteriorated, with thousands homeless or housed in squats and informal settlements like the 
former airport at Elliniko. ND increased its criticism of the management of the crisis which 
would become constant theme throughout the period in question and would come to form a 
critical part of the response of the new government under ND in 2019.  
The remaining parties also represented in Parliament were the centre-left coalition of PASOK 
and Democratic Left (DIMAR), the centrist Potami party and the centrist Enosi Kentroon party 
(EK) that entered the Parliament for the first time, as well as the Communist party (KKE). 




Golden Dawn presents itself as a nationalist organization and rejects the far-right attribution 
often given to it, by arguing that the far-right is a political betrayal that developed through 
rightwing parties aiming to “coopt patriotism and serve the Zionist status quo” (Fragkoudaki, 
2013). Contrary to its European counterparts, it does not try to smooth over its anti-Semitism 
and neo-Nazi approach and has a rich criminal activity against external and internal enemies, 
such as migrants, students, LGBT+, activists and union members (ibid, 2013:53). As expected, 
it opposed the citizenship bill, the hotspots and the Statement. The organization in fact, opposed 
the presence of migrants in Greece, claiming the policies implemented were part of the “plans 
for the Islamization of Greece”. GD argued that “the state that robbed the Greek taxpayer is 
feeding for free murders from Africa and Asia” resulting in “public spaces, ports and boulevards 
being occupied illegally. Church bells no longer ring in our cities so that the Islamists are not 
disturbed.” (To Pontiki, 2016). These sentiments were continuously reflected in the discourse 
of the organization. However, the organization was sidelined by the mainstream parties that did 
not, for the most part, align with the former’s positions.   
Of the mainstream parties, Potami had a middle-of-the-road approach to the events and 
outcomes of 2015-2018. Though the party continuously stressed the need to respect the human 
and fundamental rights of migrants, it also expressed concern about the possibility of thousands 
being stranded in Greece. In its 10-point plan proposal submitted in 2016, POTAMI notes in 
reference to Greece that, “If we continue to be embarrassed and panicked, we run the risk of 
having hundreds of thousands of immigrants trapped in the country, of different cultures and 
codes of integration” (translation, authors own) (Liberal, 2016). The implication being that 
Greece would be unable to integrate them. However, unlike ND, POTAMI was in favour of a 
national program of integration for those that had arrived in the past years, to boost the Greek 
economy and production. The party supported the Statement and wanted returns to Turkey 
within 48 hours of those rejected or opting out of asylum. It continuously criticized the 
government over poor conditions of reception and particularly the rapid deterioration of the 
hotspots. It also fervently supported the demand voiced by the Mayors of the islands hosting 
hotspots for the transfer of the arrivals to the Greek mainland (POTAMI, 2017). Thus, it 
functioned as a bridge between SYRIZA and ND, bringing forward suggestions that were 
aligned with both parties’ core positions.  
The centre-left coalition of PASOK and Democratic Left (DIMAR) held similar positions, 
though they utilised their objections to the policies of the coalition government to repeatedly 
ask for an all-party government (EfSyn, 2016). The coalition had expressed concerns over the 
implementation of the Statement. Though they supported the deal, they feared that the hotspots 
would transform into permanent settlements on the islands rather than temporary registration 
centres. In this, they were proven right. Though they supported the initial efforts of SYRIZA in 
2015, acknowledging the unprecedented scale of arrivals to Greece, from 2016 onwards they 
criticized the government’s implementation, particularly in regard to the conditions in the 
hotspots, the impact on the local economies but also the absence of European solidarity.  The 
coalition supported the bill on citizenship, an early draft of which had already passed under the 
previous PASOK government.  
KKE is a party deeply entrenched in the communist dogma with rhetoric which resembles that 
of the Stalinist era. Ideologically, KKE remains devoted to proletariat and class struggle 
(Visvizi, 2017). However, it had the most consistent position on migration, criticising from the 
early days the EU and the Greek government for policies that stood in violation of the UN 
Convention for Refugees (Risospastis, 2015). The party refused to agree on the common 
national position proposed by SYRIZA, which was agreed to by most parties in 2015. More 
than any of the other parties, it called on the Greek government to undertake its responsibilities 




convergence with the other parties was its criticism of the NGOs, however, unlike the other 
parties the objections stemmed from an ideological difference. KKE wanted the financial 
assistance to go directly to the Greek government that would undertake service provisions, 
boost the national reception system and the asylum service. Thus, it objected to the money being 
given directly to international and nongovernmental organisations (Zarianopoulos, 2015) 
Similar to the other parties in Parliament, KKE voted in support of most of the articles in the 
citizenship bill but opted out of supporting the Articles that transposed EU legislation.20  
 
3. Policy in action:  
Policy measures undertaken in 2015-2018 focuses on asylum seekers and irregular arrivals. 
Criticism over policy implementation was a common thread in the political discourse in Greece, 
targeting the coalition government primarily. In most cases the criticism was valid, as the 
implementation fell short of the policies designed. Additionally, initiatives were delayed with 
most taking place in 2016, a year into the refugee crisis.  
3.1. Assessment of the governmental position on immigration, together with the 
information on its evolution (2015-2018) 
Four drivers defined Greek policy in the period 2015-2018. The first was the introduction of 
the hotspot system in May 2015. The second was the relocation program, referring to the intra-
EU transfer of 60,000 from Greece to other EU member states. The third was the closure of the 
Western Balkan route which coincided with the fourth driver, the EU-Turkey Statement. 
Almost all the policies implemented were driven and shaped in response to the reaction and 
policies implemented by European partners. However, even under these circumstances, 
implementation can only be described as a failure. In 2015, services were scarce and poor, and 
there was no special care for vulnerable people. Registration took several days and sometimes 
even longer, and there was a complete absence of organised reception facilities on the islands 
and the mainland (Rosakou, 2017; Skleparis, 2017). The asylum service had been unable to 
respond to the rising number of asylum applications because of the closure of the route. The 
asylum service became operational in 2013, designed to process approximately 20,000 asylum 
applications each year. In 2018 alone, the service received 66,969 new applications. 
The European Commission proposed a “hot spot” approach in response to the disproportionate 
migratory flow experiences in Greece in 2015. These hotspots were established on Eastern 
Aegean islands (Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos) to swiftly register incoming migrants 
(AIDA). The hotspots were also meant to identify vulnerable persons and eligible nationalities 
for the implementation of temporary relocation of people with an imminent need of 
international protection to alternate EU member states (European Commission, 2015). The 
hotspots transformed from screening centres to detention facilities under the auspices of the 
EU-Turkey Statement in March of 2016. A geographical restriction of movement was imposed, 
to facilitate returns to Turkey. Geographical restriction means that the newcomers cannot leave 
the island where they registered until the end of their asylum process (Greek Council for 
Refugees, 2018). In practice, the Statement has increased the pressure on Greece that has been 
unable to cater to the needs of the migrants ‘hosted’ on the islands. In the hotspots, in 2017 
more than 14,000 people were trapped in spaces designed to accommodate 3,000. Unfit for 
                                                     
20 Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single 
application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member 
State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State; Directive 
2014/36/EU of The European Parliament and of The Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and 




long-term stay, in most cases tents have been set up around the existing infrastructures as an 
emergency accommodation measure. This impacted access to health education but also to the 
asylum procedure which was facing significant delays. The poor food quality and the gaps in 
medical staff and means of transportation to the hospital hinder timely access to healthcare 
services (Greek Council for Refugees, 2018b: 38-40). In parallel, suicidal tendencies critically 
increased with self-harm incidents and suicide attempts that also involved children (Greek 
Council for Refugees, 2018b: 38-40). This was a situation that continued throughout 2017 and 
2018. While conditions varied in the mainland, the situation in the hotspots remained 
consistently poor and at times worsened as arrivals increased.  
Greece set up 50,000 accommodation places across the mainland, following a request by the 
European Commission. Of these, approximately 20,000 were funded by DG ECHO for the 
implementation of the ESTIA program run by UNHCR. ESTIA was initially designed to 
facilitate relocation, by providing urban accommodation to the most vulnerable that were 
prioritised for intra-EU transfer. This meant that only nationalities eligible for relocation could 
be housed in apartments. In total, 22,822 relocation requests submitted by Greece had been 
accepted for the transfer of asylum seekers to other EU member states of the 60,000 places 
originally allocated (data from the Greek Asylum Service, 2018). The failure of relocation 
resulted in a reorganisation of the program that has since offered housing to vulnerable 
individuals and families irrespective of nationality.  
A cash-assistance program was rolled out in parallel to ESTIA by UNHCR and the IRC for 
those applying for asylum.  What is critical is that none of these measures were initiated or 
implemented by the Greek government. Instead, the management of migration had been given 
de facto to international organisations and NGOs that tried to respond to emerging needs as 
quickly as possible. The only concrete action by the Greek government regarding 
accommodation was the development of 30,000 places in camps spread across the mainland. 
For the day-to-day operations, the government relied once more on NGOs while service 
provision varied greatly both in quality and quantity.  Camps were (and remain) in need of 
health care, education, services for survivors of gender-based violence, and mental health and 
psychosocial support services (Skleparis, 2017). Some access to the services was available, but 
the quality varied greatly across camps, with further divergence evident when compared to the 
hotspots.  
3.2. Challenges in implementation of the common EU migration policies in the relevant 
country 
Greece is a unique case in the EU as regards migration and asylum policies. The geographical 
location of the country and absence of an asylum and reception system prior to 2010 
(Dimitriadi, 2018) meant that the country was already behind in achieving the minimum 
standards set out by the CEAS. The arrival of thousands of refugees merely aggravated an 
already problematic situation.  
The European Commission brought legal action against Greece in December 2015, “[...] for 
failing to correctly register migrants. The absence of registration made the creation of hotspots 
imperative. Thus, the two issues are linked.  
The biggest challenge for Greece was the implementation of returns to Turkey. The Action Plan 
for the implementation of the Statement (December 8th, 2016) calls on Greece to “remove 
administrative obstacles to swift voluntary return from the islands”, upon receipt of a negative 
first instance decision.” (European Commission, 2016b). They maintained the right to appeal 
but the assumption was that the appeals would uphold first instance decisions. This was not the 
case. Most appeal committees refused to consider Turkey as a safe third country. It should be 




Backlog Appeals Committees overturned the first instance inadmissibility decisions based on 
the safe third country concept, despite pressure from the European Commission.  
The Greek government introduced an amendment to the composition of the Appeals 
Committees and restructured their composition to include administrative judges. As a result, 
98.2% of decisions issued by the Independent Appeals Committees in 2017 upheld the first 
instance inadmissibility decisions based on the safe third country concept. 
From March 2016 until the end of 2018, a total 1690 persons had been returned under the 
Statement. Main nationalities were Pakistanis, followed by Syrians, Algerians and Afghans.  
47% had not expressed a desire to apply for asylum or withdrew their application. The 
extremely low rate of returns has remained a challenge for Greece. There are multiple reasons 
for the failure of the policy: the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016, concerns by the Greek 
Asylum Service that Turkey was not safe for non-Syrians, lengthy delays in asylum processing 
in Greece, and refusal from Turkish authorities to accept everyone listed by their Greek 
counterparts. (Basak et al, 2018).  
3.3. Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
The most controversial aspect of EU policy for Greece has been and remains the Dublin 
Regulation. The Dublin regulation determines which EU Member State is responsible for the 
application of a third country national or stateless person for international protection. In 2011, 
returns under Dublin were suspended for Greece following the decision by M.S.S. vs Belgium 
and Greece. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights made returns to the country 
impossible as it was deemed to violate several articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The suspension of Dublin to Greece was in place when the refugee crisis unfolded. In 
December 2016, a recommendation was issued by the European Commission to resume Dublin 
returns to Greece for applicants entering the European Union from 15 March 2017 and onwards. 
This initiative was met with disapproval in a letter addressed to the President of the European 
Commission and the Greek Minister of Migration Policy by the Greek Council for Refugees, 
SolidarityNow, NGO Aitima and members of the European Council for Refugees and Exiles 
who wrote: “The envisaged resumption of transfers of asylum seekers under the Dublin III 
Regulation to Greece is in our view premature in light of the persistent deficiencies in the Greek 
asylum system, that are unlikely to be resolved by the envisaged date of 15 March 2017” 
(ECRE, GCR, Aitima and SolidarityNow, 2016). Dublin is the cornerstone of the CEAS and 
its most problematic element. It has consistently failed to perform as designed and was not 
created to address situations of high influx. Its renegotiation was a key point in the discussions 
between Greece and the European Commission however to this day no agreement has been 
reached at EU level for a new Dublin that would include a permanent redistribution mechanism 
of asylum applicants.  
 
4. Migration as a legal issue  
4.1. Applicable legal framework 
The period 2015-2018 was rich in legislative initiatives and amendments, focused 
predominantly on improving the functioning of the Asylum Service and implementation of the 
Statement.  
On 3 April 2016 the Greek Parliament adopted L 4375/2016 titled “On the organisation and 
operation of the Asylum Service, the Appeals Authority, the Reception and Identification 




legislation of the provisions of Directive 2013/32/EU, provisions on the employment of 
beneficiaries of international protection and other provisions”. L 4375/2016 has partially 
attempted to regulate the establishment and function of hotspots and the procedures taking place 
there. However, national legislation failed to effectively regulate the involvement of the EU 
Agencies, for example Frontex agents (AIDA, 2017). Article 46 of Law 4375/2016 is intended 
to transpose Regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
determine which Member State is responsible for a third state national application. Law 
4375/2016 also transposes the 2013/32/EU Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, establishing 
the General Secretariat for Reception and expanding asylum services.  
L4375/2016 was meant to facilitate the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. In practice 
a parallel asylum process emerged, which is neither prescribed in the CEAS nor applied 
elsewhere in the EU. A fast-track asylum application based on (in)admissibility took place on 
the islands versus regular procedure in the mainland. The Statement drastically impacted the 
ability of the Asylum Service to perform and placed an additional burden on an already 
bureaucratic and slow system (Dimitriadi, 2017).   
The organization and functioning of asylum services were revamped under Law 4375/2016 
which transposed the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
related to “common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection”. The 
accrued backlog of applications was addressed by providing two-year residence status if an 
application has been submitted five years prior. In addition, Article 64 of Law 4375/2016 gives 
applicants the right to apply for the annulment of application decisions, however, these 
applications do not have automatic suspensive effect and thus, the applicant may be relocated 
before the judicial review is conducted (Papatzani et al. 2020). Additionally, Law 4540/2018 
“on the transposition into the Greek legislation of the provisions of Directive 2013/33/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the requirements for the 
reception of the applicants of international protection (recast, L 180/96/29.6.2013 and other 
provisions” (Official Gazette A 91/22.5.2018) included the provision for Greek-speaking 
EASO personnel to participate in the national asylum procedure.  
The biggest challenge has arisen from the emergence of two parallel asylum systems in the 
country as a result of the Statement (see AIDA, 2018; Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2018). Asylum 
seekers arriving after 20 March 2016 on the Greek islands are subject to a fast-track border 
procedure. To achieve this, until 2018, certain nationalities were prioritised for registration of 
the intent to submit asylum, particularly the Syrians. This created multiple problems for non- 
Syrians who remain stranded on the islands waiting for their application to be processed three 
years later.  In 2018, the European Ombudsman found that “there are genuine concerns about 
the quality of the admissibility interviews as well as about the procedural fairness of how they 
are conducted.” In February 2019, FRA noted that “almost three years of experience [of 
processing asylum claims in facilities at borders] in Greece shows, [that] this approach creates 
fundamental rights challenges that appear almost unsurmountable” (FRA Opinion, 2016). This 
shows that asylum continued to function in a limited way in 2018, two years after the Statement 
and three years since the refugee crisis began.  
The legal basis for the establishment of the Appeals Authority was amended twice in 2016 by 
L 4375/2016 in April 2016 and L 4399/2016 in June 2016, and then in 2017 by L 4661/2017 
(AIDA, 2018). These amendments are closely linked with the examination of appeals under the 
fast-track border procedure, following reported pressure to the Greek authorities from the EU 
on the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement,  and “coincide with the issuance of positive 
decisions of the – at that time operational – Appeals Committees (with regard to their judgment 




not a safe third country for the appellants in question” (NHCR, 2016), as highlighted by the 
National Commission on Human Rights.  
Further amendments to the procedure before the Appeals Committees that have been introduced 
by L 4540/2018 echo the 2016 Joint Action Plan on Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, and are visibly connected with pressure to limit the appeal steps and accelerate the 
procedure. This includes the possibility of judicial members of the Appeals Committee to be 
replaced in the event of “significant and unjustified delays in the processing of appeals” by a 
Joint Ministerial Decision, following approval from the General Commissioner of the 
Administrative Court. 
Greek Law 4332/2015 amended the provisions of Law 4521/2014 and the Code of Greek 
Citizenship. It “harmonizes” or transposes European Parliament and the Council Directives 
2011/98/EU into Greek legislation. Passed in July 2015 under SYRIZA governance, Law 
4332/2015 drew from Law 3838/2010 (“Ragousis Law”) and eased the path to citizenship for 
children of foreign-born parents (second-generation).  
4.2. Existing and potential conflicts between national law and legal practice of a relevant 
country and applicable EU rules  
Although the CEAS has brought an increased level of harmonisation in applied standards, there 
is no “common” or unified European Asylum System but rather 28 different asylum systems 
with common minimum standards. In many ways this has resulted in minimal harmonisation 
and, therefore, often low standards (Wagner et al, 2016; Scipioni, 2018). At the same time, the 
European Union has no competence on issues such as citizenship and/or integration. This leaves 
significant room for Member States to adopt their own policies.  
Greece, until 2016 did not offer access to social benefits, education and accommodation to 
asylum applicants. The SYRIZA government undertook significant legal reforms to amend the 
access to services for both recognised refugees and asylum seekers. According to Article 69 
and 71 L 4375/2016, recognized refugees receive full and automatic access to the labour market 
without requiring a work permit. Article 17(1) L 4540/2018 provides the same conditions and 
perquisites to vocational training programmes for Greek nationals and asylum-seeking 
applicants. These “same conditions and prerequisites as foreseen for Greek nationals” 
disregards the difficulty involved in providing necessary documentation by asylum seekers, 
automatically placing them in a different position from Greek nationals. Article 17(2) L 
4540/2018 addresses this concern by designating the Joint Ministerial as responsible for 
assessing an applicants’ skills if they do not have proper documentation.  
According to a survey issued by the UNHCR in October 2018 with 1,436 asylum seekers and 
refugee participants, “[m]ost participants reported difficulties in accessing the labour market. 
They attributed this to a lack of information, high unemployment rates, lack of required 
documentation (e.g. residency permits, passport), language barriers, the remoteness of some 
sites from cities, and lack of job advise and placement support […] The lack of Greek language 
classes, which most perceive to be required for integration, was a commonly referenced issue. 
While most participants have social security numbers (AMKA), they have difficulty obtaining 
other documents such as AFM and unemployment cards from OAED.” (UNHCR, 2018). 
Preparatory classes for all school-age children (4 to 15 years old) were established by a 
Ministerial decision in 2016, specifically targeting students who live in open temporary 
facilities. Implemented in public schools neighbouring the camps, the program taught Greek, 
English language, mathematics, sports, arts and computer science (European Parliament, 2017). 




the implementation rate of additional programming is slow, they need to catch up, and higher 
education (secondary school, university, and even vocational training) remain inaccessible.  
Asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection over the age of 15 were targeted 
for a pilot program of Greek language courses in January of 2018. The Ministry of Education 
and the Ministry Migration Policy were funded by Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF) to advance the program, with 2,000 participants between the ages of 15 and 18 and 
3,000 participants older than 18 (ibid).  
Vulnerable people and those without social security are provided with free access to public 
health services and pharmaceutical treatment based on Article 33 of Law 4368 adopted in 2016. 
Unfortunately, administrative barriers persist due to a lack of awareness of the 2016 law by 
health professionals and complications with issuing social security.  
Under Article 14(8) of Law 4375, the head of the Reception and Identification Procedure is 
expected to guide vulnerable groups and individuals to social support and protection 
institutions.  In practice this did not take place. MSF issued a report in October 2016 which 
underscored the lapses in the system that do not appropriately identify vulnerable populations 
(especially survivors of sexual violence, unaccompanied children, patients with chronic 
diseases, and those with special needs) but more importantly, do not connect them with 
necessary resources (MSF, 2016).   
Despite the legislative initiatives, Greece continued to fall short of service provision to 
recognised refugees and asylum seekers. There was no direct link between asylum and 
integration- a gap that Greece has not been able to address to this day. Thus, though not 
explicitly in conflict with EU legislation, Greece falls short in the practice and implementation 
comparatively to other EU Member States.  
 
5. Synthesis  
The period of 2015-2018 proved particularly challenging for Greece. The country first 
functioned as a transit stop and eventually a country of strandedness for thousands of migrants. 
A very clear gap existed between the official government discourse and the reality on the 
ground. Humanitarianism and hospitality were initially promoted as the official approach of 
Greece but little evidence of this existed in practice. With little accommodation facilities, an 
asylum service understaffed to handle the number of asylum applications and the hotspot 
approach implemented on the islands, Greece has emerged as a country that is a member of the 
EU but falls short of the standards set by the Common European Asylum System. The majority 
of initiatives undertaken were in fact, funded by the European Commission and implemented 
by international organisations and NGOs as implementing partners. There is little evidence of 
a national migration and asylum policy, with the country more focused on responding to the 
pressure applied by its European partners. This resulted in significant shortcomings, with 
Greece failing to address the needs of the migrants.  
The period 2015-2018 also showed the shortcomings of the EU policy on asylum that remains 
grounded on placing more responsibility on frontline partners rather than burden sharing and 
responsibility- sharing across the EU. Solidarity was never part of the original design of the 
Common European Asylum System and it continues to this day to be a critical shortcoming of 
EU migration policy. Nonetheless the refugee crisis serves as a valuable lesson. Neither the 
Statement nor the closure of the Western Balkan route proved sufficient in reducing arrivals in 
the medium-term. In 2019, Greece was once more on the receiving end of large numbers that 
arrived in a country fatigued with the presence of refugees. Without a common strategy on how 




provide anything more than short term relief. Without a national holistic policy on migration 
that links asylum with integration, Greece will continue to fall short of the European framework 
in the future.   
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1. Background information  
The size of foreign-born population in Hungary is 564,761 or 5.78% (Eurostat). This is in line 
with the low value in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region (not counting the special 
cases of Baltic states with Russian population and post-Yugoslav states with now-foreign 
population from former republics, CEE countries have the lowest ratio of foreign-born 
population). Hungary does not have a history of immigration comparable to older EU member 
states. Most naturalized citizens have traditionally been Hungarian co-ethnics living in 
neighboring countries. Under a 2010 amendment, members of this group do not have to 
establish residence in the country to be able to naturalize (external ethnic citizenship). In public 
discourse, ethnic Hungarians moving to Hungary are not considered migrants. In the first years 
after the 1989/90 regime change(s), the vast majority of immigrants where ethnic Hungarians  
(Gödri, 2010: 88–89). 
The number of resident non-citizens varied between approx. 140,000 and 160,000 in the 
analyzed period, with around two-thirds having arrived from Europe (Gödri 2010: 88-89). 
Immigration to Hungary is relatively low, in the ten thousand, mostly European in origin, with 
the leading countries being Romania, Ukraine, Germany and Slovakia. Immigration from 
Ukraine has increased considerably, due most likely to the conflict and probably 
disproportionately involving ethnic Hungarians (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Legal migration taken together, not counting EU citizens, are in the tens of thousands per year, 
with a peak in 2018 
Permits issued by 
reasons / year 
2014 2015 2016 2017  2018 
Employment and 
remunerated activities 
13 010 12 650 14 500 25 637 62 362 
Education 10 615 12 576 14 103 19 258 29 039 
Family 7 742 6 984 5 740 5 397 8 198 
Other reasons 5 576 5 895 5 254 5 714 6 820 
Official visits 1 611 1 742 1 843 2 120 2 799 
Other grounds 929 499 515 797 2 061 
Total 39 483 40 346 41 955 58 923 111 279 
Calculations based on data from BAH. Employment and remunerated activities combined for years 2017 
and 2018 (separate in the data source). 
 
The data show that the increase in 2018 is due to income-related activities like employment 




The number of people granted protection following an asylum application is considerably 
lower. The number of asylum seekers used to be relatively steady, in the low thousands. From 
2013 to 2015, we can see increases by orders of magnitude, up to the peak at 177,135 in 2015. 
 













2000 7 801 197 680 11.24% 
2001 9 554 174 290 4.86% 
2002 6 412 104 1 304 21.96% 
2003 2 401 178 772 39.57% 
2004 1 600 149 177 20.38% 
2005 1 609 97 95 11.93% 
2006 2 117 99 99 9.35% 
2007 3 419 169 83 7.37% 
2008 3 118 160 130 9.30% 
2009 4 672 177 220 8.50% 
2010 2 104 83 190 12.98% 
2011 1 693 52 153 12.11% 
2012 2 157 87 375 21.42% 
2013 18 900 198 221 2.22% 
2014 42 777 240 243 1.13% 
2015 177 135 146 362 0.29% 
2016 29 432 154 278 1.47% 
2017 3 397 106 1 185 38.00% 
2018 671 68 299 54.69% 
2019 500 22 38 12.00% 
Source: KSH on own calculations based on KSH, 
https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnvn003.html 
 
What the numbers do not show is that in 2015, there were two waves of asylum seekers. In the 
beginning of the year, many came from Kosovo, most of them likely not qualifying and in fact 
refused recognition, while starting summer 2015, Syrian and Afghan asylum seekers started to 
show up at the border in larger numbers. This latter trend continued. In 2016–18 the share of 
Afghans from those filing for asylum was around 40%, Iraqi 12-36%, Syrians 7-17%, Pakistanis 
4-13%, Iranians around 3-4% (other national groups below 4%).22 
                                                     
21 ’Oltalmazott’ or ’befogadott’. 




The ratios for 2017 and up are misleading in that the true filtering has been happening at the 
border, with the decisive majority of asylum seekers not even getting to the point where they 
could file a request that would show up in the statistics. (See more on transit zones under Section 
2.2.1 below.) 
The number of people who received some type of protection remained low, with the ratios of 
recognition falling to extreme lows (0.29% in 2015). This is largely due to measures that violate 
international and European human rights standards (for an overview of these, see Sections 2.2.3 
and 3.2.). 
 
Table 3. Number of asylum decisions by type.  
Type / number of decisions by asylum 
authority 
2015 2016 2017 2018 
recognition as refugee 146 154 106 68 
subsidiary protection (‘oltalmazott’) 356 271 1 110 281 
subsidiary protection (‘befogadott’) 6 7 75 18 
discontinuation 152 260 49 479 2 049 160 
rejection 2 917 4 675 2 880 595 
Data source: BAH 
 
It is often emphasized that Hungary was and remained a transit country, which is true for many 
asylum seekers. This, however, might hide the fact that this is at least partly23 a result of the 
inadequate regime these people experience and also the fact that there is in fact a sizable 
immigrant population. (The relative economic position and the linguistic isolation are other 
possible factors.) The shortcomings of integration policies were only aggravated by measures 
in the 2015–18 period that saw earlier supportive integrative measures – themselves criticized 
as inadequate, leading in documented cases to homelessness24 – completely dismantled (Szabó, 
2019). 
  
                                                     
23 The relative economic position and the linguistic isolation are other possible factors. 




Table 4. Incoming and outgoing ‘Dublin’ requests and transfers, submitted by and received by Hungary 













2010 2,047  446  695  178  
2011 1,718  139  411  70  
2012 1,433  191  335  126  
2013 7,756  314  850  32  
2014 7,930  1,815  827  89  
2015 :  :  :  :  
2016 26,740  :  :  204  
2017 6,805  896  129  217  
2018 2,644  277  65  53  
2019 1,694  200  1 28 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Hungary is a transit country for human trafficking and (facilitation of) irregular migration. It is 
also a sending country for human trafficking and regular migration. An official report put the 
number of Hungarians who moved to other EU countries at over 461,000 in 2017 (Gödri, 2018: 
238). 
 
2. Immigration as a political issue 
2.1. Political context 
2.1.1. The positions of major domestic parties (including the parties in the government) 
on the problem of immigration and their evolution, relevance of the immigration issue in 
the national elections (2015-2018) 
Immigration in the public discourse in 2015-18 was mostly about asylum seekers, but the 
government terminology was using the term “(economic) migrant”, associated with crime and 
terrorism. Immigration became a key issue in all subsequent political campaigns, even in local 
elections. (Local governments in Hungary have no competences that could influence national 
migration policies.) Bognár et al. (2018) call this the “moral panic button” that they describe as 
a high-cost and long-term mass manipulation technique that relies on controlled media, 
billboard campaigns, the “National Consultations” (questionnaires sent out to all citizens with 
multiple choice questions that are criticized for deviating from polling standards in their 
formulation that influences answers). Combined with other illiberal (anti-pluralist, anti-
constitutionalist) measures, this effectively eliminated meaningful pluralism. A crucial aspect 
of the regime in Hungary that is important to understand the political context of immigration is 
the authoritarian turn that led to political hegemony, domination in political discourse, the 
media, with strong anti-pluralist effects combined with anti-constitutionalist (undermining the 
separation of powers, the rule of law and, ultimately, human rights). Given the limits of this 




The concentration of power also means that the positions of the government and of the 
governing party alliance (with FIDESZ and a small entity that is only nominally a separate 
party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party) are undistinguishable (for details of 
government positions and policies, see Section 2.2.1 below). 
Public discourse was dominated by government narratives, simplified statements and focuses 
on more abstract issues like “Hungary’s identity”, “ethnic homogeneity”, “defending Christian 
culture”, “fight against pro-migrant forces” and “liberalism”, internationally as well as 
domestically but increasingly more on the EU level, and less on concrete policy questions. 
Some understand this as a securitizing meta-framing that builds on fear to maintain support and 
mobilization, with effects of polarization and enemification (Majtényi et al., 2019). “Pro-
immigration”, “liberal” forces, including those in the EU (termed ‘Brussels’ in this narrative), 
non-responsive bureaucracies and secret deals have to be fought by the genuine representatives 
of the people and protectors of national sovereignty and “Christian Europe” (used in a cultural-
civilizationist sense). 
The government narrative was aggressively employed in the large part of media (those under 
direct or indirect government control, which covers the majority of outlets), which led to 
increased xenophobia and also changes in the language (Bernáth & Messing, 2016). The word 
‘migrant’ (‘migráns’) became a dirty word, with constructed expressions like ‘migránsozás’ 
(talking about migrants in a negative way). The government actively campaigned against 
immigration, asylum seekers and refugees almost without stop, inciting hatred (Milka Tadić 
Mijović & Šajkaš, 2016: 4; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015). Government agencies, the police 
and the security services readily played into this framing by strengthening the connection to 
threats and criminality (Bernáth & Messing, 2016: 11–12). 
Thematization of migration was first apparent in the context of the Charlie Hebdo case. 
Government actors identified non-European immigration as a cause for concern but emphasized 
the non-religious elements like culture and human rights. It was Jobbik that took a traditional 
extreme right position, talking about the clash of civilizations. Even this was tamed, however, 
by earlier pro-Islam statements of the party leader. The idea of a referendum on the issue and 
the border fence were also first advanced by Jobbik (Bíró-Nagy, 2018: 272). 
Subsequent developments saw a quick shift in the government position towards the narrative 
on an existential threat to European and Christian civilization, with racial undertones, links to 
criminality and terrorism, dehumanization (Bernáth & Messing, 2016). This narrative allows 
speakers to play on post-socialist ressentiment and talk about the failure of the West to integrate 
and deal with its own post-colonial problem. This can go as far as Prime Minister Orbán 
claiming that true refugees are fleeing the multiculturalist catastrophe in Western countries and 
Hungary is willing to take them in, as opposed to “economic migrants” from outside Europe 
(Orbán, 2017). 
A party headed by former socialist PM Ferenc Gyurcsány (DK, Democratic Coalition) 
questioned most vehemently this narrative, supporting a party member who vandalized the 
border fence and the party leader sheltering asylum seekers in his home. His former party, the 
Socialists (MSZP, Hungarian Socialist Party) mostly kept a low profile, with most 
commentators seeing this as a sign that they wanted to be both critical of the government and 
to avoid wandering too far from what they considered as a generally anti-immigration public 
opinion. LMP (Politics Can Be Different), the green party seemed to be torn between a classical 
human rights-based approach and the opposition to what they saw as globalist pro-immigration 
positions. The opposition, with few exceptions (usually from smaller parties like Együtt, or 




opted for a criticism of the government for failing to deal with the problem (Bernáth & Messing, 
2016: 11). 
The voice of the opposition was generally weak due most to factors like the hegemonic media 
landscape and the curtailed funding and parliamentary powers. Most parties avoided strong 
statements that could have been labelled in the dominant government narrative as pro-migrant 
(“migrant-lover”, “migrant-stroking”), not willing to defend the proposal of an EU-wide quota 
mechanism. While there was criticism of the fence, its costs and effectiveness, there was a 
single minor opposition party (“Együtt” or “Together”) that would have eliminated the fence. 
(The party did not make it to the Parliament in the following, 2018 elections.) This hesitant and 
ineffective criticism was also true for the “quota referendum” campaign in 2016. It is 
emblematic that the large number of government billboards that in many places outnumbered 
all other (commercial) billboards were not countered by visible opposition campaigns but by a 
mock party (Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party) operated from donations, relying on parodies of 
government messages. 
The topic of irregular migration and the quota was carefully selected by the government and 
also as a result of the constant focus on migration in the government framing, the overwhelming 
majority of votes for the pro-government position was taken for granted.25 Under Hungarian 
law, for a referendum to be valid, more than 50% of the voting population should cast a valid 
vote. As a result, most opposition parties and non-government-affiliated (civil society) 
organizations suggested either abstention or casting an invalid vote, for they saw the invalidity 
of the referendum as the only realistic goal. It was a small liberal party that campaigned for a 
valid but anti-government-position vote (MTI, 2016), fueling rumors of government influence 
(Keller-Alánt, 2018). 
There were unsuccessful attempts, by the opposition, to refocus the migration debate from the 
asylum question, especially after the number of asylum seekers decreased considerably, talking 
instead about ‘the real migration issue’, i.e. the hundreds of thousands (Gödri, 2018) who left 
Hungary for more well-off member states for work, the issues in health care, or corruption. 
Migration became the central topic, a godsend at a time when public support for the governing 
party started to shrink, with increased support for far-right Jobbik in 2015 (Tóka, 2018). The 
government strategy was to make migration the number one issue and presenting it as an 
existential threat to the nation. Government-affiliated (both state and private) media outlets 
have been strongly working on establishing the threat of immigration in line with government 
narratives (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015c). One of the high-profile examples was the video 
of the head of the Office of the Prime Minister who showed streets in Vienna, commenting on 
the non-white immigrants who took over parts of the city, which led, according to him, dirt and 
disorder.26 The timing and the narration makes it clear that the video, which was temporarily 
removed by Facebook for the violation of community guidelines, sought to persuade voters that 
an opposition takeover will result in a similar immigrant takeover. 
The topic of immigration was made central to Hungarian politics, discourses and political 
campaigns. As a result, Hungarians, together with the Estonians and the Czechs, are the most 
concerned about this issue (Simonovits & Szeitl, 2019: 309). In Hungary, “the proportion of 
those who opposed immigration and who had a negative attitude toward the impact of 
immigration doubled or even tripled” between 2014 and 2016 (Simonovits & Szeitl, 2019: 309). 
After an initial decrease in xenophobic attitudes in 2015, coinciding with the anti-immigration 
                                                     
25 The text of the question put to referendum was as follows: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to 
prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National 
Assembly?”. 




campaign of the government, xenophile attitudes effectively disappeared, and xenophobic 
attitudes that were already high increased further (Table 5; Messing & Ságvári, 2018). In 
European comparison, the rejection index of third country nationals stands it for Hungary, at 
48%, with Estonia and the Czech Republic following Hungary with 29 and 28%. It is again this 
background that there is still a face of Hungary that is welcoming to migrants. This is confirmed 
by migrant accounts (Bernát et al., 2019: 38) as well as civil activities that surged in 2015 to 
help asylum seekers (Feischmidt & Zakariás, 2019). 
 
Table 5. Attitudes towards aliens 
 Xenophobes Thinkers Xenophiles 
2014 39 51 10 
April 2015 46 45 9 
July 2015 39 56 5 
October 2015 36 60 4 
January 2016 53 46 1 
October 2016 58 41 1 
January 2017 60 38 2 
Source: Simonovits, 2020: 162 
 
2.1.2. Relevance of different arguments used for or against immigration in the political 
and public debate 
The governing parties employed the narrative constructed by PM Viktor Orbán which despised 
the failed multiculturalist West and declared a struggle against pro-immigration, liberal forces 
inside and outside Hungary, to maintain the ethnic homogeneity and the national identity of the 
country. Immigration is primarily of an economic nature and Europe will cease to be Europe, 
nations will not be recognizable anymore if we let in immigrants from other countries. Those 
who are in need should receive support where they live, and only ‘true refugees’ should get 
protection, especially those fleeing multiculturalism and arrive from Western countries.27 The 
dominant government narrative depicted asylum seekers as motivated by economic 
considerations, often not poor in the traditional sense (e.g. having mobile phones and means to 
pay to smugglers) instead of a justified fear from persecution, war etc. In any case, Hungary is 
not bordering conflict zones, so whoever arrives to Hungary arrived through a safe third country 
and Hungary has no obligation to take people in who did not come directly from countries 
where they were in danger. Those who criticize the government are against Hungarian interests 
and are mercenaries of the pro-immigration forces. As such, they present a threat to the nation 
and not legitimate political actors and people who happen to hold a different opinion in a policy 
field (for more on the government position, see Section 2.2.1 below). 
As the opposition voices remained weak and dispersed, it was often NGOs active in the asylum 
and refugee field whose position was contrasted with that of the government. The most visible 
was the Hungarian Helsinki Committee that had been providing support to asylum seekers for 
decades. Civil rights activists referred to humanitarian, moral obligations as well as 
international and European obligations embodying this ethic, and the dubious factual basis for 
                                                     
27 “We shall let in true refugees: Germans, Dutch, French, and Italians, terrified politicians and journalists who 




anti-refugee statements (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015c). They often used historical 
examples of Hungarians taking refuge in other countries (after the revolutions of 1848-49 and 
1956), or Hungary helping others in the years of transition (East Germans, Hungarians from 
Romania and Yugoslavia) (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2017b). Seeking to undermine the 
argument of a threat to the country, critiques pointed out that, even at the peak of asylum 
seekers, most never intended to stay in Hungary. Accounts often voiced criticism of the 
confusion of terrorism and immigration, describing asylum seekers as potential terrorists 
instead of human beings fleeing from terrorism.28 Government messages were labelled as hate 
speech by the UN Human Rights Committee (Nebehay, 2018). As the fears instigated by 
sustained anti-immigrant messages, reports of incidents against (falsely29 or rightly identified, 
Szomszéd, 2017; Panyi, 2015) migrants emerged.30 The International Religious Freedom 
Report for 2015 of the United States cited reports, from the Muslim community, of “physical 
and verbal attacks and threats, including 10 to 15 physical assaults against Muslim women 
wearing headscarves.” (US Department of State, 2015) Furthermore, “Muslim leaders said the 
public hostility toward the community stemmed from anti-Muslim rhetoric of senior 
government officials” (US Department of State, 2015). 
 Less central were arguments about economic benefits from immigration or the fact that 
Hungary has never been homogenous,31 especially not in the past of “Great Hungary”, glorified 
in government narratives, when less than half of the population was ethnic Hungarian. A 
sociologist was targeted in a pro-government smear campaign after a statement about migrants 
being, in general, better qualified than the average population (HVG, 2018). 
2.2. Policy in action  
2.2.1. Assessment of the governmental position on immigration, together with the 
information on its evolution (2015-2018) 
Immigration became a central narrative for the government, justifying government positions 
more generally.32 The migration framing encompassed practically all political areas. E.g., the 
European criticism of the rule of law situation in Hungary was presented by the government as 
a “revenge” of pro-migration forces for having built the fence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2018). More generally, “[a]ll changes in asylum and migration law together with 
administrative modifications have been connected to the domestic political purposes (using the 
referendum on relocation, poster campaigns against migrants, intimidation of NGOs, etc.) 
instead of operating European or global migration context” (Bernát et al., 2019: 21). The 
government declared that all “attacks on Hungary” are motivated by immigration (i.e. the 
country’s anti-immigration position) (Government of Hungary, 2018). 
                                                     
28 “Migrants are portrayed as dangerous enemies in both official and public discourses in this country.” (United 
Nations, 2019). 
29 The number of false complaints about “illegal immigrants” also raised, according to the police. 
http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-hireink/helyi-hirek/nem-igaz-a-hir. 
30 See https://bit.ly/3n72XNZ. In one case of anti-migrant violence, authorities were unwilling to bring charges, 
and only sustained civil rights action allowed the case to get to court. https://bit.ly/397Xe5B. For a list of some 
documented cases, see: https://bit.ly/38YKn5E; https://bit.ly/34Yaecn. 
31 These arguments often came from academic commentators. For such an account, see e.g., the publications by 
Professor Boldizsár Nagy in the Hungarian media: https://bit.ly/2KKqjfe. 
32 For an example from after 2018, there were attempts to connect the spread of the virus to the larger narrative of 
the threat of illegal immigration that initially proved unsuccessful, but, in the later phases, stressing this connection 




Officially, immigration policy in Hungary rests on the Immigration Strategy adopted in 2013.33 
The document specifically refers to the EU requirements and uses a language of full 
compliance. The Strategy reiterates commitments to uphold international obligations under 
asylum law and to cooperate with civil society actors. It is in line with European standards, 
while it goes against actual Hungarian practice. 
The official line talks about zero immigration, not becoming a country of immigration as 
opposed to Western countries. This is contradicted by both the official immigration strategy 
and actual practice: work-related immigration rules and investment-based visa program. 
Number of visas issued was growing from 2014, with work-related migration being a leading 
ground; the number of such visas (work and remunerated activities) increased from 25,637 
(2017) to 62,362 (2018) in the final two years of the period covered in this report (see Table 1 
in Section 1). 
Applicants who bought € 250,000, later 300,000 worth bonds issued by the state treasury 
(repaid by the state in five years) could benefit from an investor visa (“golden visa”) program 
from 2013 to 2017, granting long-term residency rights. According to reports, 6583 individuals 
benefited from this scheme (Zöldi, 2019). An NGO report concluded that the program closed 
with a loss for the taxpayers (Romhányi, 2018). 
Just like in the case of citizenship and many other fields of law, general, often restrictive laws 
are circumvented by targeted preferential regimes. In a field of immigration that is not treated 
as immigration in the political discourse, ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries can 
naturalize without moving to Hungary, following a 2010 amendment, while the non-preferential 
rules of naturalization remained stringent, with a general eight-year residency requirement. The 
number of new citizens surpassed one million, or ten per cent of the resident population, in 
2017 (Government of Hungary, 2017). 
In a high-profile case, former Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski was transferred by 
Hungarian diplomats and was promptly recognized as a refugee in Hungary while sought under 
corruption charges in his home country and sentenced to two years of imprisonment (Vass, 
2019). He did not have to wait in the transit zone as all others (see below), although he arrived 
through Serbia, and was instead escorted by Hungarian diplomats. After a July 2018 
amendment to the Asylum Act, all asylum seekers received inadmissibility decisions, with the 
sole exception of Mr. Gruevski. (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2018: 12). 
A program was established to support Christians in need, “to display [Hungary’s] solidarity 
conscientiously and visibly to international public opinion” (Hungary Helps Agency, n.d.). The 
program emphasizes that it seeks to help people stay where they live (Hungary Helps Agency, 
n.d.). 
According to media reports, hundreds of refugees are accepted and supported by the Hungarian 
government (Thorpe, 2019). The deputy prime minister rejected that they could be labelled 
“migrants” as they have Hungarian ancestors (Thorpe, 2019). 
The central element of the immigration narrative, asylum policy went through frequent changes 
but the direction remained after the 2015 turn. That year brought significant changes to the 
immigration system and marked a turn in asylum-related policies. Ever since, access to 
protection and integration measures largely disappeared. A fence was built, and consecutive 
                                                     
33 Az 1698/2013. (X. 4.) Korm. határozattal elfogadott Migrációs Stratégia és az azon alapuló, az Európai Unió 
által a 2014-2020. ciklusban létrehozásra kerülő Menekültügyi és Migrációs Alaphoz kapcsolódó hétéves stratégiai 
tervdokumentum, http://belugyialapok.hu/alapok/sites/default/files/MMIA_.pdf. In English: The Migration 
Strategy and the seven-year strategic document related to Asylum and Migration Fund established by the European 




measures led to a situation where a tiny fraction of asylum seekers can access asylum 
procedures and even less are recognized as refugees or deserving other types of protection. A 
report in 2019 concluded that “the building of the fence at the Serbian and Croatian border, the 
hindering of the civil society, the closing of the refugee reception centers, the destruction of the 
welfare and legal basis of any pro-migration institution that provides almost no integration 
support for asylum-seekers made Hungary practically a closed country for asylum seekers” 
(Bernát et al., 2019: 5). 
In Summer 2015, many asylum seekers gathered and stayed in Budapest. Early September, after 
not being able to move to Austria, their next destination, a crowd started walking towards 
Austria on the highway. This triggered a reaction from the government, providing buses that 
took them to the border. Yet, due to earlier experience and a general mistrust, many were first 
unwilling to board buses. Most citizens who would have been willing to help did not take the 
risk of helping as many claimed this could qualify as a crime (smuggling). Austrian citizens 
were allowed to help. An agreement finally allowed asylum seekers to be transferred to Austria 
and Germany (FRA, 2016: 5). 
The government built a fence along its southern border in 2015, later extended, despite claims, 
by the minister of interior, that those who attempt at irregular border crossing are intercepted at 
97–98% rate (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015b, para. 2). In the mid-September to mid-
October period, the government was transferring, to the Austrian border, asylum seekers who 
got around the Serbian border and came to Hungary through Croatia, without registration or 
other processing (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (Hungarian Helsinki Committee), 2017: 8). 
The governing majority criminalized the illegal crossing of the border and established transit 
zones (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015f) on the border with Serbia (Röszke, Tompa) and at 
the airport (the zones were closed in 2020 after the decision of the ECJ, see in Section 3.2 
below). The number of entries to the transit zones and the applications that could be filed from 
there was limited, eventually shrinking to a single application per day per transit zone. These 
measures pushed irregular migration into more dangerous tactics like transfer in cargo area of 
trucks (Rendőrség, 2018), or even under trucks (Kisalföld, 2015). In one case, 71 asylum 
seekers suffocated in a tractor trailer (IOM, 2015). 
When the number of asylum seekers did not decrease, the government and the governing 
majority adopted amendments to legalize push-backs, first limited to an 8-km zone of the 
border, later extended to the entire country. Complaints of police violence emerged. According 
to a 2017 report based on the visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), “a significant number of foreign 
nationals interviewed by the delegation alleged that they had been physically ill-treated by 
Hungarian police officers in the context of their apprehension and return through the border 
fence towards Serbia (push-backs)” (CPT, 2018: 3). The CPT also noted that “the arrangements 
currently in place do not provide effective protection against refoulement, including chain 
refoulement, and recommends, inter alia, that the Hungarian authorities put an end to the 
practice of push-backs to the Serbian side of the border” (CPT, 2018: 4). 
As a result of these events, asylum seekers quickly disappeared from the country (Bernát et al., 
2019: 42–43). Both the presence and the march of the asylum seekers was used as images 
supporting the government narrative of the “migrant threat”. These images continued to be 
used, sometimes supported by imported photos.34 The limited entry to the transit zones led to 
crowds accumulating before the entry point. The resulting tensions culminated in a 2015 case 
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where a crowd of asylum seekers stranded on the Serbian side protested against the action of 
the Hungarian police, with some of the participants becoming violent (FRA, 2016: 20). The 
Hungarian police dispersed the crowd (with Serbia claiming to have its territory violated) and 
10 people were charged and eventually sentenced, in a controversial court case, to prison 
sentences, under terrorism charges (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2016b). 
It has been a long-documented feature of Hungarian asylum procedures that people leave before 
the authorities could conduct their assessment and decide on the request asylum seekers 
themselves initiated. This was in fact a crucial reason for authorities to maintain that asylum 
seekers should remain in closed institutions while their procedure is pending (a reasoning 
human rights activists in turn rejected as disproportionate). 
Mass detention has been a long-criticized feature of the Hungarian asylum regime, from well 
before 2015 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2013: 42–50) and even predating 2010 (Nagy, 
2013). The failure to provide food to asylum seekers held in transit zones was recurrently halted 
then reinstated as a response to interim measures of the ECtHR (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 
2018). By June 2016, the existing elements of the integration regime (for those few who 
received protection) was effectively dismantled (Mijatović, 2019: 4; Szabó, 2019), arguing that 
migrants should not get more than citizens35 (for more details on the legislation affecting 
asylum, see Section 3.1 below) The dismantling of the asylum system falls especially heavy on 
groups that are particularly vulnerable, including children (Bakonyi et al., 2017), women and 
LGBTI persons (Bakonyi, 2018),36 and victims of torture (Barna & Gyulai, 2016). 
2.2.2. Challenges in implementation of the common EU migration policies in the relevant 
country 
The central challenge to the implementation of EU policies in the field of immigration was that 
the government built on the narrative of a constant fight against pro-immigration forces that 
include “Brussels”, the name that became a smear name for the EU in pro-government 
narratives. At the same time, however, they also sought to maintain the narrative of complying 
with all international and European obligations. 
The government specifically rejected the argument that it broke the principle of solidarity, 
which culminated in legal arguments challenging the legality of the relocation quota (see under 
3.2 below). It argued that Hungary was actually doing more than its fair share in the form of 
border protection, including the fence, and that taking in a larger number of refugees or asylum 
seekers would go against national sovereignty and identity, the goal of maintaining ‘ethnic 
homogeneity’. The fact that Hungary continued to process (a small number of) asylum 
applications and to recognize (an even smaller number of) refugees was used to argue that there 
is in fact compliance with asylum requirements. E.g., a deputy state secretary argued, in an 
interview with a Maltese journal, that Hungary took about 1300 refugees, answering a question 
about the obligation “to take about 1300 migrants” under the EU quota (Micallef, 2018), a 
narrative that created some confusion and was later taken over by the entire government. 
The standard position of external Schengen border states like Greece, Italy or Hungary was that 
the Dublin regime is unfair in that it puts an unfair burden on these member states. (In the case 
of Hungary, it is also important that Dublin transfers to Greece, a country most asylum seekers 
cross well before arriving at the Hungarian border, were generally halted from 201137 to 
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2017.38) This would imply that these states would be the most vocal supporters of a relocation 
regime. The government of Hungary, in fact, has been opposing such proposals. The challenge 
to EU policies culminated in the government-initiated national referendum on European asylum 
quotas. The relevant bodies – the National Electoral Committee as well as the Constitutional 
Court, both less than independent institutions after public law changes establishing the regime 
– green lighted the initiative despite unconstitutionality on at least three grounds (Szente, 2016). 
While the results of the referendum were invalid due to the low turnout, the government relied 
on the high number of yes votes to justify its position (98.36% of the valid votes favoring the 
government position, rejecting quotas, with a high number of invalid votes at 6.17%39). As the 
post-referendum period fell to the only time where the governing majority lost its supermajority 
in the parliament, due to interim elections, an amendment to the Fundamental Law could not 
pass. The Ombudsperson and the Constitutional Court nevertheless helped out the government 
by initiating and adopting, respectively, a resolution that read into the Fundamental Law the 
amendment that could not be adopted by legislative means, supporting the government narrative 
that relied on identitarian and sovereigntist arguments against EU quota proposals.40 
2.2.3. Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
The position of the Government of Hungary conflicted fundamentally with the positions of EU, 
Council of Europe and UN bodies as is documented below (Section 3.2). In the words of 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatović,  “it is extremely difficult 
to access the refugee determination procedure in Hungary”, “applicants cannot access an 
effective remedy”, face “excessive use of violence by the police during forcible removals” and 
the Hungarian practice is “in violation of European and international asylum law” (Mijatović, 
2019: 4). 
The transparency necessary to do a thorough assessment of government measures and practices 
is missing. Independent experts were denied entering facilities in a number of cases (Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, 2017a: 11),41 including a UN delegation.42 
Against the scenery of incompatibility, the government in many cases sought to maintain some 
level of compliance that can be likened to the “fake compliance” phenomenon familiar from 
the literature on pre-accession conditionality (Noutcheva, 2009). For instance, the creation of 
closed transit zones while not providing food, only allowing in one person per day, and 
automatically rejecting all applicants arriving through Serbia rendered asylum protection 
meaningless in most cases. In other cases, the government engaged in a direct conflict with EU 
norms, arguing, e.g., that instead of taking in asylum seekers and refugees, it discharges its 
duties under European solidarity in the form of protecting the borders. The Commission pointed 
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the disappeared number is available through external cached version of the site at https://bit.ly/3n02UmY. The 
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40 Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB. In a similar vein, see Decision 2/2019 (III. 5.) AB, stating, among others, that 
“the right to asylum is not the refugee’s individual subjective right”. 
41 “In October 2017, the authorities terminated cooperation agreements with the HHC and have denied access to 
police detention, prisons and immigration detention after two decades of cooperation andover2,000 visits. The 
HHC can no longer monitor human rights in closed institutions. No other organisation conducts monitoring visits 
in the closed facilities, including the transit zones, that would result in public reports.” (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2018, p. 12) 
42 UN human rights experts suspend Hungary visit after access denied, Press Release, UNIS/MA/237, 15 




out, in response, that no à la carte solidarity is possible, members should comply with EU law 
requirements in their entirety (Juncker, 2017). Once it was established that food needs to be 
provided to those held in the transit zones, a prominent government politician countered that 
the country does not have an obligation to provide food for tourists visiting the country, 
implying that the same standard should apply in the two cases (Magyar, 2019). 
The paradox of the Dublin procedure is that the less compliant the Hungarian asylum system 
is, the less people are sent back (following decisions that find the Hungarian asylum regime to 
be in violation of minimum standards). This effectively rewards non-compliance in the eyes of 
a regime who seeks legitimacy by declaring itself anti-immigration. 
 
3. Immigration as a legal issue 
3.1. Brief description of the applicable legal framework in a relevant country together 
with the analysis of its actual implementation 
Key elements of the Hungarian asylum system rest on Act No. 80 of 2007 on Asylum (with its 
implementing Govt. decree no. 301/2007 (XI. 9)), Act No. 2 of 2007 on the Entry and Stay of 
Third-Country Nationals (and its implementing Govt. decree no. 114/2007 (V. 24)) and Govt. 
decree no. 9/2013 (VI.28) on the rules of execution of asylum detention and bail. All of these 
saw extensive and recurring amendments in the 2015–18 period. Many of the key provisions 
did not stand scrutiny under EU law (see Section 3.2 below). 
The increased number of asylum seekers arriving to Hungary did not trigger government action 
first. Later, state-organized buses took asylum seekers to the Austrian borders, without proper 
registration under the Schengen acquis, later including those bused to the Hungarian border by 
Croatian authorities (Bernát et al., 2019, n. 9). The events culminated in the building of the 
fence along the southern border (see earlier) and the surrounding amendments marked a clear 
break for asylum policy and asylum seekers (Bernát et al., 2019: 33). 
Amending Act No. 127 of 2015 (August) authorized the Government to designate safe third 
countries, and the Government acted upon this authorization, declaring by force of law, Serbia 
as a safe third country, with decree no. 191 of 2015,43 against earlier expert and judicial 
assessments.44 The strict enforcement of this rule led to removal against UN call (Magyar 
Helsinki Bizottság, 2017a). 
Amending Act No. 127 of 2015 eliminated effective procedural guarantees and expanded the 
time of detention (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015d). The amendment limited the right to use 
one’s native language in criminal proceedings by eliminating the obligation to provide 
translations of the indictment and the judgment (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015e). The law 
also introduced what is called the “immigration-related emergency”, stating its conditions. 
While these were not met, after the first month (Tóth, 2015: 62–63; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 
2015g), the Government continued to prolong it (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2019), every six 
months since,45 expanding it the entire territory of the country.46 This special legal order means 
                                                     
43 Govt. decree no. 191/2015. (VII. 21) Gov. decree, Art. 2. 
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supreme court: 2/2012 (XII.10) KMK. vélemény a biztonságos harmadik ország megítélésének egyes kérdéseiről, 
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45 In the reviewed period: Govt. decrees 270/2015 (IX. 18), 41/2016 (III. 9) (expanding the territorial scope as 
well), 272/2016 (IX. 5), 36/2017 (III. 6), 247/2017 (VIII. 31), 21/2018. (II. 16), 159/2018 (IX. 3). 




that individual rights can be limited in more extended ways, including property rights, freedom 
of movement, but also the possibility to use the army in border protection. 
Amending Act No. 140 of 2015 (September) introduced simplified assessment and moved the 
procedure to the transit zones, with the exception of vulnerable applicants (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2016a: 9). The territory of this ‘pre-transit zone’ area is legally Hungarian soil but 
is not considered to be falling within the responsibility of the Hungarian authorities, leading to 
dire circumstances (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2016b). The circumstances in transit zones 
are described by asylum seekers as ‘jail-like’ (Bernát et al., 2019: 33–34). The law also 
criminalized irregular border crossings (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2015a). Criminal 
proceedings followed, including aggravated cases, e.g. damaging the fence, where the statutory 
sanction is two to eight years of imprisonment (FRA, 2016: 12). After a 2017 amendment, all 
applicants, with the exception of those under 14, had to remain in the transit zones throughout 
the entire procedure, effectively universalizing detention (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2017). 
Asylum applications were also moved to the zones, applications could only be filed from within 
the transit zones, with the exception of those lawfully residing in Hungary (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2018: 11). The number of people who could enter daily decreases in several steps,  
to five in 2016 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017a: 11), eventually down to one person per 
day per transit zone from 28 January 2018 (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2018: 11). The 
decision on who can enter is not transparent, leading to complaints. A ‘community leader’ 
chosen from within the asylum seekers by themselves communicates with the authorities and 
keeps, in the case of Röszke (border with Serbia), three separate lists (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2017a: 17), later following the decisions of the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees 
(Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2018: 18). 
Amending Act No. 94 of 2016 (July) introduced pushbacks: apprehended asylum seekers can 
be pushed back to the Croatian or Serbian side from the zone within 8 km from these borders, 
without registering either the applicant or the asylum request. A 28 March 2017 amendment 
(Act No. 20 of 2017) expanded this rule to the entire country. There are reports of violence 
associated with this process (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017b; MIGSZOL (Migrant 
Solidarity Group of Hungary), 2016), and due also to the undocumented nature of these actions, 
legal remedy is not available. In most cases, Serbia did not take back asylum seekers officially 
(Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2018: 38). As a result, pushback measures happen like outside 
existing legal guarantees. FRA, the EU’s human rights body writes, based on NGO reports, that 
“local vigilante groups participated in pushback incidents against asylum seekers along the 
Serbian-Hungarian border during the summer of 2016. NGOs  registered  multiple  cases  of  
violence in which asylum seekers and refugees who tried to enter Hungary – including children 
and women –  were beaten, threatened and exposed  to  humiliating  practices  by  these  
paramilitary groups before being pushed back to Serbia” (FRA, 2016: 7–8). 
A 2016 amendment reduced the review period and document validity to three years in all cases 
(asylum and subsidiary protection; Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017a: 12). Integration 
measures largely disappeared. An April 2016 amendment eliminated the earlier allowance rule 
(“pocket money:; Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2017a: 12). Amending Act No. 39 of 2016 
(June) revoked remaining integration measures like housing support (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, 2017a: 12; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2016a). Earlier support included providing 
accommodation for a period of time, the operation of refugee camps (gradually closed down as 
asylum seekers were forced to the transit zones), ‘integration contracts’, regular allowance. only 
accommodation for 30 days in the transit zones to be counted from arrival. NGOs and local 
government organizations are the only one to provide some form of support (Bernát et al., 2019: 
37). This means that even those lucky few who are recognized as refugees are without 




language skills, recognition of degrees, lack of connections and prejudices all lead to the meagre 
opportunities of integration (Bernát et al., 2019: 37 and 38). 
Amending law Act No. 6 of 2018, dubbed “Stop Soros” as part of the anti-Soros, anti-EU and 
anti-immigration campaign, effective from July, established an automatic rejection of requests 
from those who arrived through countries where the applicant is not in danger.47 
Act No. 41 of 2018 (August) introduced a 25%48 “special tax on immigration” on activities that 
provide material support for activities helping immigration, measures that, directly or 
indirectly, facilitate immigration, including the organization of and participation in media 
campaigns and seminars, the organization of education, the network-building and operation, 
propaganda activity presenting immigration in a positive light.49 This effectively targets all 
NGOs that try to inform asylum seekers and support the integration of refugees, tasks 
abandoned by the government, in line, e.g., with the recommendation of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees and its office located in Budapest. The OLIve (Open Learning 
Initiative) initiative of Central European University (later forced out of the country, in violation 
of EU law50) offering learning opportunities for refugees was also closed as a result of the law 
(UNHCR, 2018c). The most well-known NGOs working on asylum cases refused to pay the 
tax (“Menedék”, Refuge Association; TASZ – Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee). The Hungarian Helsinki Committee challenged the legality of 
the law before the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR.51 (The Constitutional Court suspended 
its procedure, waiting for the judgment of the CJEU on the matter; to date there is no 
information on the ECtHR case.) Targeting asylum-related activities in these laws 
(criminalization and taxation) was criticized by the OSCE and Venice Commission in two joint 
opinions.52 
With another anti-NGO, anti-transparency move, the government ended civil oversight based 
on long-time cooperation in a number of areas, including those involving the police, the 
Immigration and Citizenship Office, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, and the UNHCR 
(Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, 2017c). 
The thorough criminalization of asylum-related acts also hampers NGO activism. Act No. 6 of 
2018 criminalized “aiding and supporting illegal immigration”, with up to one year of 
imprisonment, including the act to providing information and legal assistance.53 The lax 
definition of the activities means that attorneys who present applicants who are later found to 
be ineligible to asylum under the stringent Hungarian conditions can also face prosecution. The 
UNHCR stated that the amendments “deprive people who are forced to flee their homes of 
critical aid and services, and further inflame tense public discourse and rising xenophobic 
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52 https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2018)013-e and 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2018)035-e, respectively. 
53 Art. 353/A of the Penal Code. The Constitutional Court found the Act compatible with the Fundamental Law, 
and concluded that it is enough to declare constitutional requirements for the implementation. Resolution No. 




attitudes.” (UNHCR, 2018b) Amending Act No. 143 of 2015 criminalized unlawful border 
crossing and damaging the fence (3 to 20 years of imprisonment).54 Amending Act No. 20 of 
2017 (28 March 2017) made it a misdemeanor to leave the designated area around the border 
(in addition to other measures like restricting the mandatory assignment of guardians to minors 
under 14). A new ground for denying asylum to those who committed a crime punishable with 
five years of prison or more (following a final verdict) was introduced in 2018. 
In the summer of 2018, Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law, several additions meant 
to protect Hungarian sovereignty and national identity against ‘pro-immigration’ measures 
from the EU, as a direct response to the relocation quota, including the most direct clause that 
makes it unconstitutional to grant asylum to someone who arrived through a safe third country. 
The amendment added a reference to the protection of national identity in the preamble as well 
as a reference to national sovereignty in the clause on EU law, also including an anti-
immigration reference. The amendment requires a two-third majority for migration-related 
legislation. 
“No foreign population shall be settled in Hungary. A foreign national, not 
including persons who have the right to free movement and residence, may 
only live in the territory of Hungary under an application individually 
examined by the Hungarian authorities. The basic rules on the requirements 
for the submission and assessment of such applications shall be laid down 
in a cardinal Act.” (Art. XIV(1)) 
“A non-Hungarian national shall not be entitled to asylum if he or she 
arrived in the territory of Hungary through any country where he or she was 
not persecuted or directly threatened with persecution.” (Art. XIV(4)) 
“The basic rules for granting asylum shall be laid down in a cardinal Act.” 
(Art. XIV(5)) 
“We hold that the protection of our identity rooted in our historic 
constitution is a fundamental obligation of the State.” (Preamble) 
“Exercise of competences under this paragraph shall comply with the 
fundamental rights and freedoms provided for in the Fundamental Law and 
shall not limit the inalienable right of Hungary to determine its territorial 
unity, population, form of government and state structure.” (Art. E(2)) 
“The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of 
Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” (Art. R(4)) 
“The police shall participate in preventing illegal immigration.” (Art. 
46(1))55 
Relevant sections of the Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary 
The account of the UNHCR illustrates well the implications of the post-2015 asylum regime. 
The UN office followed closely the fate of three Afghan families and found the following. The 
families were detained in the transit zones from January to May 2019. In May, two families 
were escorted back to the Serbian side of the border. UNHCR staff did not have access to the 
part of the transit zone where the families were held. The families told that the adult member 
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did not receive food for five days. The third family’s removal was blocked by an injunction of 
the ECtHR (UNHCR, 2019). 
3.2. Existing and potential conflicts between national law and legal practice of a relevant 
country and applicable EU rules 
The relevant Hungarian law is subject to European acquis including the Schengen norms after 
Hungary entered the Schengen zone in 2007. Genova Conventions including the expansion of 
the geographical scope ratified in 1989. EU law encompasses a wide area of immigration and 
asylum law, incorporating also the obligations under international law. In addition to 
international fora cited earlier (UN bodies56 including the UNHCR and the UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention; Council of Europe bodies including the ECtHR, the Venice 
Commission, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; or the OSCE ODIHR), the dismantling of the asylum regime 
triggered action from EU bodies. The section below will provide a short overview of the most 
important decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the field. 
The ECJ ruled that a central piece of the Hungarian asylum legislation, the automatic rejection 
of applications by asylum seekers arriving from countries where they do not face danger (most 
commonly, Serbia, see above in Section 2.3) is in violation of EU law.57 In a different case, 
pending before the Court, it was the Commission that brought an action against Hungary 
requesting the ECJ to rule again on the third country exclusionary rule58 (the ECtHR also found 
violations of European standards. It found returns without individual assessment, based on 
declaring Serbia a safe third country, in violation of established standards, Art. 3 of ECHR in 
this case). The ECJ also ruled that the eight-day time limitation should be put aside as 
incompatible with EU if it would undermine effective guarantees of international protection. In 
a different case, the Court stated the same for a sixty-day rule.59 
The practice of not providing food for asylum applicants in the transit zones is, according to the 
Commission, against EU law, triggering an infringement procedure in 201960 (the ECtHR was 
granting interim measures for the same violation in numerous cases, but the government 
regularly reverted the practice; this problem ceased with the closing of the transit zones in 
2020). 
The Commission brought action against Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic for failing to 
fulfil their obligations under the relocation decision. The ECJ agreed with the Commission and 
declared the three countries to be in violation of EU law concerning relocations.61 
The ECJ declared the practice to keep asylum seekers in the transit zone to legally qualify as 
detention,62 its current rules to be in violation of EU law, its length should be limited to four 
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weeks and the decision should be individualized with reasons stated.63 In what led to a major 
overhaul of the Hungarian asylum situation, the government reacted by closing the transit zones 
altogether.64 This brought a considerable improvement in the case of those already in the zone 
(they were transferred to accommodation from where the asylum seekers are able to go out and 
come back and benefit from more meaningful procedural guarantees), but made it even harder 
for others to seek asylum in Hungary. New applications can only be filed at embassies (outside 
Hungary) and asylum seekers have to wait for the end of the procedures there. This means that 
other countries (like Serbia) will be responsible for the applicants (given the conditions in the 
transit zones, this will most likely mean that asylum seekers will wait out the procedures in 
better circumstances). While humanitarian visas and applications at embassies are accepted 
practice, not allowing asylum seekers to request protection at the border, within Hungary goes 
against international commitments and EU norms and is likely to trigger a new round of 
compliance procedures (which can take years while the practice can stand). The UNHCR argues 
that the law, adopted in response to the ECJ ruling, violates existing standards, most importantly 
the access to territory and non-refoulement.65 
The ECJ remedied a crucial procedural impediment, the inability of courts to directly overrule 
and change the decisions of the asylum authority. This led to a potentially endless back-and-
forth with new rejections after court invalidation, declared to be in violation of EU law.66 
The ECJ ruled it incompatible that the courts cannot alter only invalidate the decisions of the 
asylum authority.67 The problem arose because the authority could (and did) rule after the 
annulment of its decision against the court ruling and, in a second round, the court was still 
powerless to decide on its own, other than sending the case back again. The ECJ stated that in 
such cases, the national norm that does not make it possible for the court to change the 
administrative decision can be put aside as incompatible with EU law. 
The ECJ reviewed, at the initiative of a Hungarian court, the law that excludes applicants from 
asylum and subsidiary protection if they committed a crime punishable to at least five years. 
The ECJ ruled, in its judgment of 13 September 2018, that looking at the punishment provided 
by law is not enough and an individualized assessment of the crime should be carried out before 
the applicant can be excluded from protection.68 
In the case of SA, the ECJ found the Hungarian provision that automatically allows the rejection 
of asylum applications from persons having committed a crime for which possible punishment 
is five years of prison or more. EU law requires the individual assessment of whether the 
concrete crime is serious enough to justify exclusion.69 
The ECJ declared the practice of assessing the sexual orientation of asylum seekers via 
psychological experts to be in violation of EU law.70 
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A law targeting NGOs receiving funding from abroad, including organizations active in the 
asylum field, including requirements of registration, declaration and publication, under the 
burden of penalties, was found incompatible with EU law as discriminatory and violating rights 
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the free movement of capital.71 
In a case where the ECJ has not ruled but the opinion of the Advocate General (AG) is available, 
the Commission challenged key elements of the post-2015 asylum regulation of Hungary.72 The 
AG agreed on most points, including the undue limitations on access to asylum (only limited-
access transit zones), the inadequate legal guarantees in assessing asylum applications, the 
automatic detention of applicants or the pushback provisions. With the closure of the transit 
zones, some of these claims do not stand even if the violations continue or access dwindled 
further. 
A procedure under Article 7 TEU is also pending. This is the grand-scale device to make sure 
member states are in compliance with Article 2 TEU values and principles including 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Serious violations of asylum law are among the 
issues listed in the proposal of the European Parliament to the Council.73 The latter should 
decide, by qualified majority, on whether there is a serious breach of Article 2 values in which 
case the European Council could decide unanimously on possible sanctions. 
 
4. Synthesis 
The government and the governing coalition, implementing the narrative established by PM 
Viktor Orbán, engaged in a strategy that plays on xenophobic sentiments that increased 
nationally as a result of relentless anti-immigration campaigns. Government and pro-
government statements targeted not only immigrants but also those who help asylum seekers 
or criticize the government’s asylum law record. Immigration became a reference point that is 
used in broad political areas, seeking to justify government position against the EU’s criticism 
of the rule of law situation in Hungary. Domestic guarantees did little to constrain the rights 
violations and, in some cases, even boosting anti-immigrant sovereigntist government 
proposals. The voice of the opposition remained weak and ineffective in presenting a counter-
narrative. 
The asylum law of Hungary took a turn in 2015 that contravenes international and EU 
obligations and has denied meaningful venues for asking international protection. It led to 
unnecessary suffering in many document cases of deaths, torture, including police-inflicted 
injuries, inhuman and degrading treatment, including the lack of food and the prolonged 
detainment of asylum applicants in conditions, the lack of procedural guarantees, the 
elimination of even basic integration measures and the targeting of civil actors who step in to 
provide essential services. As the UNHCR concluded, “Hungary has practically closed its 
borders to people seeking international protection, in clear breach of its obligations under 
international and EU law. […] The building of physical barriers at the border and the 
introduction of restrictive laws and policies have increased the suffering of people who have 
often fled unbearable conditions in their countries of origin.” (UNHCR, 2018a) The major 
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1. Background information  
The Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) estimated that on 31 December 2018 there 
were 5.255 million foreign nationals residing in Italy, equivalent to 8.7% of the country’s 
population, in addition to 1.34 million who had acquired Italian citizenship. In total, there were 
6.6 million people from 200 different countries living in Italy on 31 December 2018. The most 
represented nationalities were the following: Rumanian (1.207 million people), Albanian 
(441,000), Moroccan (423,000), Chinese (300,000), and Ukrainian (239,000). These five 
nationalities accounted for almost 50% of all foreigners living in Italy (ISTAT, 2019). 
There was a slightly larger presence of women (51.7%) compared to men, even though 
percentages varied depending on nationality. For instance, women comprised 77.6% of the 
Ukrainian population in Italy, but 26.5% of Senegalese residents. Data showed that the average 
age of the foreign population living in Italy was 35. The foreign population on Italian soil lived 
mainly in the most developed Regions in the north (57.5%) and in the centre (25.4%), with 
increasing but much more limited percentages in the Mezzogiorno (12.2%) and Islands (4.9%). 
The Regions with the largest number of foreign nationals were Lombardy (1,181,772 – 
equivalent to 11.7% of all resident population), Latium (683,409 – 11.6%), Emilia-Romagna 
(547,537 – 12.3 %), Veneto (501,085 – 10.2 %) and Piedmont (427,911 – 9.8%). The Provinces 
with the largest number of foreign residents were Rome (556,826 – 12.8%), Milan (470,273 – 
14.5%), Turin (221,842 – 9.8%), Brescia (157,463 – 12.4%), and Naples (134,338 – 4.4%) 
(“IDOS,” 2019: 9). 
ISTAT calculated that foreign workers comprised around 10.6% of all workers in Italy at the 
end of 2018. Most of them worked in the service sector (home help and family care, hotels and 
restaurants, cleaning and moving services), industry, and agriculture (Ministry of Labour, 2019: 
16). 
As regards irregular immigration, although there are no official statistics, 279,000 to 461,000 
foreigners were estimated to be living in Italy at the end of 2018 (OECD, 2018, p. 173). In the 
same year, the number of migrants who arrived on Italian coasts was 23,370, a reduction of 
87.9% compared to 2017 (119,369), and of 92.85% compared to 2016 (181,436) (Ministry 
Home Affairs, Statistics 2018). 
In 2018, a reduction was also recorded in the number of applications for international protection 
(i.e. all persons who have lodged for asylum, subsidiary protection or any form of protection): 
53,596 compared to 130,119 in 2017, 123,600 in 2016, and 83,970 in 2015. The top three 
nationalities of asylum applicants in 2018 were Pakistani (7,368 applications), Nigerian (6,336), 
and Bangladeshi (5,026), compared to Nigerian (25,964), Bangladeshi (12,731) and Pakistani 
(9,728) in 2017; and Nigerian (27,289 and 18,174), Pakistani (13,660 and 10,403) and Gambian 
(9,040 and 8,022) in 2016 and 2015 (Ministry Home Affairs, Asylum 2018).  
Moreover, of the 95,576 asylum applications examined in 2018 (as against 81,527 in 2017, 
91,102 in 2016 and 71,117 in 2015), 67% were rejected; refugee status was afforded to 7% of 




There were a total of 189,243 people in Italy who had been afforded some form of international 
protection (refugee status, subsidiary protection, or humanitarian protection) at the end of 2018, 
compared to 167,335 in 2017 (147,370 in 2016 and 118,047 in 2015) (UNHCR, 2019: 66). 
 
2. Immigration as a political issue  
2.3. Political context 
2.1.1. The positions of major domestic parties (including the parties in the government) 
on the problem of immigration and their evolution, relevance of the immigration issue in 
the national elections (2015–2018) 
In recent years in Italy, immigration policies were adopted on an emergency basis, mainly 
focusing on migrant flows and arrivals by sea. This approach inevitably affected the response 
of both right – and left – wing parties, and had an impact on the measures taken. 
Generally, the narrative of right-wing parties is that the migration flow is mostly uncontrolled 
and that migrants come to Italy to seek a job. Once in Italy, they find a saturated labour market, 
end up living by their wits, and are often recruited by criminal organisations. For these reasons, 
the entry of migrants should be prevented, or the situation in the country would become even 
more unbearable. 
The traditional narrative of left-wing parties is that poor people flee from wars and are ready to 
risk their lives crossing the desert and the sea, to reach the country. Left-wing parties propose 
accepting and integrating migrants. They also point to Italy’s need for a young population to 
counter the decline in birth rate and the ageing of the population. 
The Five Star Movement (M5S) is new in the political arena, and is hard to place in the usual 
political spread between the left and the right. The M5S is less aggressive than right-wing 
parties on the migration issue, mirroring the more moderate views of its supporters, who are 
mostly in favour of migrant reception. 
As is the case with all populist movements, Italian populist movements, the League and 
Brothers of Italy in particular, and to a lesser extent the M5S, exploited the disillusionment with 
traditional politicians, and relied on the opposition between us (Italians) and them (migrants 
and refugees). 
Generally speaking, in order to explain Italian populism, we have to take into account the 
economic hardship faced by the country in the recent years and the difficulties encountered by 
traditional parties to find appropriate remedies to address social issues like unemployment, 
security and increasing inequality. 
In this situation of crisis of the old parties, the gap between the people and the “elite” increased 
and favoured movements like League, Brothers of Italy and Movement 5 Stars, which promised 
a radical change to traditional politics. 
The League and Brothers of Italy are typical right-wing populist parties. Both have a 
charismatic leadership, Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni respectively, and both took a strong 
anti-immigration position.  
The Five Star Movement is a different kind of populist party. As highlighted on several 
occasions by its members, the M5S is not really a party: it is a movement, and it cannot be 
included in the traditional left or right paradigm. In addition, there is no   charismatic leadership, 
but a constant appeal to the direct action of the people and the citizens. For these reasons, it 
developed innovative organisational strategies and used social networks to mobilise and 




considered as a populist and anti-establishment “party”. As regards immigration issues, over 
the years M5S showed ambiguous positions. 
As regards League, in recent years the rightist component has become more extreme. Salvini 
has been inspired by Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump in his policymaking.   
Like the U.S. president, Salvini used social media to present himself as a strong man who can 
solve Italy’s problems and, in primis, the immigration issue. The right-wing parties knew that 
immigration was one of the main issues that Italians care about. Hence, they engaged in the 
rhetoric on immigrants considered as a threat to national identity, security, the welfare state and 
employment. 
These approaches became apparent during the campaign for the general election that was held 
on 4 March 2018, the only one at a national level that has taken place in the reference period.  
At a general level, the Italian electoral system is governed by Law No 165 of 3 November 2017 
(“Law No. 165,” 2017), providing that the election programmes of all political parties should 
be deposited with the Ministry of the Interior and made public (Article 4.1). 
In the election programmes of centre-right forces (Forza Italia, League, Brothers of Italy), the 
issue of immigration was linked to that of terrorism. In addition to a review of the European 
treaties, the centre-right coalition championed the control of national borders, a stop to migrant 
landings, the repatriation of illegal migrants, the signing of agreements with the countries of 
origin of economic migrants, and the abolition of humanitarian protection. 
In the election programme of the M5S, four lines of action concerning immigration could be 
identified. The first general line concerned the management of external borders, with the 
provision of legal entry channels and the fight against trafficking in human beings. As part of 
this framework, there was a proposal to allow the submission of applications for international 
protection at the diplomatic missions (embassies and consulates) of the Member States in the 
countries of origin or transit. The second line of action concerned a review of the Dublin system 
and the setting up of an automatic and mandatory distribution mechanism of asylum seekers 
among all EU Member States, with sanctions for those that would fail to meet the obligations 
taken. Finally, at a domestic level, the programme provided for the immediate return of irregular 
migrants and a reform of the asylum system, with faster procedures for application examination 
and a more transparent management of funds. 
Similarly, the election programme of the Democratic Party (PD) proposed a better control of 
external borders. Like the M5S, the PD intended to review the Dublin Regulation, with a 
mandatory redistribution of asylum seekers in all EU countries, and a sanction system for those 
who failed to meet the established quotas. This framework included a proposal to sign 
readmission agreements with the States of origin and of transit, and the setting up of 
humanitarian corridors. At a domestic level, the PD proposed an improvement of the migrant 
reception system and the introduction of the IusCulturae principle for granting Italian 
citizenship. 
From this short presentation of the main Italian political parties’ election programmes, a couple 
of points may be made. First, it may be noticed that some programmes were more detailed, 
whereas others comprised shorter slogan-like statements. The second is about the content of the 
programmes. Many proposals did not take into account the main rules of law on asylum. As 
regards the specific proposal of amending EU founding treaties, none of the programmes spelt 
out how to do this. 
During the election campaigns, the key topic was immigration. As said before, League, as well 




more generally, towards EU migration policies. Even M5S during their electoral campaign 
proved to be increasingly anti-migration. On the contrary, PD and Forza Italia took more 
moderate positions, which turned out unsuccessful in electoral terms. 
2.1.2. Relevance of different arguments used for or against immigration in the political 
and public debate 
In the last years, migration flows in Italy have evolved in a context of economic crisis. Indeed, 
it should be pointed out that the financial crisis (started in 2008) and a massive arrival of 
migrants (from 2011) has led to a negative situation for Italian migration policies, in addition 
to the perception, in public opinion, of an unprecedented emergency. 
Most of Italian population perceived the financial crisis from 2008 as a threat in terms of 
unemployment and inflation. It should be recalled that after 2008, the unemployment rate in 
Italy continuously increased, and that in 2014 peaked at 12.7%. It should also be noted that the 
financial crisis mostly affected the young population, and that in 2014, over 42% of the young 
population was unemployed. 
For these reasons, immigration was one of the main themes of the March 2018 elections, and 
the relevant proposals outlined in the election programmes were given much consideration in 
pre-election debates. 
It should be noted that an already tense climate worsened following some news stories that 
involved people from foreign countries. Many political parties, not only centre-right ones, 
talked of immigration as an emergency, and highlighted a potential social risk. In particular, the 
League focused on the sense of insecurity, making the countering of immigration the spearhead 
of its election campaign. The theme of social resentment was channelled and reduced to an 
opposition between Italians and foreigners, leading voters to believe that closing the country to 
immigrants was a solution to many of the country’s problems. Moreover, the large media 
coverage of arrivals of migrants by sea magnified the perception that the borders were, to some 
extent, out of control. 
The use of a strongly discriminatory and anti-European language in debates may be explained 
in pre-election polls. In fact, estimates showed that almost one Italian in three would vote for a 
political party that would put ‘Italians first’. After employment, Italians considered immigration 
as one of their most urgent problems. Polls also suggested that immigration was often linked to 
criminal activity and perceived by the population as a threat to their cultural and social identity, 
and to their access to the labour market and welfare system. Finally, polls showed a 
geographical and social differentiation in the perception of the migration phenomenon. In fact, 
countering immigration was a theme that was felt more strongly in the north than in the south, 
especially in the outskirts of cities. Socially, a sense of insecurity was more pervasive among 
unemployed people and housewives, and among the least paid and least skilled workers in the 
private sector (IPSOS, 2018: 116). 
As a result, the March 2018 general election rewarded the political parties that placed a strong 
focus on the immigration issue. The centre-right coalition obtained more than 37% of votes, the 
M5S alone almost 33%, and the centre-left coalition almost 23% (Ministry Home Affairs, 
Election Results, 2018). 
Due to the absence of a clear majority that could rule the country, consultations led to a 
government alliance between the M5S and the League, which combined their election 
programmes in a shared document (Government Contract). In this Government Contract, the 
theme of migration was given great consideration, which led to the adoption of very stringent 




As regards the results of the election, many analysts agree that the theme of immigration control 
stirred the attention and concerns of traditionally left-wing voters, too. They also found that 
there was an association between the hostility of the population towards immigration and their 
distrust towards European institutions and the integration measures that had been undertaken 
domestically in recent years. More generally, Italian citizens felt frustrated with the ruling class 
and with inequality and lack of opportunities for new generations, and disappointed with EU 
Member States, which had not helped Italy to manage its sea borders (Levi, Mariani and 
Mongiardo, 2019). 
The countries of arrival cannot handle migration flows alone on behalf of Europe. It should be 
pointed out that if Italy (and of course other countries of arrival, like Greece) is left alone in the 
management of migration flows, it is not because of decisions made by the European 
Commission or other EU Institutions. For instance, we could mention initiatives taken to 
increase the distribution of applicants for international protection who are already in the 
territory of the Union (the relocation mechanism adopted by the Council in 2015).   
The relocation system was a first implementation of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility between Member States, as set out in Article 80 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the principle of solidarity was 
undermined by a lack of cooperation from a considerable number of Member States, the 
Visegrad countries in particular. Probably, the real issue is that all Member States have to 
change their approaches to the migration issues (Crescenzi, 2019). 
2.4. Policy in action 
2.2.1. Assessment of the governmental position on immigration, together with the 
information on its evolution (2015–2018) 
Politically, the period 2015 – 2018 saw the succession of three governments with three different 
Ministers of Home Affairs: Angelino Alfano (21 February 2014 – 12 December 2016), Marco 
Minniti (12 December 2016 – 1 June 2018), and Matteo Salvini (1 June 2018 – 5 September 
2019). They are responsible for the main immigration measures. 
Before the coalition formed by M5S and Lega took power, PD had governed the country with 
two different cabinets: Renzi (2014-2016) and Gentiloni (2016-2018). The PD was not able to 
recognize the depth of the post-2008 recession and the gravity of unemployment, particularly 
among young people. It also had failed to understand the effect of the immigration issues among 
the Italian population, which also affected traditional left-wing voters.  
The policies adopted in this period by the three Minister of Home Affairs before mentioned, 
despite some differences, were all intended to manage and contain the arrivals of migrants on 
Italian shores. This aim was pursued through two lines of action: at a European level, the 
implementation of the relocation system, adopted by the European Commission, in EU Member 
States; and at an extra-European level, the strengthening of relations with migrants’ countries 
of origin and transit. 
In the period 2015 – 2016, in order to fully implement the European Agenda on Migration, Italy 
adopted a Roadmap (Ministry Home Affairs, Roadmap, 2015) and a Ministerial Circular 
(Ministry Home Affairs, Circular Ministerial, 2015), transposing the relocation measures taken 
by the European Commission, and it set up six hotspots (Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani, 
Lampedusa, Augusta, and Taranto). 
At the same time, the Ministry of the Interior signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 




Memorandum signed with Sudan on 3 August 2016 falls within this framework (Ministry Home 
Affairs, Memorandum of Understanding, 2016). 
Two lines of action also characterised migration policies in the period 2016 – 2018: the NGO 
Code of Conduct and the agreements made with migrants’ countries of origin and transit. The 
NGO Code of Conduct outlined a set of rules NGOs had to abide by during rescue operations 
at sea. Italian authorities could take measures with respect to the vessels, should the NGOs fail 
to sign or comply with the Code of Conduct (Ministry Home Affairs, Code of Conduct, 2017). 
The Memorandum of Understanding with Libya of 2 February 2017 on the strengthening of 
border security and the fight against irregular migration fall instead within the framework of 
international cooperation concerning immigration (Italian Government, Memorandum of 
understanding, 2017).  
In the period 2018–19, migration policies were at the core of the newly formed government in 
its first months of office. In particular, the Government adopted a stricter line in this area, with 
a set of measures concerning NGOs working in the Mediterranean and the closure of Italian 
ports to vessels with migrants on board. 
Three additional decisions were also taken. First, a 1.5% tax was introduced on money transfers 
to non-EU countries (the so-called remittances, which amounted to € 6.2 million as of 31 
December 2018) (Law No. 136, 2018, art. 25 novies). Second, the country did not join the 
Global Compact for Migration adopted by the UN in December 2018. Third, cooperation was 
strengthened with the countries of origin and transit for managing departures and repatriation. 
As regards the Global Compact, the Italian Governments that initially supported it were 
different (with Renzi and Gentiloni Prime Ministers) than the Government in charge at the 
moment of its adoption. Indeed, as mentioned before, in December 2018, the government 
coalition was composed by the M5S and the League.  
The priorities of these two parties were, inter alia, to stop irregular migration and to radically 
change the relationship with the EU. However, their ideas on how to proceed to reach those 
aims diverged widely. In the case of the Global Compact, different points of view between 
League and M5S led firstly to a state of uncertainty and, after a few months, to the decision by 
the Italian Parliament to withdraw from the Agreement.  
In particular, League and Brothers of Italy considered the Global Compact as a risk in terms of 
State’s sovereignty. They believed that it established a sort of right to migrate, encouraged 
irregular cross-border movement, and promoted continuous migration flows, using 
demographic and economic reasons. Finally, they considered the Global Compact like a dowel 
of a project, aimed at annihilating borders, cultures, and, in particular, national sovereignty in 
the field of migration. 
Overall, in recent years, immigration policies have become a hotbed of tension. In this sense, 
populist parties have put the topic of immigration, and especially of managing the migration 
phenomenon, at the core of their political and governmental activity. 
2.2.2. Challenges in implementation of the common EU migration policies in the relevant 
country 
One of the primary challenges that Italy had to tackle in the period 2015–2019 concerning EU 
policy implementation was the transposition of the Reception Directive and of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. This was made by Legislative Decree No. 142 of 18 July 2015 
(“Legislative Decree No. 142, 2015). Operationally, the government took steps aimed at 
improving the migrant reception system on domestic soil and reducing the time required to 




Then, Italy undertook to apply the lines set forth in the European Agenda on Migration. In 
particular, three main policies were pursued: signing cooperation agreements in the area of 
migration with third countries; managing the Central Mediterranean migration route; and 
especially activating relocation procedures. 
The lines of action proposed in the European Agenda on Migration included strengthening 
solidarity and shared responsibility between EU Member States by setting up a temporary 
distribution scheme for applicants of international protection already on EU soil. The aim was 
to help Italy and Greece face the emergency situation characterised by the sudden influx of 
third-country nationals on their soil. The relocation plan, adopted by Council Decision (EU) 
2015/1523 and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 in September 2015, required the beneficiary 
states – Greece and Italy – to strengthen their asylum and return systems. In particular, they had 
to set up ‘hotspots’ for the identification, registration and fingerprinting of newly arrived 
migrants. The relocation procedure was to be triggered within two months of the decision being 
taken by the authorities of the EU Member States, which had to cooperate by giving priority to 
applicants with special vulnerabilities. 
2.2.3. Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
As one of the main instruments for fighting illegal immigration, the Italian Government signed 
a set of bilateral agreements on immigration. 
Generally, these were readmission agreements aimed at obtaining the cooperation of foreign 
countries’ authorities in returning irregular migrants. Some of them were part of wider ranging 
agreements, which included forms of cooperation between law-enforcement authorities, 
especially with countries with the highest migration pressure. 
The agreement made by Italy with non-European countries is in line with the indications 
outlined in the European Agenda on Migration. In fact, since 2015, the external dimension of 
the EU migration policy focused on supporting third countries involved in migration routes, 
with the aim of reducing migration flows and repatriating irregular migrants. The support of 
Italy by the EU is part of this approach, after Italy signed a Memorandum with Libya, with an 
allocation of € 39.92 million for a better management of migration flows in the Central 
Mediterranean route (4 May 2017) (European Commission, Migration and Border 
Management, 2017) and the adoption of an Action Plan to reduce pressure and increase 
solidarity (4 July 2017) (European Commission, Action Plan, 2017). 
However, the use of Memorandums with third countries raised some criticism. On a political 
level, issue was taken with the fact that these Memorandums were signed with non-democratic 
states, such as Sudan, or with countries that are not very respectful of human rights, such as 
Libya. It was highlighted, in fact, that Libya was not a party to the Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and to the main international agreements on human rights protection. 
Moreover, there were reports of inhuman and degrading treatment in migrant detention centres 
in Libya. 
A specific request in this regard is made in the Joint Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNSMIL Mission of 20 December 2018 on the 
situation of human rights of migrants and refugees in Libya: “The European Union and its 
Member States must also reconsider the human costs of their policies and efforts to stem 
migration to Europe and ensure that their cooperation and assistance to the Libyan authorities 
are human rights-based, in line with their own obligations under international human rights and 
refugee law, and do not, directly or indirectly, result in men, women and children being trapped 




A second remark may be made on the content of these Memorandums. They are characterised 
by a preventive nature, which was not the case with the re-admission agreements traditionally 
signed by Italy, which allowed the repatriation of people once their protection application had 
been rejected following a substantive examination. By contrast, the memorandums (still in 
force) concern people who might be in need of protection, but whose application is not 
examined because that is a responsibility of the country of origin. 
For instance, the Memorandum with Sudan established that it is up to the Sudanese authorities 
to identify, examine, and issue travel documents for return operations (Article 9). Moreover, in 
the event of an emergency situation, as established by the parties, the identification of irregular 
migrants may be done directly on Sudanese soil, once the return has taken place (Article 14). 
The application of this Memorandum stirred much protest in Italy. In this regard, an appeal is 
still pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) by some Sudanese nationals 
who were forcibly returned to Sudan by the Italian government on 24 August 2016 after being 
arrested in Ventimiglia (Case W.A. and others v. Italy, 2017). 
A last remark may be made on memorandums: they may lead to the violation of the right to 
non-refoulement. In fact, a considerable proportion of scholars and of civil society believe that, 
through these memorandums, Italy is delegating refoulements to migrants’ countries of origin 
or transit. This practice violates many international rules. Italy was already condemned by the 
ECHR in 2012 for the violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment), and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), as well as Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 
to the Convention (prohibition of mass expulsion) (Case Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012). It is useful 
to recall that the refoulement prohibition is also affirmed at a European level in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (Article 78.1), the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 18-19), 
and the Qualification Directive (Article 21). 
As regards the relocation system, the roadmap and the circular mentioned above provided for 
the setting up in Italy of six hotspots (Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani, Lampedusa, 
Augusta, and Taranto), with the aim of reaching an overall initial reception capacity of 2500 
places. However, many operational and organisational difficulties were met in this effort. 
Operational delays were encountered in setting up hotspots and expanding their reception 
capacity. Moreover, the need arose to set up mobile hotspots, since many of the arrivals 
occurred in places other than the six locations identified. In terms of organisational aspects, in 
contrast, the main difficulties were the adoption of standard operational protocols in hotspots, 
staff training, coordination between different offices involved, the registration and processing 
of the applications submitted by persons to be relocated, and the setting up of ad hoc procedures 
for unaccompanied minors. 
Lack of cooperation between States added to domestic difficulties. In fact, even though the 
relocation programme was mandatory, only a few member states gave it full implementation. 
Available data shows that only 31,503 relocations had taken place –10,265 from Italy and 
21,238 from Greece – at the end of 2017, the programme deadline, compared to 160,000 
planned relocation (European Commission, Relocation, 2017). 
Lack of cooperation by other EU Member States led the Italian authorities to take more stringent 
measures in the period 2018–2019. In particular, NGOs carrying out rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean were forbidden to enter Italian ports, as they were accused of having ties with 
traffickers’ networks. At a general level, closing ports was used as a way to put pressure on and 
force other EU Member States to receive a number of asylum seekers, following the failure of 
relocation measures. However, with the exception of a few occasional agreements for a 
voluntary distribution of asylum seekers between some states, the relocation measure based on 




an anti-EU perspective; the European Union was blamed for most of the shortcomings recorded 
in managing the migration phenomenon. 
 
3. Immigration as a legal issue 
3.1 Brief description of the applicable legal framework in a relevant country together with 
the analysis of its actual implementation 
The subject of immigration is regulated by Law No 40 of 6 March 1998 (Law No. 40, 2018), 
and by Legislative Decree No 286 of 25 July 1998, Consolidated Act on Immigration and the 
Condition of Foreign Nationals (TUI) (Legislative Decree No. 286, 1998). The right of asylum 
is regulated in the Italian Constitution: “A foreigner who, in his home country, is denied the 
actual exercise of the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian constitution shall be 
entitled to the right of asylum under the conditions established by law” (Article 10.3). However, 
it should be pointed out that Italian legislation does not define the conditions to access the right 
of asylum. The relevant rules have been defined, for the most part, through the transposition of 
Community law. 
In the reference period of the Report, three decrees concerning immigration were adopted, 
which amended the TUI: Decree Law No 13 of 17 February 2017, Urgent provisions for the 
acceleration of international protection proceedings, as well as the fight against illegal 
immigration (Decree Law No. 13, 2017); Decree Law No 113 of 4 October 2018, Urgent 
provisions on international protection and immigration–public security (Decree Law No. 113, 
2018); and Decree Law No 53, of 4 June 2019, Urgent provisions concerning public order and 
security (Law Decree No. 53, 2019). 
Overall, the immigration of non-EU nationals is governed by the principle of immigration 
quotas. Yearly, on the basis of the labour force demand, the government adopts the Immigration 
Quota Decree (Decreto flussi), establishing the number of foreign nationals who can enter the 
country for work reasons. For 2018, the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 
15 December 2017 provided for the entry of 30,850 non-EU workers (Decree of the President 
of the Council of Ministers, 2018). 
By contrast, illegal entry and stay on national territory is considered a crime punishable by a 
fine or removal. In particular, removal may be carried out by escorting the person concerned to 
the border by the police (if there is a risk of absconding, the application is manifestly unfounded, 
or if he or she poses a risk to public policy, etc.) or by voluntary departure, including through 
an assisted voluntary return programme. 
As regards integration, foreign nationals who reside legally in Italy are afforded the 
fundamental rights of freedom and equality enshrined in the Constitution as well as a number 
of civil, social, and political rights that are recognised by ordinary law. In domestic law, a 
particular emphasis is placed on the right to health, which is guaranteed to all foreign nationals, 
including those who fail to comply with entry and residence requirements (Articles 34–36 TUI). 
However, there are still forms of discrimination in place, linked, among other things, to access 
to goods and welfare services. As far as education and training is concerned, attainment and 
attendance levels differ between Italians and foreign nationals. As regards work, there is a 
greater presence of foreign nationals in low skilled sectors, with an average monthly pay that is 
24% lower than that of Italians (slightly above € 1,000 compared to almost € 1,400, 
respectively). In the case of foreign female workers, the pay is even lower. 
Finally, acquiring Italian citizenship is governed by Law No 91 of 5 February 1992 (Law No. 




years of residence in Italy; to stateless persons, after five years of residence in Italy; to foreign 
nationals’ children born in Italy when they attain 18 years of age; to the spouse of Italian 
nationals; and to adult foreign nationals adopted by Italians (Articles 3–5). Decree 113/2018 
introduced the possibility to revoke already acquired Italian citizenship if a person is considered 
to pose a risk to the State. Revocation is made by Decree of the President of the Republic 
(Article 14).  
3.2 Existing and potential conflicts between national law and legal practice of a relevant 
country and applicable EU rules  
The three decrees above adopted between 2017 and 2019 were affected by the particular 
situation Italy was facing in that period. In fact, the Italian asylum system was under pressure, 
as a result of a strong increase in migration flows due to the war in Syria and the situation 
following the Arab spring. As indicated in the first paragraph, a total of 391,285 asylum 
applications were submitted in Italy between 2015 and 2018. For these reasons, the decrees had 
the greatest bearing on three main issues: the procedures for examining the applications for 
international protection, the reception system, and the management of arrivals by sea. 
A first general remark may be made on the emergency criterion used to adopt the decrees. 
Actually, scholars agree that all three decrees do not fulfil the constitutional and legislative 
requirements of need and urgency. In fact, they contain diverse, but immediately applicable 
rules, for which an ordinary legislative process, following a parliamentary debate, would have 
been more appropriate. 
Below follows an analysis of the individual decrees, with an emphasis on the elements that are 
in contrast with the main European provisions contained in the Reception Directive and the 
Asylum Procedures Directive in particular. 
Decree 13/2017 was the first to be adopted. A remark may be made on the new procedural 
elements introduced by the Decree, in particular, the possibility to video record the applicant’s 
interview before the Territorial Commissions for the Recognition of Refugee Status (Article 
6.1) and the elimination of the appeal for asylum applications (Article 6.13). Video recording 
does not ensure privacy and security, and it may now be used instead of having the applicant 
physically present at a hearing. Decree 13/2017 establishes that the presence of the applicant at 
the hearing may be ordered by the judge exclusively if he or she deems it appropriate after 
reviewing the video recording of the interview before the Commission (Article 6.10 and 6.11). 
It is clear that the right to a hearing is an essential and indispensable element of the process, 
especially in the case of international protection, because the statements of an applicant are an 
objective pre-requisite in order to examine the credibility, and hence the recognition of the right. 
As regards the second aspect, the text of the Decree provides for the abolition of the second 
instance of appeal for those who had their application rejected in the first instance. According 
to the drafters of the Decree, in fact, the setting up of special sections with judges having 
specific expertise would offer sufficient guarantees for determining the appropriateness of an 
asylum application. However, eliminating the appeal is a violation of the principle of equal 
confrontation between the parties and of fair proceedings enshrined in the Italian Constitution 
(Article 111) at a domestic level, and of the right to an effective remedy set out in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Article. 47) and in the Asylum Procedures Directive (Article 46.3) at a 
European level. In particular, the Asylum Directive Procedure lays down that “Member States 
shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts 
and points of law […] at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance”. 
Overall, attempting to eliminate the system backlog and accelerate procedures by giving up the 




In this connection, it must be recalled that the Court of Justice has had occasion to rule, in its 
judgment of 28 September 2018,74 that “Directive 2013/32/EU does not oblige Member States 
to provide an appeal against the first-instance appeals, or that an appeal at that instance should 
have automatic suspensory effect. The case before the Court concerned a request for a 
preliminary ruling from the Milan Tribunal regarding the suspensive effect of appeals and the 
criteria for assessing a need for suspension” (Case F.R. v Home Affairs, 2018, para. 32).  
Another comment may be made on Decree 13/2017 concerning the hotspot system. The Decree 
does not incorporate what the European institutions have repeatedly requested to Italy, namely 
to regulate the phases of migrants’ initial reception and identification by statute law. In fact, 
even though the Decree provides a legal basis for hotspots (Article 10, ter), it does not specify 
their nature, nor does it define how and for how long an applicant may be detained for 
identification purposes. This is a violation of the Reception Directive, stating that an applicant 
can be detained “only for as short a period as possible” for identification activity (Article 46). 
Moreover, it should be noted that Italy was condemned by the ECHR for the illegal detention 
of foreign nationals, in violation of Article 5 of the Convention, at the Lampedusa reception 
centre (hotspot) in violation of an effective remedy (Case Khlaifia v. Italy, 2016). 
Law-Decree 113/2018, and in particular Title I (Articles 1–15), governing the area of 
immigration, raises the largest number of issues with reference to Community law. 
The first is the abrogation of protection on humanitarian grounds. Protection on humanitarian 
grounds was provided for in TUI (Article 5.6) when asylum status or subsidiary protection 
could not be recognised, but there were serious reasons, in particular of humanitarian character 
or arising from constitutional or international obligations of the Italian State, to provide some 
protection to an applicant. Instead of humanitarian protection, the Decree introduced a number 
of special permits, with a validity of up to one year, to be issued exclusively for given reasons: 
medical care, natural disasters, acts of civic merit, exploitative working situations, domestic 
violence, and social protection (Article 1 paragraphs 1 and 2). 
Although humanitarian protection was not formally provided at a European level, it was 
advocated in the Qualification Directive. In fact, Recital 15 states that persons that are not in 
need of international protection may be granted, on a discretionary basis, the right to remain in 
the country for compassionate or humanitarian reasons. Furthermore, domestically, the 
abolition of humanitarian protection is in contrast with the case-law of the Court of Cassation, 
which considered this permit as one of the instruments used to apply the right of asylum 
provided for in Article 10(3) of the Italian Constitution (Italian Court of Cassation, Decision 
No. 29460, 2019). 
Law-Decree 113/2018 also contains a set of measures limiting personal freedom: from the 
detention of asylum seekers in hotspots to the extension of the detention of irregular migrants 
in pre-removal centres (CPRs) from 90 to 180 days. 
As regards the detention of asylum seekers in hotspots (Article 3), this is in contrast with both 
the Italian Constitution and with the main international agreements in this area, such as the 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Moreover, this provision is in line neither with the Qualification Directive nor with the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, which establish that a person should in no way be detained for 
the simple fact of having submitted an application for international protection (Article 8) and 
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that the Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is 
an applicant (Article 26). These are, in fact, persons who have asked to access a right and, as 
such, cannot be deprived of their personal freedom. Moreover, the Decree does not define the 
cases in which detention can be ordered; they simply arise from their condition of not having 
an identity document, which is common to asylum seekers. 
Article 3 of the Decree has additional elements, concerning the length and the place of 
detention, that contrast with the Reception Directive. Under the Decree, in fact, an applicant 
may be detained for identification activity for 30 days in hotspots or in initial reception centres, 
and 180 days in CPRs if their identity is not confirmed – making a total of 210 days. By contrast, 
the Reception Directive establishes that an applicant can be detained only for as short a period 
as possible (Article 9). As regards the facilities indicated in the Decree for the detention, the 
hotspots are first reception centres and, as such, do not provide special guarantees. By contrast, 
the Reception Directive provides that the detention of an asylum seeker should take place in 
detention centres offering specific reception standards (Articles 9–10). 
Another form of detention provided for in the Decree relates to a foreign national awaiting 
removal, who may be detained in the place where the removal measure was taken if there is no 
availability in CPRs (Article 4). No indication is given of what this place actually is, nor of 
what sort of place may be considered appropriate. Moreover, the Decree does not even provide 
indications of the guarantees to be given to detainees. On these grounds, this provision does not 
comply with the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), Article 16, which establishes that detention 
should take place in specialised, clearly defined, detention facilities. 
Another critical issue is that of accelerated procedures if an asylum seeker makes an application 
directly at the border or in a transit zone after being apprehended on grounds of having escaped 
or tried to escape controls. This provision seems too general and does not seem to be in line 
with the Asylum Procedures Directive. Presumably, a person who is apprehended at the border 
or in a transit area for having escaped or tried to escape controls does not wish to report to the 
authorities as soon as possible to apply for asylum (Article 31, paragraph 8). In the same way, 
the Decree does not seem to exempt vulnerable persons and those who have special needs from 
the accelerated procedure, unlike what is provided for in the Asylum Procedures Directive 
(Recital 30). 
Similarly, the changes made on subsequent applications in the Decree raise a number of 
compatibility issues with the provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive. In particular, the 
Decree establishes that an applicant is not entitled to remain on Italian soil awaiting the outcome 
of his or her procedure if they have made the application merely in order to delay or frustrate 
the enforcement of a removal decision, or if, after a decision rejecting the previous application, 
the subsequent application does not contain any new substantive elements. The Asylum 
Procedures Directive allows Member States to introduce provisions on the admissibility of 
subsequent applications provided that a preliminary examination is made as to whether new 
elements have arisen (Articles 40- 41), and that these provisions do not render impossible the 
access of the applicant to a new procedure (Article 42.2). If a subsequent application is 
considered to be inadmissible, the applicant is allowed to remain in the territory, pending the 
outcome of the procedure to rule whether or not the applicant may remain in the territory 
(Article 46.8). 
A last remark is linked to the changes that the Decree made to the Reception system that was 
originally intended for asylum seekers and refugees (SPRAR), which is now available only to 
beneficiaries of international protection and unaccompanied minors (Article 12) (“Cittalia”, 
2018). Pursuant to the Decree, asylum seekers are hosted in regular reception centres, in which 




courses. In this way, beneficiaries of international protection are the only ones who have access 
to social and labour market integration programmes. Moreover, asylum seekers are now hosted 
in emergency facilities, whose standards of living are lower than those prescribed in the 
Reception Directive. That was not the case in SPRAR facilities. The reform did not lead to an 
overhaul of emergency facilities, nor to forms of cooperation between the two levels of 
reception. 
Moreover, the Decree fails to provide a form of specific reception for vulnerable asylum 
seekers, who presently may only be hosted in initial reception centres. This again may be a 
violation of the Reception Directive (Articles 21–22). 
Finally, it should be considered that the reform of the system dealt a serious blow to local 
economies, especially in the South, which had benefited from the spread of SPRAR projects. 
In the old system, in fact, migrants were distributed across the country, avoiding concentrations 
in large centres and easing rising social tension. 
The precarious situation of asylum seekers is further aggravated by the provision in the Decree 
that they are no longer allowed to register at a registry office and obtain a residence permit 
(Article 13). However, access to social services is still guaranteed on the basis of the domicile 
they declared when completing their asylum application (Article 13.1). 
The last relevant Decree in the area of migration is No 53/2019. In particular, the most 
controversial provision is Article 1, laying down that the Ministry of the Interior may limit or 
prohibit vessels that violate Italian immigration laws to enter transit or come to a halt in the 
territorial sea. A first remark that may be made on this Decree is linked to the concept of ‘safe 
port’ of landing, as affirmed in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 
(1979), establishing that people rescued at sea should be disembarked at the closest ‘safe port’, 
considering geographical proximity and humanitarian concerns. Now, for almost all vessels 
rescuing migrants in the Central Mediterranean, in the proximity of Libya, the first safe port is 
Italy. In fact, no other country is equipped to allow disembarkation without putting rescued 
people at risk. 
Moreover, all rescued migrants are potential asylum seekers. In this sense, removing a vessel 
full of asylum seekers would be equivalent to collective refoulement, which is forbidden by the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 78.1), the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Articles 18–19), and the Qualification Directive (Article 21). 
 
4. Synthesis 
In Italy, there were three governments with three different Ministers of the Interior between 
2015 and 2018. The main political and legislative measures adopted in the area of immigration 
were affected by the pressure the Italian asylum system was under, as a result of a strong 
increase in migration flows due to the war in Syria and the situation following the Arab spring. 
In fact, in that period, Italy received a total of 391,285 asylum applications.  
Despite some differences, all the policies adopted were intended to manage and contain the 
arrivals of migrants on Italian shores. At an internal (EU) level, that goal was pursued by setting 
up hotspots and activating the relocation system adopted by the EU Commission. At an external 
(non-EU) level, several cooperation agreements were concluded in order to control departures 
and manage the return of migrants. The internal approach encountered strong operational and 
organisational delays, which, combined with poor cooperation on the part of other EU Member 




Agreements with third countries met with much opposition, as they are based on prevention 
and, especially, as they may violate human rights. 
From a legislative standpoint, in the period 2015–2019, three decrees were adopted, amending 
migration regulation. They mostly affected the procedures for the examination of applications 
for international protection, and the reception and management of arrivals. In particular, the 
procedural measures (the optional hearing of the applicant, the abolition of the appeal for 
asylum applications, and the elimination of the residence permit for humanitarian reasons) are 
the most controversial, as they are, in a number of respects, in contrast with what is provided 
for in the European Reception Directive and the Return Directive. 
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1. 1. Background information 
The Polish legal system draws a distinction between the following categories of migrants: (a) 
refugees (as defined in 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees); (b) 
persons granted subsidiary protection; (c) tolerated stay permit holders; (d) asylum seekers; (e) 
persons granted humanitarian protection; (f) returnees; (g) economic migrants; (h) 
illegally present or residing persons (Kancelaria Senatu, 2016: 4-5). 
Interestingly, the vast majority of migrants who came to live in Poland permanently (see Art. 
25.1 of the Population Registration Act of 24 September 2010) were Poles returning from 
abroad (69% of all immigrants in 2018; 74% in 2017). Consequently, most of immigrants in 
the above sense arrived from the United Kingdom (3,500 in 2018) and Germany (2,300 in 
2018). The third largest group were persons coming from Ukraine (1,900 in 2018; 1,400 in 
2017) (GUS 2019, 27). It should be also noted that: “the year 2016 was the first one in the 
period considered here when the net permanent migration rate for Poland reached a positive 
value (1,500 people). In 2017, it increased to 3,600 people” (European Commission, 2019). 
Simultaneously, the growth in a number of immigrants who stay temporarily could be observed 
(see below). These were mainly economic migrants. In addition, there was a large group of 
persons plnning to study in Poland, mainly from Ukraine and Belarus. Altogether there were 
78,300 foreign students in 2018 and 72,700 in 2017 (GUS, 2019: 27). 
1.1. Residence permits 
Since 2014, Poland has welcomed approximately 1-2 million immigrants from Ukraine. 
Moreover, according to Eurostat, “in 2018, one out of five first residence permits was issued in 
Poland (635,000, or 20% of total permits issued in the EU)” (Strzelecki et al., 2020: 5). 
Likewise, “in 2017, 1 out of 5 first residence permits was issued in Poland (683,000, or 22% of 
total permits issued in the EU)”. Out of this number, 596,916 (87.4%) of persons indicated 
employment reasons (which result in 59% of all permits issued for employment reasons in the 
European Union); 34,709 (5.1%) educational reasons; 3,517 (0.5%) family reasons; and 48,086 
(7%) other reasons (Eurostat, 2018a). As recognized by the OECD, “in 2017 Poland was among 
the countries with the highest number of temporary working immigrants, estimated at about 1.1 
million” (Strzelecki et al., 2020: 20). 
It should be noted that in 2017, 88% of all residence permits granted to citizens of Ukraine were 
issued in Poland. Moreover, Ukrainians “continued to receive the highest number of permits in 
the EU” with about half of all first residence permits issued in the EU in 2017 (…) issued to 
citizens of […] seven countries”, namely: Ukraine, Syria, China, India, the United States, 
Morocco, and Afghanistan (Eurostat, 2018a). 
In 2017, “the largest numbers of permits were issued for employment reasons, with the highest 
shares observed in Poland (87% of all residence permits issued in the Member State)” (Eurostat, 
2018a). 
As regards the distribution among different countries of origin, in 2017 Poland issued 585,439 
(85.7%) residence permits for Ukrainians; 42,756 (6.3%) for Belarusians; 7,803 (1.1%) for 




In 2016, the number of first residence permits issued in the European Union to non-EU citizens 
was around 3.4 million. With 585,969 (17.5%) first residence permits issued in 2016, Poland 
counted the second highest number of such documents issued in the EU (15.4 first residence 
permits issued per thousand inhabitants; in the EU the figure was 6.5 per thousand on average) 
(Eurostat, 2017a). In terms of reasons for issuing first residence permits in Poland, in 2016 the 
vast majority concerned employment reasons (493,960; 84.3%). It was followed by educational 
reasons (32,676; 5.6%); family reasons (8,416; 1.4%); other reasons (50,917; 8.7%) (Eurostat, 
2017a). What is more, Poland “was by far the first destination for employment related permits” 
(494,000 permits; 58% of all permits issued for employment reasons in the EU in 2016) 
(Eurostat, 2017a). 
As regards the distribution among different countries of origin, in 2016 Poland issued 512,552 
(87.5%) residence permits for Ukrainians; 28,165 (4.8%) for Belarusians; 7,613 (1.3%) for 
Moldavians (Eurostat, 2017a). 
In 2015, the number of first residence permits issued in the European Union to non-EU citizens 
was around 2.6 million. One out of five first residence permits was issued in Poland (541,583; 
20.8%), which was the second highest number in the EU (14.3 first residence permits issued 
per thousand inhabitants; in the EU the figure was 5.1 per thousand on average) (Eurostat, 
2016). In terms of reasons for issuing first residence permits in Poland, in 2015 the vast majority 
concerned employment reasons (375,342; 69.3%). It was followed by educational reasons 
(39,308; 7.3%); family reasons (1,010; 0.2%); other reasons (125,923; 23.3%) (Eurostat, 2016). 
Thus, Poland “was by far the first destination for employment related permits” (53% of all 
permits issued for employment reasons in the European Union in 2015) (Eurostat, 2016). 
As regards the distribution among different countries of origin, in 2015 Poland issued 430,081 
(79.4%) residence permits for Ukrainians; 75,394 (13.9%) for Belarusians; 7,987 (1.5%) for 
Moldavians (Eurostat, 2016). 
1.2. Citizenship 
As for acquisition of Polish citizenship, statistics regarding top 3 recipient countries are as 
follows: 
- 2015 – total: 3,974 granted citizenships; Ukraine (1,957, 49.2%); Belarus (472, 11.9%), 
Armenia (285, 7.2%); 94% of persons granted Polish citizenship were non-EU citizens 
(Eurostat 2017b); 
- 2016 – total: 3,684 granted citizenships; Ukraine (1,885, 51.2%); Belarus (563, 15.3%); 
Russia (236, 6.4%) (Eurostat 2018b);75 
- 2017 – total: 4,233 granted citizenships; Ukraine (2,397, 56.6%); Belarus (759, 17.9%); 
Russia (220, 5.1%) (Eurostat 2019b); 
- 2018 – total: 5,115 granted citizenships (estimated, provisional); Ukraine (2,797, 54.5%); 
Belarus (1,109, 21.6%); Russia (243, 4.7%) (Eurostat, 2020). 
1.3. Refugees 
According to statistics provided by the head of the Office for Foreigners, the number of 
“applications and granting of protection status at first instance” in 2018 were the following 
(Helsinki Foundation, 2018): 
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- total: 4,131 applications; pending at the end of 2018: 3,065; refugee status: 168; subsidiary 
protection: 191; rejection: 2,128; refugee rate: 6.75%; subsidiary protection rate: 7.76%; 
rejection rate: 85.56%; 
- Russia: 2,721 applications; refugee status: 9; subsidiary protection: 61; rejection: 1,212; 
refugee rate: 0.7%; subsidiary protection rate: 4.75%; rejection rate: 94.53%; 
- Ukraine: 466 applications; refugee status: 11; subsidiary protection: 74; rejection: 443; 
refugee rate: 2.08%; subsidiary protection rate: 14.01%; rejection rate: 83.90%; 
- Tajikistan: 144 applications; refugee status: 10; subsidiary protection: 14; rejection: 77; 
refugee rate: 9.9%; subsidiary protection rate: 13.86%; rejection rate: 76.23%; 
- Iraq: 71 applications; refugee status: 19; subsidiary protection: 8; rejection: 11; refugee rate: 
50%; subsidiary protection rate: 21.05%; rejection rate: 28.94%. 
The vast majority of persons coming to Poland are economic migrants. Nearly 73% of aliens 
arriving in Poland in 2018 declare their intention to join the labour market. Other applicants 
mentioned family reasons (12%) and opportunities to move onto university studies (10%) 
(UDSC 2018). 
 
2. Immigration as a political issue 
The presidential elections in May 2015 and parliamentary elections in October 2015 coincided 
in time with the migration crisis and the problem of the relocation system in the European 
Union. Thus, for the first time, a problem of migration and, in particular, refugees became one 
of the main themes of the election campaigns. The ongoing public debate seem to have played 
an important role in a significant political shift that Poland eventually experienced. 
The question of migrants and refugees came up again during the local elections held in October 
and November 2018. However, this time it was a secondary matter. 
2.1. Political context 
There are two major political parties in Poland: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) 
and Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform). PO governed since 2007, forming the 
government with a small Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL, Polish Peasant’s Party). PO was 
broadly perceived as liberal, modern, and seeking for a clear separation of the Church and state. 
Nonetheless, PO was in fact quite a conservative party, focused on improving economic 
situation in the country. In 2015 it lost both the general and presidential elections. 
On May 24, 2015 Andrzej Duda – PiS candidate for a president – won the elections just by a 
very narrow margin.76 He took office on August 6, 2015. Subsequently, in October 2015 PiS – 
the PO’s main political opponent – won the general elections, securing a majority in the 
parliament.77 
Thus, the PiS, together with some minor political parties, has governed since the autumn of 
2015. “The Allied Right”, as the coalition dominated by PiS it is often called, is regarded as 
conservative, illiberal, populist party. It is a member of the Eurosceptic European Conservatives 
and Reformists Party (Wigura et al. 2020, van Kessel 2015, Łętowska, 2018). 
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Before 2015, the question of immigration to Poland has not been debated. According to P. 
Sadowski and K. Szczawińska: “[a]t the peak of the so-called migrant crisis, the European 
Commission presented legislative proposals regarding the relocation of asylum-seekers residing 
in Greece and Italy to other Member States (European Commission, 2015, May 27, 2015, 
September 9). It was the first and the last time that a genuine debate on immigration was taking 
place in Poland” (Sadowska and Szczawińska 2017: 218-19). 
Likewise, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights noticed that a question of migrants and 
refugees appeared for the first time during the election campaign in 2015. A public debate on 
this problem was stormy; many anti-Islamic and anti-immigration voices could be heard. The 
debate was accompanied by numerous demonstrations, both supporting and opposing 
accommodation of refugees in Poland (Demczuk et al. 2018: 3). 
In May 2015, PO’s government announced that Poland would help 60 Christian families from 
Syria (Kopacz, 2015a). In September 2015, during the 25th Economic Forum in Krynica-Zdrój, 
Ewa Kopacz, Polish PM at that time, said that Poland cannot afford economic migrants. 
However, she emphasized that taking the refugees is the national obligation and a test of 
decency (TVN24, 2015). During a meeting with NGO’s dealing with a question of migrants in 
September 2015, Ewa Kopacz said: “Thank you for not regarding migrants’ 'quota’ or 'threat’. 
For you they are simply real people who need help” (Kopacz, 2015b). Thus, the Kopacz’s 
government rhetoric was moderate and reassuring. Although various questions, regarding for 
example public security, appeared, the government tried to calm down the public opinion. 
Compared to PO’s government, a possible change in rhetoric regarding refugees could be 
noticed during the political campaign in autumn 2015. Although PiS focused on social and 
ideological questions, it used the issue of refugees in the election campaign too. The party’s 
rhetoric was based mostly on people’s fears and prejudices. 
In September 2015 Beata Szydło, then PiS’s candidate for the PM, said that a decision to agree 
on accommodating migrants in Poland was a scandal; it was made contrary to the security 
grounds and public opinion. She also warned that it was not only about 7,000 people but many 
more, since they will be able to bring their families to Poland (Szydło, 2015). 
2.1.1. The positions of major domestic parties (including the parties in the government) 
on the problem of immigration and their evolution, relevance of the immigration issue in 
the national elections (2015-2018) 
As regards the positions of major domestic parties on the problem of immigration, 2 types of 
political factions will be analysed briefly: (i) the ruling coalition, (ii) other political groups in 
the Polish parliament. 
The Polish parliament is composed of 2 chambers: the Sejm (the Lower House consisting of 
460 MP’s elected for 4 years) and the Senat (Senate, the Upper House consisting of 100 
members elected for 4 years). 
The 2015 parliamentary elections included 17 political factions (in case of the Sejm) and 7 (in 
case of Senate). The results were as following: 
1. Sejm (PKW, 2015b): 
- KW Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (37.58% votes / 235 seats) – the ruling coalition; 
- KW Platforma Obywatelska RP (24.09% votes / 138 seats); 
- KW Wyborców „Kukiz’15” (8.81% votes / 42 seats); 




- KW Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (5.13% votes / 16 seats); 
- KW Wyborców Mniejszość Niemiecka (0.18% votes / 1 seat). 
2. Senat (PKW 2015c): 
- KW Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (61 seats); 
- KW Platforma Obywatelska RP (34 seats); 
- KW Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (1 seat); 
- 4 komitety wyborcze wyborców kandydatów niezależnych - independent candidates (4 
seats). 
Major extra-parliamentary political parties: 
- Koalicyjny KW Zjednoczona Lewica SLD+TR+PPS+UP+Zieloni - The Allied Left 
(7.55% votes); 
- KW KORWiN (4.76% votes); 
- KW Partia Razem – The Together Party (3.62% votes). 
It was somewhat surprising that no left-wing party entered the parliament, although around 10% 
of Poles voted for the left (The Allied Left and Razem). It was the result to the system according 
to which votes are counted (8% threshold for common lists of different parties). Consequently, 
during the analysis period moderate and radical right-wing parties dominated Sejm. 
Additionally, in 2018 PiS won the elections in 9 out of 16 of local governments (województwo), 
however the overwhelming majority of the elected presidents of the Polish cities were 
independent candidates or those supported by Koalicja Obywatelska (KO, The Civic Coalition) 
with PO as its major actor. 
a) Prawo i Sprawiedliwość  
Programme of PiS: As for migration, the 2014 programme of PiS focused on the problem of 
Polish emigration to the West for economic reasons (PiS, 2014: 12-14). An issue of immigration 
was not tackled. 
Activity of PiS: PiS strongly disapproved welcoming refugees in Poland, arguing that the idea 
of multiculturalism, promoted and implemented by the European Union, has failed. The 
government officials and leading politicians often associated migrants from the Middle East 
and Africa with terrorism and crimes. It seems that such rhetoric – based mostly on people’s 
fears and prejudices – met the expectations of the society. The overriding opinion on welcoming 
migrants form Africa and the Middle East was one of scepticism. 
Some examples: It seems that a speech given by Jarosław Kaczyński (a PiS leader) in Maków 
Mazowiecki in October 2015 was particularly significant. During the meeting with his voters, 
he said that in terms of migrants the Minister of Public Health should have formed an opinion. 
Kaczyński stated “threats already exist. Symptoms of very serious diseases can be observed, 
for example cholera in Greece, so diseases which have not been present in Europe for a very 
long time. […] Some speak of even more dangerous diseases. What is more, there are merely 
geographical differences. It means that various types of parasites that are not dangerous for 
migrants might be dangerous here. It does not mean anybody should be discriminated against. 




Polish new PM’s speech in the European Parliament in January 2016 should also be noted. 
Beata Szydło said that Poland had welcomed 1,000,000 Ukrainian refugees. In fact, the vast 
majority of Ukrainians in Poland were economic migrants – as Ukrainian ambassador in Poland, 
Andrij Deszczyca, explained. What is more, out of 4,000 applications for asylum made in 2015, 
only 2 persons received such status (Deszczyca, 2016). Thus, PiS tried to give misleading 
impression of Poland actually being involved in helping refugees from Eastern Europe. 
In March 2016, just after the terrorist attacks in Brussels, Polish PM, Szydło said: “Now it is 
impossible to welcome any migrants in Poland”; “German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, pursued 
an open migration policy. She even invited them to Europe. I always repeat it was not Poland 
that invited migrants to Europe. We know that we should help and we want to help people who 
had to flee their countries due to war. We have always declared: they should be given financial 
support. But we should not welcome thousands of migrants that come to Europe to improve 
their lives. Among them there are terrorists, too” (Szydło, 2016a). 
The visit of Pope Francis in July 2016 did not change the Government’s attitude towards 
refugees. Although he called for help for them, Beata Szydło said: “We have to pay particular 
attention to Polish citizen’s safety. My duty is to make Poles feel safe […]. We will increase 
the humanitarian aid for the Middle East and Africa […]. It is the best policy we can adopt” 
(Szydło, 2016b). 
Likewise, Minister of the Interior, Mariusz Błaszczak, criticised the former government’s 
decision on welcoming 7,000 refugees. He stated for instance: “We will not do anything that 
would threaten national security. We will not make another New Year’s Eve like in Cologne, 
Dusseldorf or Hamburg happen in Poland” (Błaszczak, 2016a); “France is in a much more 
difficult situation than Poland. Poland would be in the same situation if the government had not 
changed. We would have thousands of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa, according 
to the former government’s decision”, “Immigrants from Africa and the Middle East do not 
integrate. That  is the fact”, “The core of European values and our culture is Christianity. We 
need to come back to our origins […]. They don’t respect these values. What is more, they 
impose their values on us” (Błaszczak, 2016b), “It is a symbol of Western European open-door 
policy. It leads to terrorist attacks, it leads to immigrant’s camp in Calais” (Błaszczak, 2016c). 
Additional information: point 2.2.1. 
b) Platforma Obywatelska  
Programme of PO: A problem of migration policy was addressed in the PO’s 2015 programme, 
i.e. the need for conducting “wise policy which guarantees that Polish society may not be 
threatened by uncontrolled migration” was mentioned (PO, 2015: 6). PO’s programme also 
stated that: “the European Union must face up to the problem of migratory pressures on some 
member states, as well as the tragedy of refugees. Its actions must be directed towards 
eliminating the root cause of this problem, rather than ad hoc actions targeted to its 
consequences. We believe that European solidarity in terms of migration must be responsible; 
and the voluntary principle should be understood as a chance to decide on the scale of our 
engagement, if possible. It must be accompanied by full government control of the process of 
welcoming refugees; effective separation of refugees from illegal economic immigrants; 
possibility to verify immigrants in terms of security; and providing adequate funds in the EU 
budget for welcoming and integration of migrants in Members States. […] As a country 
guarding Eastern boarders of the EU, we will seek to include the question of migration from 
the East to the EU in the common migration policy. We expect solidarity from others, and we 
want to show solidarity […].” (PO, 2015: 66-67). 





Programme of Kukiz’15: In 2015, the Kukiz’15 movement announced the “Change strategy.” 
The problem of migration was addressed in terms of Polish emigration abroad (Kukiz’15, 2015: 
7 and 20). 
Activity of Kukiz’15: In September 2015 Paweł Kukiz, the founder of Kukiz’15 movement, 
referred to the problem of refugees on his Facebook. The main ideas were as follows: 
“Thesis 1: pictures depicting women with children are distorted, 75% of immigrants are men 
whose women and children stayed in countries, where allegedly they cannot survive. 
Thesis 2: Since the beginning of the year, nearly 0.5 mln immigrants arrived in Europe. Around 
2,000 died in the Mediterranean. The mass influx of another hundreds of thousand immigrants 
means death to many more thousands. 
Thesis 3: Immigrants must be helped in the country of origin. […] A new “Marshall Plan” need 
to be proposed. 
Thesis 4: We must send a clear message that there is no room for another hundreds of thousands 
of people. Otherwise, […] this situation would never change. Most of them should be sent back 
home, providing them with food for 14 days. The vast majority is young men, so they’ll be fine. 
[…] 
Thesis 5: We talk about welcoming refugees, not immigrants. It’s falsehood: there’s no clear 
system that can distinguish one from another. […] Most of them do not escape from territory 
where the conflict was being played out, but they escape for economic reasons. Thus, they are 
economic immigrants. 
Thesis 6: There can be no consent for quotas proposed by the European Commission, as long 
as the core problem of protecting borders is not resolved. […] 
Thesis 7: Among immigrants, for example in Hungary, fighters of the Islamic State can be 
identified. There will be more and more of them, since they have announced that their aim is to 
bring terrorists to Europe. […] 
Thesis 9: In Kazakhstan, Siberia, and Eastern Ukraine, at least tens of thousands Poles and 
descendants of Poles live, waiting for repatriation. They do not need to be assimilated; they will 
not launch terrorist attacks. […]” (Kukiz, 2015). 
d) Nowoczesna 
Programme of Nowoczesna: In July 2015 Nowoczesna presented its basic thesis. In its 
programme adopted in 2016, the migration crisis was only mentioned. In particular, it 
recognized a need for “common asylum and immigration policy”. It also referred to the problem 
of emigration of Poles (Nowoczesna, 2016). 
Activity of Nowoczesna: Nowoczesna regarded accommodation of refugees as Poland’s moral 
obligation (IAR, 2015, Petru, 2015). During the party congress in May 2017, its leader, Ryszard 
Petru, stated: “As for refugees, we simply have to be fair. It is a major, complex problem all the 
more we cannot turn our backs on this situation. Today, Nowoczesna makes it clear: if 
necessary, Poland with its allies, has a duty to accommodate refugees, fleeing death, hunger, 
and war. However, we need to prepare for it in the best possible way. It’s a task for the state 
and non-governmental organizations.” (Petru, 2017: 11’-11’45”). 
e) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
Programme of PSL: In PSL’s 2015 “Declaration - Close to human affairs” the problem of 




Activity of PSL: See: point 2.2.1 regarding to the PO’s governmental activity. 
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights presented an interesting report regarding election 
campaign in 2018. The report was limited to candidates for mayors of 10 biggest Polish cities. 
According to this document, three attitudes towards the problem of refugees and migration 
could be outlined: 
1) emphasis on openness and memory of multicultural past; 
2) a pragmatic approach; 
3) opposition to the idea of accommodating refugees (Demczuk et al., 2018: 8). 
As stated in the Report, in 2018 the question of migration and refugees was not the main topic 
of a campaign (Demczuk et al., 2018: 33). 
The report indicated, however, that in June 2017 a declaration on migration was adopted by 7 
presidents of cities affiliated to the Union of Polish Metropolises. They were basically 
associated with the opposition. During the 2018 campaign, they were widely criticised for it 
(Demczuk et al., 2018: 8). 
2.1.2. Relevance of different arguments used for or against immigration in the political, 
and public debate 
As showed in point 2.1.1 of this report, regarding positions of the major domestic parties 
(including the parties in the government) on the problem of immigration, the most relevant 
arguments against immigration in the political and public debate appear to be as following: 
- the question of public safety: the assumption that welcoming migrants from Africa and the 
Middle East might threaten national safety, in particular the risk of terrorist attacks may 
increase (that was the view of the ruling coalition and right-wing parties); 
- the question of multiculturalism: the assumption that the core of the Polish culture is 
Christianity and integration of migrants from Africa and the Middle East is impossible, as 
they do not respect our values (that was the view of ruling coalition and right-wing parties). 
As for the arguments for immigration, the most important was that of moral obligation. 
However, two major ways to solve the problem of migrants could be observed: 
- the first one recognized the possibility to welcome refugees in Poland (i.e. the PO’s 
government); 
- the second one found humanitarian aid more appropriate (i.e. the PiS’s government). 
See also: point 2.2.1 
2.2. Policy in action 
2.2.1. Assessment of the governmental position on immigration, with the information on 
its evolution (2015-2018) 
As indicated earlier, a significant change could be noticed in the rhetoric regarding migrants 
and refugees. PiS’s leaders were fare more cautious. They also frequently appealed to fear and 
prejudice. 
The influence of such activities on public opinion towards migrants was undeniable and the 
level of anti-immigration sentiments has increased. The potential reasons for such negative 
attitudes seem to be as follows: the refugee crisis and a growing number of terrorist attacks in 




Middle East and Africa; right-wing and public media anti-immigration and anti-Islamic 
propaganda presenting Muslims as terrorists and criminals. 
In this context, it should be noted that Polish public opinion was strongly divided. Judging by 
the media coverage, the majority of the society feared to welcome refugees on the sole ground 
of their religion, namely Islam. I.e., according to the opinion pool carried out in May 2015, 53% 
of Poles “were against offering international protection to refugees from the Middle East and 
Africa” (CBOS, 2015). 
I.e., public opinion poll carried out by TNS in October 2015 had the following results: 73% of 
the respondents strongly agreed or tended to agree that welcoming refugees would cause 
increasing unemployment (64% in 2006); 68% of the respondents strongly agreed or tended to 
agree that welcoming refugees would cause more crime (55% in 2006); 30% of the respondents 
strongly agreed or tended to agree that welcoming refugees would enrich the national culture 
(48% in 2006); 30% of the respondents strongly agreed or tended to agree that welcoming 
refugees would enrich the country, since there are many talented and well-educated people 
(58% in 2006) (TNS Polska, 2015). 
According to the public opinion poll carried out by CBOS in January 2016: 53% of the 
respondents were against welcoming refugees from areas of armed conflict; 37% of the 
respondents stated that Poland should accommodate refugees for a period until they can return 
to their countries of origin; 4% of the respondents stated that Poland should welcome refugees 
and permit them to settle in Poland (CBOS, 2016a). 
Interestingly, an attitude of the respondents differs significantly regarding refugees from Africa 
/ Middle East and Ukraine. According to public opinion poll carried out by CBOS in February 
2016 67% of the respondents were strongly against or against welcoming refugees from Africa 
and the Middle East; 26% of the respondents were of the opposite view; 34% of the respondents 
were strongly against or against welcoming refugees from Ukraine; 59% of the respondents 
were of the opposite view (CBOS, 2016b). 
The subsequent public opinion polls carried out by the CBOS in 2016 resulted in similar 
conclusions.78 
2.2.2. Challenges in implementation of the common EU migration policies in the relevant 
country 
In 2015 both the Polish governments (PO-PSL) and PiS criticized the way the EU attempted to 
face the migration crisis. Nevertheless, while the former one accepted relocation mechanism, 
the latter rejected it (Pędziwiatr and Legut, 2016: 672). 
The 2015 EU refugee relocation mechanism was indeed contested by governments of several 
countries, including Poland (CJEU, 2020). 
In response to this mechanism, in May 2016 Sejm adopted a resolution on "Defending the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Poland and the rights of its citizens,” which states, among other 
                                                     
78 See: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców w Polsce i w Czechach, 
Komunikat z badań nr 54/2016, April 2016, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_054_16.PDF; Stosunek 
do przyjmowania uchodźców po ogłoszeniu nowej propozycji Komisji Europejskiej dotyczącej reformy polityki 
azylowej, Komunikat z badań nr 79/2016, May 2016: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_079_16.PDF; 
Stosunek do przyjmowania uchodźców, Komunikat z badań nr 98/2016, July 2016: 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_098_16.PDF; Komunikat z badań nr 128/2016, September 2016: 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_128_16.PDF; Komunikat z badań nr 136/2016, October 2016: 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_136_16.PDF; Komunikat z badań nr 153/2016, November 2016: 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2016/K_153_16.PDF; Komunikat z badań nr 169/2016, December 2016: 




things, that: "in the institutions of the European Union [...] attempts are made to impose on 
Poland a decision on the immigrants who have come to Europe. The announced decisions to 
solve this problem have no basis in European law, they violate the sovereignty of our country, 
European values and the subsidiarity principle of the European Union. They also pose a threat 
to the social order in Poland, the security of its citizens and the civilisation heritage and national 
identity. The Sejm of the Republic of Poland calls on the government to oppose any action 
against the sovereignty of the state and states that it is the government's duty to defend the 
national interest and constitutional order in the Republic of Poland” (Sejm, 2016a ).79 
In October 2016, another resolution was adopted (Sejm 2016b). It concerned Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European and of the Council Parliament establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person. The resolution states that the Proposal is not be in line with the subsidiarity 
principle. 
Both resolutions were not legally binding, however they clearly indicate the nature of Polish 
authorities to a problem of accommodating refugees. 
In December 2017 Mateusz Morawiecki was appointed as a new PM. 
At that time, Beata Kempa was nominated minister responsible for humanitarian aid. She held 
that position from January 2018 to June 2019. The need for establishing a new post was 
explained as a reaction to “increasing humanitarian needs and migration pressure in the world” 
(Kempa 2019). 
According to the activity report, Beata Kempa undertook, i.e. the following actions: cooperation 
with NGO’s; establishing cooperation with agencies engaged in humanitarian aid; international 
cooperation. The report also mentioned coordination activities, i.e.: setting up a group of 
experts; organising a meeting with missionaries; organising an Innovative Humanitarian Aid 
Forum; presenting achievements before the Government; celebrating Holy Mass with the 
intention of peace in Syria; organising a “Polish humanitarian aid” exhibition (Kempa, 2019: 
5-15). It should be noted that Beata Kempa focused on problems of Christians in the world. 
The Supreme Audit Office has indicated that: “Although a Minister responsible for 
humanitarian aid was nominated in January 2018, until May 2019 no proposals for humanitarian 
aid policy were put forward. Humanitarian aid was granted within the scope proposed by 
NGO’s” (Dziuba, 2020). 
According to the European Commission, no people have been relocated to Poland since the 
launch of the scheme to December 2016 (European Commission, 2016). In June 2017 the 
European Commission concluded: “In total, more than 20,000 people have been relocated so 
far. While most of the Member States are now contributing fairly and proportionally to the 
implementation of the scheme, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in breach of their legal 
obligations are neither pledging nor relocating from Greece and Italy” (European Commission, 
2017). Likewise in 2018: “Hungary and Poland remain the only Member States that have not 
relocated a single person and Poland has not made any pledge since 16 December 2015” 
(Pędziwiatr and Legut, 2016: 672). 
                                                     
79 The results of voting were as follows: (i) 222 MP’s belonging to PiS voted in favour of the resolution; 11 had 
not taken part in the voting; (ii) 29 MP’s belonging to KUKIZ’15 voted in favour of the resolution; 7 had not taken 
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2.2.3. Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that quite a number of the Polish legal acts 
concerning immigration and immigrants (laws: generally binding acts adopted by the national 
Parliament; and regulations: executive acts to the laws, issued mainly at the government level) 
are partly an implementation of the European Union and international law. 
As for the new EU strategy targeted at solving migration crisis appeared during European 
Council summits, as well as European Commission meetings with European, African, and 
Turkish governments between March 2015 and March 2016 (Pędziwiatr and Legut, 2016: 672), 
the situation is ambiguous. 
PM Ewa Kopacz’s government was sceptical about compulsory and automatic relocation 
mechanism. It also criticized that mechanism as a durable solution (Pędziwiatr and Legut, 2016: 
682). When Ms Beata Szydło was appointed as the new PM in November 2015, she announced 
that although a new government would respect EU migration policy, Pole’s safety would remain 
the most important issue. It meant that the EU migration policy would be contested (Pędziwiatr 
and Legut, 2016: 685-686). 
As A. Adamczyk points out: “After the attacks in Paris and Brussels, the Prime Minister stated 
on the Superstacja TV channel that she did not believe it feasible‚ for Poland to admit 
immigrants at the moment” (Adamczyk, 2019: 122). 
It should be mentioned that in September 2018, during the summit of EU Heads of State and 
Government in Salzburg, a new Polish PM M. Morawiecki upheld the PiS government’s view 
that Poland would keep refusing to welcome migrants within the relocation mechanism. As 
Adamczyk noticed: “Like other states in the Visegrad group, it continued to oppose forced 
relocation, preferring voluntary decisions by individual states. An additional argument to refuse 
to admit foreigners under relocation was the lack of a guarantee of the appropriate level of 
security in relation to these people.” (Adamczyk, 2019: 122-123). According to Adamczyk: 
“the PiS government has remained consistent and not changed its opinion on the relocation and 
resettlement of people who require international protection to Poland. Moreover, from the 
beginning the government has maintained the attitude that people in need should receive aid at 
the site of conflict or in neighboring states. The inconsistency in the migration policy has 
primarily been related to the fact that, contrary to the opinions that Poland is closed for 
foreigners, the number of immigrants arriving in Poland has actually increased. […] despite the 
anti-immigrant government rhetoric, the number of foreigners in Poland has increased. Their 
number has grown even though the issue of immigrant influx has been associated with that of 
terrorist threat and reduced security level. Additionally, the statements of the ruling party’s 
politicians have implied concerns with Poland accepting Muslim immigrants, while 
government representatives have signed employment agreements with countries where Islam is 
the dominant religion. The lack of coherence in Polish migration policy has resulted from the 
absence of a government document that would define such a policy. This has also translated 
into pursuing an ad hoc policy and the failure to develop a migration doctrine. This situation is 
dangerous as it makes Polish migration policy unpredictable” (Adamczyk, 2019: 134-135). 
More information about the non-compliance with the EU requirements: point. 3.2. 
 
3. Immigration as a legal issue  
3.1. Brief description of the applicable legal framework in a relevant country together 




As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that quite a number of Polish legal acts concerning 
immigration and immigrants (laws: generally binding acts adopted by the national Parliament; 
and regulations: executive acts to the laws, issued mainly at the government level) are partly an 
implementation of the European Union and international law. 
An example of implementation of the EU law (e.g. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States) is the Act 
of 14 July 2006 on the entry into, residence in and exit from the territory of the Republic of 
Poland of citizens of the European Union Member States and their family members. On the 
other hand, the regulations contained in the Polish law on the refugee status in the Act of 13 
June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland 
are partially based on the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees drawn up in Geneva 
on 28 July 1951.  
For the sake of clarity, it should also be stressed that when analysing Polish legal acts on 
immigration, it is always necessary to distinguish between the legal situation of an EU citizen, 
persons coming from outside the EU and persons with refugee status, as the legal regime in 
which the persons are located is different and the catalogue of rights and obligations to which 
the persons are subject also varies. The most important Polish legal acts regulating immigration 
will be listed below, together with their brief characteristics. 
First of all, the Act of 12 December 2013 on foreigners (Act on foreigners)80 should be 
indicated, which regulates the rules and conditions of foreigners' entry into, transit through, stay 
in and exit from the territory of the Republic of Poland, the procedure and authorities competent 
in these matters (Art. 1). However, its provisions do not apply to members of diplomatic 
missions and consular posts of foreign countries and other persons equated with them on the 
basis of acts, agreements or generally established international customs, provided that they are 
reciprocal and have documents confirming the performance of their functions entitling them to 
enter and stay on the territory of the Republic of Poland (with exceptions provided for in this 
Act), as well as to nationals of the Member States of the European Union, the Member States 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) - Parties to the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area or the Swiss Confederation and members of their families who join them or 
reside with them (Art. 2). According to this Act, a foreigner is anyone who does not hold Polish 
citizenship (Art. 3.2). 
Secondly, the legal act to which reference should be made is the Act of 13 June 2003 on granting 
protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland (Act on granting 
protection to foreigners).81 This Act sets out the principles, conditions and procedures for 
granting protection to foreigners on the territory of the Republic of Poland and the authorities 
competent in these matters (Art. 1). According to the Act, a foreigner is granted protection on 
the territory of the Republic of Poland by the granting the refugee status, granting subsidiary 
protection, granting asylum, granting temporary protection (Art. 3.1). What is important, each 
foreigner’s application for protection is examined as an application for granting the refugee 
status, unless the foreigner explicitly applies for asylum or the request for protection results 
                                                     
80 Act on foreigners, Polish Journal of Laws 2013.1650 of 2013.12.30, as amended; this Act implements a number 
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amended). 
81 Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland, Polish Journal of Laws 




from a court ruling on inadmissibility of foreigner’s surrender or from the decision of the 
Minister of Justice on the refusal to surrender the foreigner (Art. 3.2). 
Another act which relates to immigration issues is the Act of 14 July 2006 on the entry into, 
residence in and exit from the territory of the Republic of Poland of nationals of the Member 
States of the European Union and their family members,82 which lays down the rules and 
conditions for entry into, residence in and exit from the territory of the Republic of Poland of 
nationals of the Member States of the European Union, nationals of the Member States of the 
EFTA – Parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, nationals of the Swiss 
Confederation, family members of the nationals referred to above who join or stay with them 
and the procedure and authorities competent in these matters (Art. 1). 
From the point of view of this study and indication of the implementation of the provisions of 
the Polish law regulating immigration, it is necessary to briefly present the Office for Foreigners 
(Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców) (governmental administration office), headed by the Chief, 
who performs a number of tasks resulting from the aforementioned Act on Foreigners. The 
catalogue of these tasks includes, among other things: issuing decisions and decisions in the 
first instance and considering appeals against decisions and complaints against decisions issued 
in the first instance by other authorities in matters regulated by all three acts listed in this 
chapter; activities related to the functioning of the Schengen Information System, providing the 
authorities of other European Union Member States with a number of data on foreigners (details 
are regulated by the Act on foreigners in Art. 22). The head of the aforementioned Office is the 
central body of government administration (as Polish administrative law name it), competent, 
inter alia, in matters concerning the entry of foreigners into the territory of the Republic of 
Poland, transit through this territory, stay in and departure from it, granting the refugee status, 
granting a permit to stay for humanitarian reasons or a permit for tolerated stay, granting asylum 
to foreigners (Art. 16). The body examining appeals against the decision of the Chief of the 
Office for Foreigners is the Refugee Board in matters concerning granting the refugee status. 
3.2. Existing and potential conflicts between national law and legal practice of a relevant 
country and applicable EU rules  
As an introduction, it should be stressed that the three Polish legal acts mentioned above 
implement a number of legislative acts of the European Union. Thus, the Act on foreigners 
implements the provisions of several EU directives; similarly, the Act on granting protection to 
foreigners and the Act on entering the territory of the Republic of Poland implement several 
EU directives.  
It is important to bear in mind what has already been pointed out, that distinguishing between 
the status of a person to whom one applies both Polish and European law. For example, 
according to the regulation on the free movement of workers within the Union,83 such a worker 
enjoys the same social and tax privileges as employees of a given country (Art. 7.2). The 
Citizenship Directive,84 on the other hand, despite the shortcomings signalled,85 introduced the 
                                                     
82 Act of 14 July 2006 on the entry into, residence in and exit from the territory of the Republic of Poland of 
nationals of the Member States of the European Union and their family members, Polish Journal of Laws 
2014.1525 of 2014.11.06 as amended. 
83 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Union, OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, pp. 1-12 
84 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 
2004.158.77, 30.04.2020. 
85 For example, the European Parliament states explicitly in its study that “there is evidence of serious shortcomings 
in the implementation of the Directive and of persistent obstacles to freedom of movement, as highlighted in the 




concept of “citizenship of the Union” into national legislation, which covers all Union citizens 
who move to or reside in a Member State other than the Member State of which they are 
nationals and their family members who accompany or join them. These EU laws are an 
example of how free movement of persons can be achieved and concern citizens of EU Member 
States. 
The status of non-EU nationals from third countries is much more complex. Particularly 
noteworthy is the legal crisis related to the 2015 EU refugee relocation mechanism contested 
by the governments of several countries, including Poland (see below). 
In response to this mechanism, Sejm adopted a resolution on “Defending the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Poland and the rights of its citizens” (see: point 2.2.1.). 
The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled, however, in Joined Cases C-715/17, C-
718/17 and C-719/17 Commission v Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that, by refusing 
to comply with the temporary relocation mechanism for applicants for international protection, 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic failed to fulfil their obligations under EU law. In the 
opinion of the Court, those States could not, in order to evade the implementation of that 
mechanism, rely either on their obligations relating to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security or on the malfunctioning of the relocation mechanism which 
they allege. The Court pointed out that Poland was not entitled to derogate from the application 
of the relocation decision on the basis of Art. 72 TFEU, according to which the provisions of 
the Treaty relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, to which asylum policy in 
particular belongs, “shall be without prejudice to the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security”. Since that provision is a derogating provision from the general rules of 
European Union law and must be interpreted strictly. Consequently, the provision does not 
confer on the Member States the power to derogate from the provisions of European Union law 
by simply invoking the interests relating to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security, but requires them to prove the necessity of the derogation 
provided for in that provision in order to fulfil their obligations in that regard (CJEU 2020). 
In this context, it should be noted that European law provides for common policies on border 
control, asylum and migration. In accordance with Arts. 79 and 80 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, the Union should develop a common immigration policy aimed at 
ensuring, at all stages, effective management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country 
nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced fight against, 
illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. The European Parliament and the Council 
shall adopt measures, inter alia, on: conditions of entry and residence; standards on procedures 
for the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for 
the purpose of family reunification; the definition of the rights of third country nationals 
residing legally in a Member State, including those relating to freedom of movement and of 
residence in other Member States; and illegal immigration and illegal residence. In addition, 
the Union’s immigration policies and their implementation are subject to the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States, including at financial 
level.  
It should be added that the management of immigration in the EU is multi-level in nature; it is 
a process that takes place both at the level of the European institutions and at national level, 
involving a large number of actors, including local authorities, etc. However, this is not always 
                                                     
infringement procedures for incorrect or incomplete transposition of the Directive, the huge number of petitions 
submitted to Parliament and the very high number of cases pending before the Court of Justice” 




an effective process in terms of the actual adoption of legislation on immigration issues 
(Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014: 19-21, 129-130). 
However, returning to the national law and the issue of immigration from third countries, 
pursuant to the Act on granting protection to foreigners, a foreigner is granted the refugee status 
if, due to a justified fear of being persecuted in the country of origin for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, political beliefs or belonging to a specific social group, he cannot or does not want 
to benefit from the protection of that country. Moreover, the refugee status is also granted to a 
minor child of a foreigner who obtained the refugee status in the Republic of Poland, born on 
this territory (Art. 13). The implementation of the quoted provisions is well illustrated by the 
practice developed by the Polish administration concerning Ukrainian citizens. The protection 
resulting from granting the refugee status is extended to Ukrainians from Crimea occupied by 
Russia; from other parts of Ukraine, especially Lugansk and Donetsk regions, as long as there 
are grounds for granting the refugee status in the individual case (Kowalski, 2016). 
A foreigner who does not meet the conditions for granting the refugee status shall be granted 
subsidiary protection in accordance with the Polish law, if his/her return to the country of origin 
may expose him/her to a real risk of suffering serious harm: death penalty or execution, torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, serious and individual threat to life or health 
resulting from the widespread use of violence against civilians in a situation of international or 
internal armed conflict - and because of this risk he cannot or does not want to benefit from the 
country of origin protection (Act on granting protection to foreigners, Art. 15). 
Finally, a foreigner may, upon his/her application, be granted asylum in the Republic of Poland, 
if it is necessary to provide him/her with protection and if an important interest of the Republic 
of Poland so requires (Act on granting protection to foreigners, Art. 90). Asylum is an institution 
separate from the refugee status; both the asylum and the refugee status find their legal basis in 
the Polish Constitution and the refugee status and granting subsidiary protection are regulated 
both on the international (already mentioned Geneva Convention of 1951) and European level; 
the aim of the regulation at the EU level was to unify the interpretation of the definition of a 
refugee, however – as is indicated in the literature – this goal has not been fully achieved 
(Kowalski, 2016). 
The annual reports of the Office for Foreigners constitute an important source of knowledge on 
the practice of the Polish administration in relation to immigration, inter alia, on legalisation of 
stay and international protection of foreigners. For example, the report for 2015 stressed that: 
“the Geneva Convention did not regulate issues related to the maintenance by the host country 
of persons applying for refugee status. The Act on granting protection to foreigners within the 
territory of the Republic of Poland provides for the possibility to provide such persons with 
social assistance and medical care and, optionally, with assistance in voluntary return to the 
country to which they have the right of entry or with assistance in transfer to the country 
responsible for examining the application for international protection. Social assistance 
includes assistance provided in a centre or assistance provided outside the centre, consisting in 
the payment of a cash benefit to cover the costs of stay in the territory of the Republic of Poland 
on their own. Moreover, a person who covered the costs of the funeral of a foreigner who died 
during the proceedings for granting the refugee status is entitled to a funeral allowance” (UDSC, 
2016). The same report lists the European legal acts which have been implemented in the Polish 
legislation. Finally, the document states explicitly that: “the consequence of Poland's 
membership in the European Union is not only the need to adapt the provisions of national law 
to the EU regulations, but also the possibility to benefit from EU funds, including the European 
Refugee Fund” (UDSC, 2016: 36-38). In a similar spirit – pointing to a number of aspects of 




In 2016 The Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK), in the information on granting protection to 
a foreigner in Poland, stated that: “the Polish administration received applications for the 
refugee status in accordance with the law. Guarded and residence centres for foreigners were 
also properly organized and run. However, NIK draws attention to the deficiencies concerning 
the supervision and preparation of state authorities to perform statutory tasks. The shortcomings 
also concerned the efficiency of the implementation of the refugee procedures, which, 
according to the Chamber, may be further extended by the newly introduced chapter of the 
proceedings for granting the refugee status. It is about introducing into the Act on foreigners a 
solution according to which proceedings concerning one person could be conducted by two 
different government administration bodies – the Border Guard and the Office for Foreigners. 
The information of the Supreme Chamber of Control states that “there are two separate 
proceedings concerning personal and socio-political situation of one foreigner: The Border 
Guard conducts proceedings to a large extent on the basis of evidence already collected and 
assessed by the Head of the Office for Foreigners” (NIK, 2016). 
Concluding on the possible conflict between Polish and European law on immigration, it should 
be stressed that to a large extent Polish law is adapted to European law. Immigration from 
outside the EU is the subject of debate in Poland. The most serious legal implications are 
undoubtedly the violations of the EU law by Poland on opposing the mechanism of relocation 
of refugees in connection with their mass influx from outside Europe into the EU. The EU 
Internal Market is an area of access to a number of privileges for EU citizens. However, people 
from outside Europe can function in the EU – also in Poland – on the basis of international, 
European and national law, after meeting a number of criteria and successfully completing 
proceedings, e.g. for obtaining a visa. However, correct or incorrect application of national law 
and possible violation of European law should always be considered in an individual case. 
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 Introduction 
The following report provides an in-depth analysis of the im/migration situation, policies and 
debates in Slovakia in 2015-2018. First, it offers background information, followed by 
explaining approaches of the key political parties on immigration topic and description of key 
arguments and narratives used for or against immigration in the political and public debate.  
The second part provides assessment of the governmental position on immigration, together 
with the information on its evolution.  
The third part discusses immigration as a legal issue, including conflicts of policies at the EU 
and national level. 
Finally, it offers key synthesis of findings as well as tentative recommendations, including 
reference to a set of detailed recommendations suggested by a local stakeholder organisation. 
It is based on critical overview of available literature and additional research of legal and policy 
documents. The German Presidency of the Council of the EU is discussing the issue of refugees 
relocation during its current presidency.86 Indeed, the European Commission introduced a 
blueprint of its new plan on asylum policy in September 2020. Furthermore, the government is 
going to revise the key policy documents in coming years. Thus, this issue is highly topical and 
deserves more analytical attention, especially if the aim is to come to a sound policy advise. 
For busy people, there is a succint summary with recommendations at the end of the report.  
Especially during and around period in question, Slovakia had been transforming gradually 
from a country of emigration to a country of a limited transit for illegal migration, and it was 
becoming a country of final destination for legal migration (Bolečeková and Olejárová, 2017: 
192). In fact, even terminology was changing, at least among experts, replacing a term illegal 
migration with a more neutral term irregular migration. However, we kept here multiple terms 
in place since the discourses at that time (political, media/public or expert level discourses) 
showed inconsistency. In fact, the term “irregular” migration could be found only as an excetion 
from the rule in all types of discourses.  
It should be mentioned the role of the media during refugee/migrant crisis, or, as it turned out, 
a crisis of European migration policy. 
One has to differentiate analytically on the one hand between media coverage and 
commentaries, and on the other hand, political discourse as presented in the media (see for an 
example proper differentiation by Chudžíková, 2016).  
                                                     




In general, a longitudinal study based on framing and carried out in earlier and the most critical 
period (2013-2016) by Kovář (2019) found that the security-threat frame was the dominant 
frame in the media, while economic framing was significantly less frequent in Slovak media. 
While both quality media and tabloids employed the security-threat frame often, it was 
significantly more prominent in tabloids. This appears to be too general observation, though. 
For example, specifically for the 2016 year, the major Slovak mainstream media sources 
maintained objectivity and informed promptly, professionally and without unnecessary affects 
about topic of Islam (Islam and refugees were seen as almost identical issues in public 
discourse, although there was also strong correlation in public/media debate between migrants 
and (black) Africans), with emotional and sensational information presented in some alternative 
information sources (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2017: 523). Similarly, Chudžíková’s (2016) micro-
research pointed at relatively balanced coverage of the media on refugee/migrant issue in 
September 2015.  
For the political discourse as presented by politicians and political parties in the media (two 
selected newspapers), the most dominant political actor was the governing party, the “Smer-
SD”. This discourse was changing since spring 2015 into electoral discourse for upcoming 2016 
general elections, and from framing “it’s not our problem, it’s the responsibility of the EU”, to 
a more political phrase, “migrant is a threat, and presents a danger – risk for our country”. 
Similarly, the number of articles mentioning “migration/refugee crisis” was increasing, with 
two peaks – one in September 2015 and the second peak in the first quarter of 2016. Among 
other political actors who commented on refugees/migrant in positive way, the most visible was 
then President Andrej Kiska, while the most frequent political representant expressing negative 
perspective on various aspects of the crisis was then the P.M. Robert Fico (Žúborová and 
Borárosová, 2017).87 However, institutionalization and shift between security–humanitarian 
discourses and threat–victim-framing throughout 2015 year was not typical only for Slovakia – 
it was actually found in Austria and the Czech Republic, too (Kluknavská, Bernhard, 
Boomgaarden, 2019). Moreover, the change in framing happened following the November 
2015 Paris terrorist attacks when the humanitarian framing was quickly overwhelmed by a 
defensive securitisation frame in the media across Europe, especially in Central Europe 
(Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017). Yet for Slovakia the first change in discourse – seeing 
migrants/refugees more closely related to Slovakia - could be seen already in late August 2015. 
At that time, 71 corpses of migrants/refugees were found close to Austrian-Slovak borders, but 
on Austrian side of the common borders (Chudžíková, 2016: 94).88  
The political discourse in selected daily papers and Facebook from July 2017 to January 2018 
on the issue of migration/refugees was rather marginal and relatively more sympathetic to 
refugees/migrants (Spálová and Szabo, 2018). The crisis seemed to be gone, and there were 
more important local issues like “captured state” and corruption. 
In the later period (May-August 2018), local media reported on migration in a more diverse 
style than in either Estonia or the Czech Republic (Pospěch, Jurečková, Hacek, Chalupková, 
Ivanič, Kaal, Rense, Tokošová, 2019; and Ivanič in Kačmár, 2019). In particular, local media 
reflected migration within context of labour migration (there are many guestworkers or workers 
who moved abroad from Slovakia, seeking jobs and other opportunities for some time or 
permanently abroad). Furthermore, in contrast to Hungary and partially in contrast to Poland as 
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well as the Czech Republic, negative coverage of migration or refugees did not occur in the 
mainstream media (but in so called alternative, mostly only online media). The mainstream 
media, including tabloid media, focused at problematic aspects of migration less often and in 
less negatively emotional manner than the Czech media. Conversely, the local media discussed 
also more often political issues and integration. Finally, although the dominant discourse in the 
mainstream media was lead by politicians, their presence in the media discourse was less 
frequent than either in Estonia or the Czech Republic (Pospěch et al., 2019; Ivanič, Kačmár, 
2019). 
Be that as it may, it was crucial that when migration crisis started in 2015, there were upcoming 
general election in a country in March 2016 – thus, refugees or “migrants” became useful 
scapegoat for many politicians and political parties running in the elections. As put by Mudde 
(2016, cited in Wiczanowska, 2017: 70), “securitization of the refugee issue shall be deemed as 
instrumentalization aimed at general elections of 2016.” Within this context, a long tradition of 
ethno-centricism, populism and illiberalism/geographical closeness in Slovakia (Harris, 2019; 
Sekerák, 2019; Gallová-Kriglerová, 2016: 73) was unfortunately rather (un)helpful. Indeed, a 
research by Chromková-Manea and Kusá (2019) confirmed quite strong correlation between 
high level of ethnocentrism (to be born in  a country, to command a language, to have parents 
with local origin, etc) and having negative attitude towards migrants in general in Slovakia (as 
well as in the Czech Republic). Moreover, there was no positive impact of increase in level of 
higher education on social distancing. Interestingly, ethnocentrism has actually increased 
between 2008-2017 period. 
Fundamentally, there had been already applied emotional ethno-nationalist and homonegative 
discourses by anti-LGBT activists during the (ultimately unsuccessful) referendum on “The 
Protection of Family” held on February 7, 2015. This pre-referendum discourse already used 
the discursive cleavages of the dichotomy of “depraved Europe” and “traditional/pure 
Slovakia”. Moreover, the frames used - “norms forced from above, legislature and judiciary 
activism, collapsing European civilisation, protection of national development and threat to the 
Slovak nation” (Valkovičová, 2017) were quite adaptable to discourse during refugee crisis 
which was ongoing about the same time and culminated a few months later (with two peaks, as 
mentioned). Thus, public was already accustomed to emotional rhetoric that fitted perfectly to 
negative refugee rhetoric narratives. 
No wonder that, as put by Andrew Stroehlein, representative of Human Rights Watch at that 
time: "It appears that Slovakia has experienced migrant crisis without migrants. The number of 
refugees is minimal, yet paradoxically fear is enormous.”89 Yet even this was only partial truth. 
Apparently, and additionally to the above-mentioned contributing factors, there might have 
been impact of important short-term trend in legal migration. As put by Benč (2015: 62): “From 
a country where immigration in particular has had no mass nature, where the number of asylum 
seekers along with the quantity of migrants living and working in the country has been low,90 
Slovakia has been undergoing an important transformation on in this domain during the past 3-
5 years. The inflow of legal migrants has been growing to an unexpected extent, carrying with 
it a great acceleration of challenges.” The increase of foreigners between 2004 and 2016 (as 
much as 4.2 times) was the third fastest growth rate in the European Union in that period 
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(Letavajová and Divinský, 2019: 16).91 Similarly, there was a reverse trend of number of illegal 
border crossings that were replaced in statistics with illegal stays in a country (Benč, 2015: 58). 
Thus, what we could see in 2015 in Slovakia was a typical case of moral panic, based on four 
indicators (concern, hostility, consensus and disproportionality) – see Androvičová (2016: 54-
58). Moreover, the arguments for the elite-engineered model of panic are the strongest here 
(Androvičová, 2016: 62). This can be seen in the following section. However, among the elite 
one can include some Christian and nationalist activists (or anti-LGBT activists) who initiated 
divising referendum and its discourse that pre-cooked mood in society. Moreover, Bolečeková 
and Olejárová (2017: 194) have suggested that recent “historical experience” with the misuse 
(to be discussed further) of the asylum system could have had impact on the attitude of 
Slovaks concerning the 2015 refugee crisis. 
 
 Background information 
Slovakia has historically been country of emigrants rather than immigrants. There is no 
consensus among researchers as to how many foreigners (with a residence permit) live in 
Slovakia. The total number seems to be around 150,000 persons as of 2019. The Slovak 
Statistical Office uses the term foreigner and not migrant. 
HRL (2020: 14) claims that there were 143,075 foreigners living in Slovakia in 2019. However, 
there were only only 2.2% of foreigners living in Slovakia at the end of 2018 (121,000 
individuals) according to Letavajová and Divinský (2019: 7). In contrast, Bolečeková and 
Olejárová (2017: 192) used another definition and data which produced different perspective.92 
In their view, already at the beginning of 2014, the number of immigrants (i.e., persons with a 
place of birth outside of Slovakia) was approximately 174,900 (3.2% of the population), of 
which approximately 146,300 (2.7%) came from other EU member states and approximately 
28,600 thousand (0.5%) moved from third countries. Fourth statistical perspective was offered 
Bargerová (2016, p. 28). According to her calculations, there have been 84,787 foreigners living 
in Slovakia at the end of 2015 (share 1.56%).  
It can be estimated that more than a third of foreigners from “third countries” living in Slovakia 
represented permanently settled individuals or families and about 60% of them had temporary 
permits (Bargerová, 2016: 29). 
Be that as it may, these included mostly legal migrants (mainly guestworkers) or other legal 
and illegal migrants that were granted various form of protection or, exceptionally, citizenship.  
The estimates of undocumented immigrants or those having undefined status were about some 
12,000 to 13,000 persons; the majority of them being most likely Ukrainians (Letavajová and 
Divinský, 2019: 19). In contrast, an estimate of those leaving the country over the past years 
was put at between 15,000 to 20,000 persons annually (Letavajová and Divinský, 2019: 15). 
For comparison, total population of Slovakia is about 5.4 million. 
Slovakia had been throughout period in question among countries with the lowest ratio of 
asylum seekers in the EU (asylum requests per million citizens), and it was actually the country 
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with proportionally the lowest number of asylum seekers in the EU in 2016 year.93 Similarly, 
in 2017, Slovakia registered just around 160 asylum applications, the lowest number in the EU 
that year (GDP, 2019). In part this was result of its status as a transit country (refugees/migrants´ 
final destination were other countries, typically Germany or the UK), not being a major transit 
route for refugees /migrants in general (Benč, 2015: 61) and especially since autumn 2015 in 
particular,94 as well as it was seen as a country with a very strict asylum granting policy.95 The 
last point should be explained briefly here – the ministry of interior or the Migration Authority 
can grant asylum on “humaritarian” grounds or the government can offer a“temporary shelter” 
even without any need to claim any persecution (section 9 and section 29 respectively, of the 
Act 480/2002). Thus, what has been strict was actual aplication of the law, not only the law as 
such, as we shall discuss further. In any case, during 25 years (since 1993) there were only 856 
successful asylum seekers out of 58,874 asylum requests (Berthotyová, 2019). Yet it should be 
mentioned that majority of refugees requested asylum only formally, once they were checked 
by the police on their route further west, north or south.96 The fact is that even in times of crisis, 
Slovakia has not become a final destination for asylum seekers and irregular immigrants 
(Bolečeková and Olejárová, 2017: 196). Nonetheless, illegal migration of “migrants” (less so 
of “refugees”) became one of the most discussed and the most controversial political issues 
particularly in years 2015 and 2016. 
A very limited migration to Slovakia has traditionally constituted mainly by nationals of 
neighbouring countries, or countries with historical ties to Slovakia97 or developing countries 
that have the trade links with Slovakia (Macková, Harmáček and Opršal, 2019). Between 2015 
and 2018 we can, however, see a change in the share of migrants in Slovakia. The share of EU 
nationals among those migrants residing in Slovakia with valid residence permit continuously 
decreased (from 58% to 46%), and in 2018, there was already a higher share of third country 
nationals for that year (54% - see Table 1 in annex).98 
The EU nationals were represented mainly by nationals of neighbouring countries - Czech 
Republic and Hungary (see Table 2 in annex). Among the third country nationals, traditionally, 
the largest groups are nationals of other Slavic countries: Ukraine, Serbia and Russia (see Table 
3 in annex). 
In terms of the inflow of legal immigrants (number of residence permits granted), the third 
country nationals made up clear majority of the applicants (see Table 4 in annex). This number 
has been constantly increasing since 2015, whilst the number of EU nationals remained quite 
constant (around 7,000 persons). Similarly as in the case of stock data (number of people with 
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is the lowest number of asylum seekers in Slovakia out of the Union), https://dennikn.sk/666115/eurostat-na-
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of Migration Routes, Human Smugglers are avoiding the Country), https://domov.sme.sk/c/8051377/slovensko-
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95 The judge who deals with asylum requests suggested that low number of asylum seekers is a result of strict 
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96 For example, according to the Human Rights League, around 140-200 unaccompanied children are apprehended 
every year in Slovakia, of whom around 90% disappear from the shelters. Human Rights League, 2016, 
Disappearing children, http://www.hrl.sk/projekty/miznuce-detidisappearing-children. Bolečeková and Olejárová 
(2017, 194) argued that many asylum seekers left Slovakia over the course of the asylum procedure, even before 
a final decision on asylum was reached. This was the main reason for which, despite a considerable number of 
applications, asylum was only granted to a small number of applicants, and for which the data on refused, 
suspended or withdrawn applications for asylum can provide only an indication of the state of illegal migration in 
Slovakia. 
97 E.g. Serbia, with historical Slovak ethnic minority, see Bella, 2020 and Zlatanovic and Marušiak, 2017. 




valid residence permit), in the case of third country nationals being granted residence permits, 
nationals of Ukraine, Serbia and Russia were the most often represented (between 60 and 70%). 
However, when it comes to illegal immigration we observe no substantial change between 
2015 and 2018, i.e. during and after the European a crisis of European migration policy. 
Yet it is true that the authorities recorded an almost 100% increase in illegal migration in 2015 
in comparison with 2014 year. However, in absolute numbers this was 2,535 checked illegal 
migrants. It is hard to call it a real crisis (Bolečeková and Olejárová, 2017: 196). Although this 
number reflects trend, rather than real number of irregular migrants, there was certainly a lot of 
coverage of “marching” migrants and related security measures adopted by some countries.  
Over the years, the most frequent nationality of illegal immigrants was Ukrainian (34-69% - 
see Table 6). This is a bit unexpected fact since Ukraine is a neighbouring country. There was 
no political persecution or extreme poverty or other major factors that would encourage illegal 
immigration. Whilst we can observe an influx of people of Syrian nationality in 2015, this 
remains under 25% (582 individuals in total numbers in 2015) and decreased to 4% in 2016 (82 
individuals). Similarly, people of Afghan nationality were among the group arriving in 2015 in 
larger numbers than usual (10%, 265 individuals). However, significantly, among those 
migrants/refugees entering Slovakia illegally, only 4-5% applied for asylum (see Table 6). 
Clearly, Slovakia was not among the main target countries of refugees. Only Ukrainians could 
see this as an option, due to language and culture similarity (and then free movement within 
Schengen area, and in particular to the Czech Republic or Germany). In fact, Ukrainians and 
some others entering Slovakia illegally could be seen mostly as illegal “guestworkers”, while 
there was also increasing number of legal workers coming from Ukraine to Slovakia especially 
since 2012 (Benč, 2015: 52). Before 2015, and one can assume that this observation is valid for 
later period, too, Ukrainians appeared in the official statistics mostly due to staying over the 
granted period and then being checked and arrested at illegal work  or on their way back home 
at the border crossing point, when leaving the Schengen area. There have been only a few 
Ukrainians apprehended while illegally crossing the border (Benč, 2015: 9-10, Bolečeková and 
Olejárová 2017: 196). 
Over the course of four years, there were only 820 asylum applications submitted (see Table 7 
in annex) and there were only 209 asylum applications approved.99  
However, it should be mentioned that the statistical data in this case are more or less estimates, 
since they usually only display the volume of known illegal immigration (Bolečeková and 
Olejárová 2017: 195). 
 
 Immigration as a political issue 
The issue of legal or illegal migration was found only very rarely in electoral programmes of 
political parties before 2002 and 2006 general elections (Štefančík, 2010b). 
Alexandra Malangone, a lawyer and researcher at Slovakian NGO Human Rights League 
pointed out that there was a major discrepancy between the official policy and practice in 
Slovakia regarding the migration. She argued that Slovakia only minimally applied the EU’s 
basic standards to the integration of foreigners in the country. She also pointed to the insufficient 
monitoring and evaluation of policies that have an impact on the integration of foreigners 
(Mihálik and Jankoľa, 2016: 5). Some studies (e.g. Bolečeková and Olejárová, 2017), as well 
as the case law (discussed further) suggest that this was often the case. The Migrant Integration 
                                                     




Policy Index showed that Slovakia’s integration policies were “slightly unfavourable”, but 
more telling was fact that the country ranked 34th place out of 38 compared countries for 
2014.100 
3.1 Political context 
As mentioned, a rapid increase of legal migrants in a few years before 2015 year, and a very 
fresh discourse on LGBT issues (nicknamed “protection of traditional family”), had preceded 
an image of emotional threat of even larger number of illegal migrants or refugees. In this 
transformation, both already present and ongoing wider social trends and legacies (see some 
emerging trends in Hlinčíková, Lamačková and Sekulová, 2011), as well as rhetoric of 
politicians, duly and fairly reported by the mainstream media, played the key roles. Politicians 
in their majority, in turn, were motivated by upcoming general elections in the country. As put 
by Wiczanowska (2017: 1): “Slovakia constitutes the most vivid example pro-European parties 
changing rhetoric for more national which is quite transparent for the V4 countries.”  
Most local politicians attempted to capitalise on the refugee situation, although some of them 
possibly honestly believed that relocation won´t work and that Slovakia can and should show 
solidarity in other ways. Only a few of them defended more liberal position during refugee 
crisis. The first issuse can be seen in the following political party positions, while the second 
position was clearly seen in the debate in the Parliament (to be discussed later). 
3.1.1. The positions of major domestic parties on the problem of immigration and their 
evolution, relevance of the immigration issue in the national elections 
The parties analyzed in this section are the parties represented in the Parliament in the period 
2016-2020. For the year 2015, there was a single party government in Slovakia lead by Smer-
SD. One of the parties that were successful in the 2016 elections – Sieť (The Network) – does 
not exist anymore under its original name. It disintegrated very shortly after the elections as a 
relevant political subject. Therefore, it is not included in this chapter, even though it was for a 
short period member of the government coalition. One of the parties present in 2012-2015 
parliamentary session – Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) has narrowly failed in both 
2016 and 2020 parliamentary elections. However, we included this political movement in our 
analysis since it was present in the Parliament in 2015 year. 
The migration crisis has transformed the electoral discourse in 2016 (but not in 2020) by and 
large into issue of migration (Žúborová and  Borárosová, 2017; Androvičová, 2016). 
 In general, the key words that characterised positions of mainstream political parties before 
2016 general elections on immigration included: Security, defence, protection, humanism, 
sovereignty, international relations, responsibility.101 However, there was imballance how 
individual parties approached this issue. Overall, this topic was too much in focus of political 
parties considering relevance of illegal and legal migration to Slovakia (Hlinčíková, 2016). 
Although migration was an important topic before the 2016 parliamentary elections, 
immediately before the elections, the importance of completely different topics grew, namely 
topics related to domestic problems, such as the strike of nurses and teachers. 
Interestingly, a much more salient and long-term issue, emigration of Slovaks abroad (as 
permanent or temporary emigration of estimated between 300,000 and 350,000 Slovak citizens 
living abroad persons in total, Letavajová and Divinský, 2019: 15, also Baláž and Karasová, 
2016: 44) was tackled marginally and in general terms in majority of electoral programmes 
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(Hlinčíková, 2016) as well as during the campaign before general elections or in public 
discourse in general.102 
The topic of migration was again used by political parties before the local elections held in 
November 2018 and in relation to the UN Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration held in Marrakech in December 2018.103 Two coalition parties 
present in the Parliament (Smer-SD and SNS), including oppositional ĽSNS and Sme rodina, 
supported passing resolution against this Global Compact.104 Only 15 MPs voted against this 
resolution, while 31 MPs showed no interest to vote and further 8 MPs did not participate in 
voting while present and 8 MPs were absent. The Global Compact was called “an ambiguous, 
one-sided document.”105 
Before discussing this issue further, to avoid confusion, as put by Mihálik and Jankoľa (2016: 
10): “The political ideology of Slovak political parties does not always play a major role in 
conflict management.” Or, as put bluntly and perhaps a bit exaggerated by a former MEP Boris 
Zala (2020), “Leaders and leadership of our (political) parties do not have in essence any 
political orientation (…). Personal ideo-political fundaments, value-based clear-cut orientation 
and integrity are totally absent.”  
In order to clarify populist orientation of parties to be discussed, we used the populism index 
according to the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA). This brought mixed 
results since some parties low on populism showed rather strong anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
a) Smer-SD – “Direction-Social Democracy” 
Party Smer-SD, led by Robert Fico, was in the government throughout the whole period (2015-
2020). While before the elections of 2016 it had majority in the Parliament and led the single-
party Government, after the elections Smer-SD become the majory party in coalition 
government together with the Slovak National Party (SNS) and Most-Híd (“Bridge”). 
Based on expert assessment, it showed rather low populism level - 3,96 magnitude of populism 
at 10 points scale (indicators: Manichean, indivisible, general will, people centrism and 
antielitism).106 Nonetheless, with respect to migration, it was rather significantly populist, as 
will be shown. 
The topic of immigration became one of the main topics of the 2016 elections, especially for 
Smer-SD. After the start of the migration crisis in 2015, P.M. Robert Fico (also as leader of 
Smer-SD) strongly criticized the EU107 for the system of quota in the reallocation of refugees 
(see Štefančík-Dulebová, 2017: 133). The party ran without a party programme in the 2016 
elections, thus the electoral campaign and general programme priorities108 are sources of 
information on the stance of the party towards immigration and the refugee crisis. Smer-SD 
changed its main electoral slogan from “We are working for Slovakia” to a new one “We are 
protecting Slovakia” in October 2015. The main message of the campaign was that refugee 
(migrants) and the refugee crisis are a threat to Slovakia and that Smer-SD will protect the 
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country (see more in Práznovská, 2019: 271-273). This message was mainly visible on the 
billboards (“Protecting Slovakia”) and in the speeches made by the party leader Robert Fico 
who frequently held press conferences in this topic (see Kysel, 2016).109  
 
 
Source: David Ištok/Aktuality.sk, https://www.aktuality.sk/fotogaleria/311519/poznate-
volebne-programy-politickych-stran-najdete-ich-tazko-ak-vobec/1/ 
 
Robert Fico coupled this slogan with statements that touched on the security threat for Slovaks, 
such as that the security of Slovaks had a higher priority than the rights of migrants, or that the 
government monitors Muslims (Walter, 2019). 
Between 2015 and 2016, the P.M. Fico clearly dominated the media space on the topic of 
international migration and thus significantly influenced the society-wide discussion on this 
issue (Štefančík & Dulebová, 2017: 153). The main messages communicated by the P.M. and 
his party was that the EU quota system is a non-systemic solution to the problem and that 
Muslim immigrants represent a security threat, they need to be monitored and anti-terrorist 
measures need to be taken. Fearmongering was one of the P.M.’s main communication 
strategies immediately before and after the parliamentary elections in 2016 (Štefančík & 
Dulebová, 2017: 153). However, the party also proposed some – mostly rather vague - solutions 
to the crisis such as the better protection of Schengen borders, the stabilisation of the situation 
in countries of refugees/migrants, and the establishment so called secure place (Bolečeková and 
Olejárová 2017: 217). 
Robert Fico resigned as P.M. after a series of anti-government protests triggered by the murder 
of an investigative journalist and his fiancée in 2018. Based on the articles available on the 
website of the party,110 the new P.M. Peter Pellegrini (Smer-SD) was more restrained in his 
communication on the topic of migration. In November 2018, he declared that the position of 
the government in the issue of migration has not changed, the party had continued to reject 
quota on the redistribution of migrants among EU M.S. At the same time, however, Pellegrini 
sharply rejected the abuse and unreasonable fearmongering in the topic of migration used by 
some opposition parties as part of the ongoing campaign for municipal elections.111 
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In the parliamentary elections held in February 2020, Robert Fico, the leader of Smer-SD 
(although electoral leader was P. Pellegrini) was again vocal on the topic of immigration. The 
Facebook campaign of the party and R.Fico was built primarily on putting in contrast the “pro-
immigrant“ policies of other parties (mainly party Za ľudí – For people, led by former president 
Andrej Kiska) with the policies of Smer-SD that support young families or pensioners (instead 
of immigrants): 
“We at Smer - SD will never allow immigrants to rob our pensioners of their well – deserved 
thirteenth pension.”112 “The opposition promises helping migrants, we help our young families 
with doubling child allowances.”113 
“Peter Pellegrini - 34.1%. Mr. Kiska, even surveys show that Slovaks want higher pensions and 
support for families and not immigrants in Slovakia.”114 
b) SNS – “Slovak National Party” 
The Slovak National Party (SNS) became member of the coalition government after the 
elections in 2016 and received no seats in the Parliament after the 2020 elections. 
Based on expert assessment, it showed rather low populism level (4.43 magnitude at 10 points 
scale, indicators: Manichean, indivisible, general will, people centrism and anti-elitism).115 
The leader of SNS (and Speaker of the Parliament 2016-2020) Andrej Danko supported the 
decisions of the government in 2015 and called for a referendum to strengthen the mandate of 
the government in defending its anti-immigration position at EU level.116 In the 2016 election 
campaign, the party declared in its party programme assistance and support to refugees and 
adherence to the asylum process, but at the same time also supported strict border protection 
(Hlinčíková, 2016). SNS proposed to make illegal border crossings a criminal offense. 
However, it is not possible to apply for asylum at Slovak embassies abroad and the only possible 
way how to seek asylum would be to cross the border without a permit (Hlinčíková, 2016). 
Multicultural society could according to the party programme endanger the ethnic, cultural, 
religious and social integrity of Slovaks (Hlinčíková, 2016). In relation to Muslims, the party 
wanted to introduce restrictions on wearing burqa, and on the construction of minarets and 
mosques. 
After SNS became member of the coalition government, the party’s position on the issue of 
migration remained negative. In 2018, the party was against the adoption of the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration which it considered to be in philosophical 
contradiction and inconsistent with Slovakia‘s security and migration policy.117 Before the 
elections of 2020, the party programme mentioned as one of SNS‘s successes preventing 
uncontrolled migration by blocking the Marrakech Convention (a nickname for the Global 
Compact - this was indeed stopped in the Parliament shortly before general elections)118 as well 
as stopping the islamization of the country by stricter registration rules for chuches (There had 
been already introduced higher limits on religious groups membership under 2016-2020 
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118 See on this Dostál (2018). Dostál argued that argument used by SNS that this document was not in line with 




government, with tacit reference to Islam).119 Under the chapter on national security, the party 
also declared to push for an international solution to crises in Asia and Africa which would stop 
further migrants to Europe.120 However, the party did not offer any specific solutions and the 
topic of migration in the SNS electoral campaign seemed to be rather marginal. 
c) Most-Híd – “Bridge” 
Similarly to the SNS electoral failure, whilst the “civic” party Most-Híd (“Bridge” in Slovak 
and Hungarian, it represents mainly the Hungarian minority in Slovakia) was one of 
government parties in the period 2016-2020, it did not gain any seats in the Parliament in the 
2020 elections. Yet it was one of few parties that was rather moderate towards refugees. 
According to Štefančík & Dulebová (2017: 118) the centrist Most-Híd was the only 
parliamentary party in 2015 with neutral or even positive attitude in dealing with the refugee 
crisis. Indeed, it was probably the only political party that called for open solidarity with 
migrants (Mihálik and Jankoľa, 2016: 19). In contrast with the SNS and Smer-SD, Most-Híd 
also took a different path in the electoral campaign in 2016. In the party programme Most-Híd 
declared the need to adopt a new migration policy, but did not develop what it should be like. 
It also saw migration as an opportunity to recruit foreign experts, with an emphasis on “linking 
immigration to labour market needs” (Hlinčíková, 2016).  
Based on expert assessment, it was not populist either – showing only 0.33 magnitude of 
populism at 10 points scale (indicators: Manichean, indivisible, general will, people centrism 
and anti-elitism).121  
 
 
Source: SME - Jozef Jakubčo, https://domov.sme.sk/c/20070306/bezpecnost-hlasa-uz-aj-
opozicia.html 
 
There was only one exceptional case when a candidate for Most-Híd utilised tacitly anti-
migration slogan “For a Safe Life” in 2016. 
The statements of the leader of the party Béla Bugár from the period before the elections in 
2020, furthermore, pointed to the fact that Slovakia was facing more severe problems than the 
migration, such as the collapsing healthcare system or corruption which Most-Híd wanted to 
                                                     
119 This law increases the number of required members of a religious community from 20,000 to 50,000 to be able 
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focus on.122 This approach was based on the low number of asylum applications submitted in 
Slovakia. 
In 2018, Most-Híd supported the participation of Slovakia on the conference in Marrakech to 
discuss UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, whilst the SNS and in 
fact majority of MPs boycotted the event.123 However, Most-Híd did not vote openly for or 
against associated declaration of the Parliament (most MPs presented themselves as “absent”, 
while two MPs voted against resolution), condemning the Global Compact. 
The party Most-Híd at the same rejected the mandatory quota as well as misusing the topic of 
migration for political gains.124 
d) SaS – “Freedom and Solidarity” 
SaS (Sloboda a Solidarita – Freedom and Solidarity), is one of the liberal parties in Slovakia. 
However, “its liberalism focuses on economic issues rather than social ones” (Sekerák, 2019: 
237). The party was in the opposition until the elections in February 2020, when it became 
member of the coalition government. 
The leader of the party Richard Sulík often presented Eurosceptic opinions which were in 2015 
also accompanied by anti-immigration rhetoric mainly through the rejection of the mandatory 
quota system.125 According to the 2016 party programme of SaS, refugees were seen as a 
security threat.126 The party’s solution (so called a five-point plan) to the refugee crisis was 
therefore to close EU’s borders and to transfer the responsibility to the countries through which 
most Middle Eastern refugees came, by building two refugee camps financed by the EU, 
established in Turkey or the Balkans and in northern Africa. Moreover, all the illegal immigrants 
from the EU would be transferred to such camps where they would wait for their asylum 
application to be assessed.127 (see more in Práznovská, 2019: 274-275; Bolečeková and 
Olejárová 2017: 217-218). 
The anti-immigration rhetoric of the leader of the party has not changed over the period 2015-
2020. In the 2020 electoral campaign the topic of migrants was marginal. There is no mention 
of refugees of migrants in the party programme of SaS.128 However, in the period after the 
elections Richard Sulík stated that one of the points on which the creation of a next government 
coalition could be hindered was the topic of migration and more specifically the mandatory 
quota to accept refugees in Slovakia.129 
Perhaps surprisingly, SaS populism index according to the Populism and Political Parties Expert 
Survey (POPPA) was rather low – just 3.3 points at 10 point scale. Specifically, attitude towards 
immigration was seen only at 1.55 level. 
e) OĽaNO – “Ordinary People and Independent Personalities” 
                                                     
122 Sources: https://www.most-hid.sk/sk/most-hid-premier-prekryva-ozajstne-problemy-slovenska, 
https://www.cas.sk/clanok/368796/predseda-most-hid-bela-bugar-preco-chcem-prijat-migrantov/. 
123 Source: https://www.most-hid.sk/sk/solymos-slovensko-malo-ist-rokovat-o-globalnom-pakte-osn-o-migracii. 
124 Source: https://www.webnoviny.sk/most-hid-v-pripade-paktu-o-migracii-podporuje-lajcaka-ale-odmieta-
spravy-o-povinnych-kvotach/. 
125 Also L. Galko, the former Member of Slovak Parliament had expressed extremely negative views on migrants. 
126 SaS party programme 2016: http://oldweb-sulik.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/volebny-program-sas-volby-
2016.pdf. 
127 Source: https://bit.ly/3n7Q0DA. 






OĽaNO with its leader Igor Matovič is not a typical political party, as “the movement was never 
a classical political party but rather ad hoc group of candidates or MPS without an 
organizational structure or membership base” (Hynčica and Šárovec 2018: 17 in Sekerák, 2019: 
237). After being in the opposition in the period 2012-2020, OĽaNO won the 2020 elections 
and created a coalition government together with SaS, Sme Rodina and a new party Za ľudí 
(“For People”). 
Its populism according to the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) was 7 
points at 10 points level scale. 
In its 2016 party programme OĽaNO - similarly to SaS - first of all called for helping refugees 
outside of Europe, including the processing of asylum applications.130 Yet it also put illegal 
migration among threats such as organised crime, weapons of mass destruction spread and 
terrorism (2016 Programme: 114). The solution was to be found in targeted financial 
developmental help, peace-making by the EU but also in refugee camps outside the Schengen 
area and then selection of refugees to be settled in a country (2016 Programme: 133). Overall 
the party’s rhetorics regarding the migration crisis was seen as oscilating from negative to 
neutral (Štefančík & Dulebová, 2017: 151). In 2015-2016, the MP od OĽaNO called for 
distinguishing refugees from migrants and also for finding solutions to helping refugees, 
however, at the same time the solutions preferred by the party were to protect Schengen Area 
and the EU borders whilst rejecting the quota system (see Bolečeková and Olejárová 2017: 
218).131 Similarly, in its 2015 blueprint document, OĽaNO suggested to exclude from the 
Schengen Area those countries that fail to protect external borders (Bolečeková and Olejárová 
2017: 218).  
The OĽaNO called for a common EU strategy towards migrant crisis. This call for a common 
EU strategy was again repeated once the debate around rejecting UN’s Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration started in Slovakia in 2018.132 It found the UN Global 
Compact worthless because it did not address agreements with third countries on the return of 
refugees. However, OĽaNO MPs were divided on this issue. About a half of them did not 
participate in voting and another half was not oficially present during voting, and just two MPs 
voted against the negative Parliamentary resolution.  
The party programme for the 2020 elections on the topic of migration was similar to the one 
from 2016, but migration was mentioned in fewer points under common security policy.133 The 
focus of the 2020 campaign was mainly on the critique of the government and more specifically 
Smer-SD. 
f) Christian Democratic Movement 
The movement was in opposition during migrant crisis and then did not succeed either in 2016 
or in 2020 general elections. However, although it expressed its solidarity with migrants, 
ultimately it voted in favour of Declaration of the Parliament in 2015. This could be explained 
by observation that the movement expressed visible solidarity but first of all related to refugees 
and not migrants. The movement ignored terrorism threats and more or less safety issues. The 
political leadership called for finding solutions such as creation of permanent EU representative 
for refugees as well as the need for common European migration framework (Mihálik and 
Jankoľa, 2016: 17). 
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131 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gq7ytcWRVqY. 
132 Source: https://bit.ly/353uNVc. 




Its populism index according to the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) was 
2.87. 
g) ĽSNS - “Kotleba-People’s Party Our Slovakia” 
The party led by Marián Kotleba is “often described as far right, Eurosceptic, national–populist, 
neo-Fascist, conservative, homophobic and anti-immigrant.” (Sekerák, 2019, p. 238). It is in 
the Parliament since the 2016 elections. 
Its populism index according to the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) was 
9.27 – the highest among all relevant Slovak parliamentary political parties. 
The anti-immigrant rhetorics of the party were present through the period of 2015-2020, often 
interconnected with the rejection of EU institutions. In the 2016 party programme the topic of 
immigration has a separate point - the fourth point of the ten-point programme has the title “We 
will not allow immigrants to occupy Slovakia”. The party was against Muslim immigrants 
entering the country, calling them aggressive and claiming that they receive everything for free 
(in contrast with the local population). The only solutions the party offered to protect Slovakia 
from immigrants was securing the borders with the involvement of the army and the deportation 
of any immigrants who would enter the country.134 The anti-immigrant measures are also clearly 
anti-Muslim, as the party also claims to protect the Christian and traditional values (see more 





In short, the issue of migration and of the Roma community were at the centre of the 2016 
campaign for Kotleba-ĽSNS (Walter, 2019).  
The 2020 party programme similarly consisted of 10 points, however, immigrants were 
mentioned only marginally. The party claimed to introduce stricter immigration policy and the 
control of illegal employment of foreigners as part of its foreign policy plans that reject any 
“dictate from Brussels”.135 
h) Sme Rodina - “We are Family” 
The movement showed strong identity-oriented politics, being Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant and 
having – formally - conservative family values (Sekerák, 2019: 237). The party entered the 
Parliament after the 2016 elections and was in the opposition until the 2020 elections. Currently 
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it is a member of the government coalition together with OĽaNO, SaS and Za ľudí (For the 
People). 
Its populism index according to the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) was 
7.83. 
The 2016 party programme was very short. Nonetheless, it promised to build new fences and 
to increase budget for law enforcing authorities.136 The party mentioned migrants as people who 
do not want to integrate or adapt to European way of life and values during the 2016 electoral 
campaign and also claimed they are economic immigrants, not refugees.137 (see more in 
Práznovská, 2019: 275). 
In 2018 the party supported rejection of the UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration, arguing that it would undermine the sovereignty of Slovakia as the country 
might not be able to decide on its own who are not legitimate immigrants. The leader of the 
party argued against document despite the acknowledgment of the fact that it is a political 
document which is not legally binding.138 
Similarly to the statements from 2016 party programme, the 2020 party programme also stated 
that 90% of the people entering the EU are not refugees, but economic immigrants. The party 
rejected any EU migrant quota and saw the immigrants as a security threat as well as a potential 
threat to the social system of the country and to the cultural identity of Slovak citizens.139 
3.1.2. Relevance of different arguments used for or against immigration in the political 
and public debate 
As mentioned, the topic of international migration before 2015 was an extremely marginal topic 
in Slovakia that the political parties paid almost no attention to (Štefančík & Dulebová, 2017: 
114). However, the security discourse of migration had been important long before the refugee 
crisis. It was not frequent topic, but if migration was discussed by politicians, it was most often 
framed as a security issue (Androvičová, 2015; Koščová, 2012).140 Yet polarization around 
immigration in Slovakia had not been significant within the political spectrum before 2015 
refugee crisis, e.g. among political parties, but has been noticeable among individual politicians 
and other actors (mainly representatives of human-rights organizations) (Androvičová, 2015, 
p. 45). Therefore, it was not surprising that since the onset of the migration crisis in 2015, every 
political party took a stance on immigration, mainly by using arguments against immigration. 
These originated from both the government and opposition parties, particularly arguing that 
immigration is a security threat and that the predominantly Muslim migrants are culturally 
incompatible with the Slovak population. Some of the opposition parties in the period 2015-
2020 also used the argument that immigrants would be a burden for the social system and would 
not contribute economically (e.g. Kotleba-ĽSNS and Sme Rodina). 
The public debate in the context of international migration focused primarily on two levels: 
“First, the approach of the EU to the redistribution of refugees, or the so-called quota system. 
Second, the alleged incompatibility of domestic cohabitation with Muslim immigrants” 
                                                     
136 Facebook Boris Kollár – https://www.facebook.com/Boris-Kollar-1464024763918594/. 
137 Sources: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=782316545239525; https://demagog.sk/vyrok/vr14661/, 
https://tv.hnonline.sk/aktualne-videa/657125-prizivnik-kollar-sa-rozkrical-kvoli-utecencom-poliacik-mam-
problem-byt-s-nim-v-jednej-miestnosti. 
138 Source: https://domov.sme.sk/c/20952896/sme-rodina-vyzyva-vladu-aby-nepodpisala-migracny-pakt.html. 
139 Sme Rodina party programme 2020: https://hnutie-smerodina.sk/dokumenty/Final-Program-SME-RODINA-
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(Štefančík & Dulebová, 2017: 152). On both levels, there was a prevalence of negative opinions 
presented by politicians. 
Fear was often used to increase the parties’ voting preferences, mainly by the key party Smer-
SD and by its leader Robert Fico (Štefančík & Dulebová, 2017: 153). Typically, a word 
“refugee” was missing in commentary by P.M. Fico in his reaction to ruling of the Court of 
Justice of the EU on the case raised by the Slovak government in 2015 against decision to re-
allocated certain number of refugees (Tóda, 2017b). 
A mini-analysis (a week and three online media) of speeches of politicians from September 
2015 pointed out that solidarity was understood as solidarity with first contact countries, less 
so with countries that were receiving refugees/migrants as final destination. However, even for 
the first group of states there were doubts raised as far as how these countries tackled the issue. 
Only a few politicians and public figures acknowledged co-responsibility of Slovakia. 
Occasionally, it was pointed at failed integration of Roma as a negative experience with 
integration. The quota issue was seen as dysfunctional policy suggestion. The solution was seen 
in stopping refugees at borders, providing help to countries of origin of refugees and to countries 
where refugees were located within EU (Chudžíková, 2016). 
On 24 June 2015, the deputies of the Parliament approved a Declaration that in effect rejected 
the compulsory quotas agreed by the Council of the EU (Interior Ministers) and the EC, 
respectively, for the redistribution of refugees, but at the same time they expressed regret over 
the situation and a willingness to help solve the problem and accept refugees on a voluntary 
basis. The resolution 1837141 was supported by MPs across the political spectrum – 125 out of 
150 voted in favor.142  
Importantly, debate in the Parliament was tempered by violent anti-muslim and anti-refugee 
demonstration organised just a few days earlier (on the World Refugee Day).143 Moreover, 
Androvičová, 2016: 61) pointed out that it was exactly at the same time when the annual 
Globsec Conference happened. The importance of both events, as read by the people, was very 
similar: immigrants and terrorism are huge security threats (Androvičová, 2016). Yet this seems 
to be a bit exaggeration – most public did not have any clue about Globsec Conference. 
All deputies disapproved violent demonstration. In particular, Martin Poliačik, M.P. (SaS), 
pointed out that this protest was not motivated by the quota issue. The quota issue was 
secondary topic. The primary topic of the topic was – as it was called officially – Protest Against 
Islamisation of Europe. In other words, it was against oppression of others on the basis of their 
religious belief, as well as on the basis of belonging to a certain group of people. Ľuboš Blaha 
(MP for Smer-SD) called this “neo-Nazi march”. 
Considering EU-wide importance of this topic, it may be useful to present additional opinions 
of some local MPs on this issue. This shows that parliamentary debate was not that much black-
and-white as reported by the media and some analysts. 
The first speaker was actually the P.M. Robert Fico. The P.M. Fico explained that there is a need 
for a more complex solution. The quota-based solution was seen as “boomerang”. He cited vice-
prime minister and minister of interior who called this approach as “invitation for (human) 
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traffickers.” Politically, Fico pointed at emerging a big conflict about the role and rights of the 
Council of the EU versus the role and rights of the EC. Furthermore, P.M. Fico announced that 
as chairing Visegrad 4 countries, Slovakia has contacted P.Ms. of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. The goal was to pass a common declaration and to coordinate common steps on 
session of the upcoming Council of the EU. As a possible final step how to stop refugees´ 
relocation P.M. Fico suggested to call a referendum on behalf of the Parliament. It was 
mentioned that Slovakia is providing developmental aid, as well as it is providing humanitarian 
help to refugees from Syria. Finally, as put by the P.M. Fico, Slovakia as the only country of 
Schengen area was participating in humanitarian transfer of endangered persons (mostly 
mothers with kids). This was the result of trilateral cooperation with international organisations 
that has been ongoing for six years. The Government also decided to increase capacity from 
100 to 150 persons which allows to offer temporary shelter for up to 300 refugees annually.144 
Others speakers pointed out that there are some positive examples coming from civil sector and 
religious organisations. For example, M.Huba (MP for OĽaNO), mentioned a public call of 
more than 30 NGOs called “Medditeranean Sea is Also ‘Our Sea’,”145 or initiative of the 
Commonwealth of Ladislav Hanus called “Who can help” aimed to help in integration of 
refugees resettled by the Government from Syria and Iraq.146 Huba also compared past attitude 
of Slovakia to Jewish citizens who ended up in Nazi concentration camps. Huba argued that if 
Slovakia would accept about 700 refugees, i.e. just a 1% of those deported during WWII, that 
would be a “symbolic gesture, as well as a small practical contribution to correcting sins and 
crimes against humanity committed by our ancestors”. 
The overall message was that Slovakia is ready to help but disagrees with quota system (e.g. 
Ľuboš Martinák, MP for Smer-SD). Renáta Zmajkovičová (MP for Smer-SD) blamed “news 
coming from Brussels” for traumatising citizens. “It was natural, that people are afraid, there 
was coming something new and they have been afraid of inflow of people with strange 
cultures...” She also pointed out that it will be much more costly effort if this effort is meant 
seriously. 
The most critical speech was delivered by Ľuboš Blaha, self-declared “true Marxist” (MP for 
Smer-SD, not a party member at that time). Blaha put both solutions (quota issue versus 
extremism on the streets) on the same level, labelling them both as “extrems.” He explicitly 
blamed for the refugee problem USA and “Western powers”, as well as colonialism. Moreover, 
Blaha mentioned that “Africans and Asians do not want to come to Slovakia”. He saw two 
problems here: first, since these people do not want to stay in Slovakia, their “enforced 
internations” would go against human rights. Second, Slovakia should show solidarity with the 
biggest and richest EU M.S. – final destinations of these people. 
Already mentioned Poliačik (MP) in response explained that the EU “Dublin system” forces 
migrants to go where they do no want to go. In this respect, František Šebej (MP on Most-Híd 
list) questioned decision of postponing the Dublin 3 system by Hungary. Jana Vaľová (MP for 
Smer-SD) tried to focus at practical issues: a need for financial sources and related 
accommodation options, as well as respecting the will of the local people.147 Július Brocka (MP 
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for Christian Democratic Movement) was sceptical about national solution only and announced 
that all members of his party club would vote for suggested Declaration. 
As put correctly, but simplified by Wiczanowska (2017, p. 71): “Due to his ability of 
securitization, R. Fico managed to turn refugee crisis into a political consensus.” 
Overall, not only parliamentary debate, but the main discursive (de)legitimation strategies 
presented in the political framing of refugees lead to the refusal of acceptance of non-Christian 
refugees. In background, there was positive “us” and negative “others” representations. In short, 
the dividing line between “Slovaks” and “others” has been formed around cultural-religious 
(in)adaptability. Kissová (2018) argued that this discourse leads to notion that refugees or 
migrants are not worthy of solidarity. However, as mentioned, this last message was not 
explicitly present in the Parliamentary debate, on the contrary. Nonetheless, the parliamentary 
elections in March 2016 have intensified Islamophobia, particularly in the context of the so-
called refugee crisis (refugees were seen by and large as Muslims, and not only in Slovakia148) 
and the campaign of radical political parties: Kotleba – ĽSNS and Sme rodina – Boris Kollár, 
but also by the political commentaries and campaign slogans by the majority of mainstream 
political parties, namely Smer-SD, SaS, SNS. Tellingly, the names of the Slovak politicians were 
differently negatively prioritised here: Fico, Sulik, Danko, Kotleba, and Kollár were seen as 
those especially being against Muslims (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2017: 521; see also Androvičová, 
2016: 50-51). 
More broadly speaking, there were different topics employed before and after adoption of the 
EU refugee redistribution system (at the EU level, not practically adopted in full scope in 
Slovakia). In the former period, economic interests, border protection, and organized crime 
were applied as main themes of (de)legitimation strategies. In the latter period, cultural 
interests, identity protection, and terrorism had been employed. Archaically, and absurdly 
(considering its normative universality) Christianity became an iconic response to global 
changes and had been used as a mobilizing tool for invoking nationalist and anti-EU sentiment 
(Kissová, 2018). This religious based selection or discrimination became the focus of 
international press (see e.g. O’Grady, 2015; Cunningham, 2016; Lerner, 2016). 
After the general elections in March 2016 the topic of immigration was less common, just 
returning briefly during Slovak Presidency of the Council of EU in the second half of 2016. 
Moreover, with the debate on UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
and the participation of Slovakia on the related Marrakech conference it became again part of 
the public debate throughout 2018. In late 2018, Slovak Parliament opted (just narrowly passing 
constitutional majority of 90 “yes” votes) not to vote in favour of approving the Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. As a result, Mr Lajčák, the minister of 
foreign affairs resigned for a while. Mr. Lajčák was actually behind coordinating draft of this 
global compact idea while he was chairing special session of the UN on this topic.149 
Mr. Lajčák commented discourse on migrants in Slovakia and within the V4 later on as follows: 
“The Visegrad Group has communicated a full range of rational and smart positions (on 
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migration) in a way that made its partners unhappy. [...] These (proposals) were commented, 
often in a very populist and negative way.”150 
In conclusion, the manufacture of migrants/refugees as cultural and security threats, particularly 
in the case of Muslim refugees, not only assisted in their dehumanisation, but it “also 
legitimised actions taken against them through the perpetuation of a particular discourse”, as 
correctly pointed by Sajjad (2018) in a wider East European context. 
In particular, opinion polls have shown that social distancing towards a Muslim family has 
increased by 41 points (from 32 to 73 points) and by 38 points (from 21 to 59) for 
immigrant family between 2008 and 2017 period in Slovakia (SITA, 2017). There was rather 
high public rejection of migrants and quota system in the late 2015 (Linczényi, 2017). In fact, 
refugees/migrants were seen more as “the EU” problem than local problem, although opinion 
polls fluctuated over time and dependend very much on issue at stake (and formulation of the 
questions) (see Bolečeková and Olejárová 2017: 211-213). 
We are going to discuss policy actions legitimised by described discourse in the following 
section. 
3.2 Policy in action 
By and large, governmental and parliamentary positions have been documented in their 
discursive form in previous section. Therefore, we mention further official documents to 
illustrate this issue. However, some critics pointed out that it was not coincidence that the 
Parliament approved a number of anti-terrorist measures (Act 444/2015) in late 2015 year 
(Mikušovič, 2015).151 Officially, it was reaction to terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. 
However, there were suspicions that this legislation was part of campaign (or its culmination) 
that connected refugees with terrorists. There had been criticism that these measures were 
passed in hastily way although they impacted basic human rights.152 For example, as a result of 
this legislation, intelligence services are supposed to collect information about political and 
religious extremism expressed in a violent way, or about illegal international transport of 
persons and about migration of persons. The measures have been supported only by MPs for 
Smer-SD (that were in a single party majority government). 
3.2.1 Assessment of the governmental position on immigration, together with the 
information on its evolution (2015-2018) 
It should be mentioned here that Slovak authorities and experts did not pay sufficient attention 
to challenges associated with future legal and illegal migration with exception of protecting 
Schengen borders due to access to the EU and Schengen Area. The first serious attempt at 
tackling integration of foreigners was document passed in 2009. However, at about the same 
time (2010) prepared Strategy of Development of Slovak Society was seen as just a little and 
unsystematically focused at issue of migration. Moreover, there were presented just vague ideas 
                                                     
150 Aktuality (22.7.2019 19:07), Lajčák: Slovensko by v rámci V4 nemalo íst proti svojim záujmom (Slovakia 
should not go against its own interests within V4), https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/710556/lajcak-slovensko-by-
v-ramci-v4-nemalo-ist-proti-svojim-zaujmom/. 
151 See Ulcl (2015), Protiteroristický balík zákonov (Anti-terrorist Package of Legislation), PRO BONO 12/2015, 
http://www.ulclegal.com/sk/bulletin-pro-bono/2015/12/5414-protiteroristicky-balik-zakonov, also Ministry of 
Interior (2016, January 2). Od 1. januára 2016 je účinná nová protiteroristická legislatíva (There is valid a new 
anti-terrorist legislation since January 2016).  https://www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy-1&sprava=od-1-januara-
2016-je-ucinna-nova-protiteroristicka-legislativa. 
152 TASR (2015, December 21).  Podľa balíka polícia, prokuratúra, súdy a tajné služby získajú od januára v boji 
proti terorizmu rad nových oprávnení (According to Package,  the police, prosecutors office, courts and 





and illegal migration was associated with terrorism and threats to democracy (Štefančík, 
2010b). 
There are these main documents regarding the immigration to Slovakia that are relevant for the 
analyzed period. 
The first one is the official Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic – Outlook 2020 (2011).153 
This document was created by the Ministry of Interior and together with the Integration policy 
of the Slovak Republic (2014) forms the basis for the policy in the area of immigration and 
integration. In fact, it rather summarises what migration policy includes in local conditions. In 
hindsight, it is puzzling what exactly was meant by this type of bureaucratic style sentences: “It 
(the document) is unambiguous expression of readiness and willingness to participate at 
harmonisation of migration policies of individual states within EU. It is also expression of 
solidarity with basic principles and the way it (EU) works during control of individual processes 
of migration” (p. 1). Clearly, later positions of the governments in 2015-2016 did not fully 
match with these aims. The Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic – Outlook 2020 (2011) 
states that the most decisive political and legal framework in the area of migration policy is that 
of the EU although it also mentions a lack of EU-wide immigration policy. 
The documents states three types of protection to “foreigners”: asylum, subsidiary (sometimes 
translated as “complementary”) protection and temporary refuge for “leavers” (azyl, doplnková 
ochrana, poskytovanie dočasného útočiska – odídenci). The document does not tackle in any 
detail these types of protections. 
Additionally, the document mentions in general terms participation at relocation of foreigners 
under the EU banner, based on trillateral agreements with the government, the UN High 
Commissionaire for Refugees and IOM. Independently from these activities, the document 
mentions relocation of foreigners that were granted international protection in cooperation with 
other EU M.S. Finally, the document specifies missing a single inter-authority body (jednotný 
prierezový orgán) that would centralise tasks in migration policy of Slovakia. It envisions 
“perspective goal” to create “Immigration and Naturalisation Authority.” However, this has not 
yet happened.154 Instead, the platform for coordination of migration policy is the Steering 
Committee for Migration and Integration of Foreigners, chaired by the Director of the 
Migration Office. 
An analysis by Bolečeková and Olejárová (2018), pointed out that the document in question 
does not list all the instruments of the migration policy. It is possible that: “Non-existence of 
the logical classification of the instruments of migration policy in the document may be one of 
the reasons of their ineffective application in the day-to-day running of the migration policy in 
the Slovak Republic.” (Bolečeková and Olejárová, 2018: 237). Moreover, the sanctioning-
regulatory instruments outweigh the more encouraging-positive financial and communicative 
ones. (Bolečeková and Olejárová, 2018). 
                                                     
153 https://rokovania.gov.sk/RVL/Material/7763/1, Migration policy of the Slovak Republic: 
https://www.employment.gov.sk/files/slovensky/ministerstvo/integracia-
cudzincov/dokumenty/migracna_politika.pdf. 
154 There is the Migration Authority, but this has already existed for a long time. See Migračný úrad MV SR pôsobí 
už viac ako štvrťstoročie (The Migration Authority has been working already for a quarter of Decade), (11. 07. 
2019 ),  https://www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy-6&sprava=migracny-urad-mv-sr-posobi-uz-viac-ako-stvrtstorocie . 
This has been confirmed in email communication with Soňa Oboňová, European Migration Network (EMN) 





The second document, Integration policy of the Slovak Republic was published by the Ministry 
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family in 2014.155 It is based on the EU recommendations in this 
policy area, and also relies on EU funding for integration projects. The document highlights the 
role of regions in implementing integration policies as well as the role of municipalities. 
Integration Policy of the Slovak Republic states among its principles “equality”. Also, the 
document claims to be: “oriented on the prevention of xenophobia and the elimination of 
prejudices and stereotypes towards foreigners” (p. 17). Finally, “Cultural and religious 
diversity are also important aspects of education and they are traditionally found in Slovak 
schools; children of foreigners enrich this even further.” (p. 24). However, the P.M. Fico 
openly said that Muslim refugees are “impossible to integrate” (in Gabrižová, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is not clear what is meaning of this document since it also states that „It neither 
defines nor describes the current state of policies but proposes new visions and directions in the 
integration of foreigners [...]” (p. 4). Perhaps it is helpful in a sense that it makes distinction 
between “migrant”156 and “asylum seeker”.157 In other words, this document was more or less 
of lip-service type. Indeed, 2019 report by Mészárosová and Oboňová (2019: 13) stated that 
this document was seen as outdated already in 2018. Similarly, on the one hand, suggested 
integration policies in labour marker were seen as very ambitious and complex. On the other 
hand, there were missing specific tools how to achieve stated goals (Gallová-Kriglerová, 2016: 
68). Furthermore, in educational integration, schools lacked a support from the state authorities 
and integration of foreign-born kids was matter of individual initiatives of schools or teachers 
(Gallová-Kriglerová, 2016: 70-71). 
It should be mentioned that there exist (in addition to already mentioned MIPEX study) an 
earlier study that attempted to identify suitable indicators for measuring success of foreigners´ 
integration. However, its conclusions suggested that there are missing data for such task 
(Vašečka, 2011). 
There was a plan to elaborate a new Integration Programme for Persons with Provided 
International Protection on the Territory of the Slovak Republic (with deadline in June 2019).   
Third, there is rarely among researched studies cited Declaration of the Government 568/2015 
(UV-35775/2015 (October 21, 2015).158 This declaration followed meeting of the P.M. R. Fico 
and some ministers with initiators “Plea for Humanity” from October 1, 2015. It is possible that 
some additional positive impact could have Declaration of the Council of the Cabinet for human 
rights, minorities and gender equality from October 15, 2015.159 The governmental document 
specified state support to NGOs in humanitarian and integration support of refugees. The 
government promised to provide a million EUR for NGOs in coming next years to support 
activities for refugees, as well as to increase a number of stipends for Syrian refugees to 30. 
There were some other promises such as a webportal that would inform about integration of 
foreigners in Slovakia and to offer language lessons and lessons about local culture for refugees, 
or Integration Programme for Persons with International Protection. 
Fourth, the Strategy of job mobility of foreigners in the Slovak Republic until 2020, with an 
Outlook to 2030, which was published by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family in 
                                                     
155 Integration policy of the Slovak Republic: https://www.employment.gov.sk/files/slovensky/uvod/informacie-
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156 A person who leaves a country or region with the aim to settle in a different country or region. 
157 A foreigner, who complied with the criteria pursuant to the Geneva Convention related to the Legal Status of 
Refugees and Act No. 480/2002 Coll. on Asylum as amended, based on which this person was acknowledged as 
an asylum seeker and provided with international protection in the form of asylum. 
158 https://rokovania.gov.sk/RVL/Material/12397/1. 





2018, is the most recent document (40 pages).160 It was created due to the lack of skilled labour 
force in Slovakia (mainly in manufacturing). The document therefore focuses on legal 
migration. The short-term objective is to adopt emergency (hot-fix) measures to address the 
shortage of skilled labor in the Slovak labor market (p. 11). Most of the proposed measures aim 
to decrease the administrative burden for both the employers and the potential employees 
(immigrants). The document contains more specific measures, including changes in legislation, 
but without any deadlines (For more on job-market related migration see Bolečeková, 2019). 
There are some legal background documents, first of all it is the Act on Asylum (480/2002) and 
then the Act 404/2011 on the Act on the Residence of Foreigners. These documents will be 
discussed later on. We are also going briefly to discuss related legislation. Similarly, we discuss 
“the effective solidarity concept” in the next paragraphs.  
In summary, Slovakia has nourished limited anti-(illegal)immigrant securitisation framed 
discourse some time before refugee crisis (at the level of some political parties, some 
“alternative media, and some politicians), while at the same time a number of legal 
migrants had been increasing. The official documents were rather formal and were 
primarily focused at reflection of ongoing challenges. Specifically, more legal foreign 
workforce was needed. This is only partially contradictory position161 – it has been 
consistently argued that Slovakia wants to be selective in accepting foreigners. However, 
this was ultimately by and large not really flexible policy from the point of contributing 
to a solution of migration crisis in 2015. 
When it comes to the rhetoric of the government, it was built largely on anti-immigration 
statements in the period before the national elections in 2016. The P.M.  Robert Fico frequently 
held press conferences where he criticized the quota system and stated that he wants “to prevent 
the emergence of a comprehensive Muslim community in Slovakia” (January 2016).162 The fact 
that Slovakia’s presidency in the Council of the European Union started in the second half of 
the same year, however, eased this rhetoric. The focus during the presidency was on protecting 
the borders of the EU and on proposing so called “effective solidarity” (Zachová, Zgut, 
Kokoszczynski and Gabrižová, 2017). 
When Peter Pellegrini replaced Robert Fico as P.M. in early 2018, he continued to reject the 
quota system, however, his rhetoric was less anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant than that of his 
predecessor. 
3.2.2 Challenges in implementation of the common EU migration policies in Slovakia 
The Ministry of Labour is responsible for integration of foreigners and for labour migration as 
well as for protection of not accompanied minors (minors without parents or other guides). The 
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs tackles mainly legal migration (visa policy). The 
Ministry of the Interior implements governmental migration and asylum policies mainly 
through the Migration Office and the Bureau of the Border and Aliens Police.  
The Migration Office runs three types of facilities – “reception centre” (záchytný tábor), 
“accommodation centre” (pobytový tábor) and an “integration centre“. There also is a special 
Emergency Transit Centre that serves refugees awaiting resettlement in the new country in 
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cooperation with IOM and UNHCR, financed by USRAP – United States Refugee Admissions 
Program.163 
The Bureau of Border and Aliens Police runs two police detention units for foreigners (Útvar 
policajného zaistenia pre cudzincov) located near the Hungarian border, and close to the 
Ukrainian border, respectively. 
There is not available any specific state-sponsored accommodation for persons granted 
international protection. These persons have to rely on help provided by NGOs or municipalities 
(HRL, 2020, 8). 
Slovakia implemented majority of new or the most recent legal regulations concerning the 
common EU migration policy during period in question. The following challenges reflect issues 
that actually go from the perspective of its impact even beyond the common EU migration 
policies. In other words, these challenges are more universal than just focusing at EU 
perspective. 
Global Detention Project (2016) reported that the government has pursued restrictive and 
discriminatory immigration policies since the onset of the refugee crisis in early 2015. There 
were indications of increasing numbers of families with children being placed in detention 
without consideration of alternatives. Despite legal safeguards families with children were 
routinely detained for several months and alternatives were rarely granted. On several 
occasions, the detention of families with children has been ordered for five or six months at the 
outset—hence not for the shortest possible period of time. Moreover, between 2016 and 2018, 
four UN human rights treaty bodies criticised Slovak immigration detention practices. In 
general, the most problematic aspects included detention centres’ prison-like environments, the 
fact that the presumption in favour of majority is applied to unaccompanied children,164 
stringent conditions concerning eligibility for non-custodial alternatives to detention resulting 
in infrequent granting of alternatives, systematic detention of families with children, and the 
requirement for detainees to pay the costs of their own detention (GDP, 2019: 8). 
In 2016, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) expressed 
concern that detained asylum seekers with disabilities did not receive appropriate support and 
accommodation. In 2018, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) urged Slovakia to provide alternatives to the detention of asylum seekers, while in 
2016, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) recommended that Slovakia ensure that the 
detention of asylum seekers is justified as reasonable, necessary, and proportionate considering 
each case’s circumstances (GDP, 2019: 10). 
3.2.3 Existing and potential conflicts between national policies and common EU policy 
position 
The quota system to redistribute refugees caused a largely negative reaction in the political 
debate and subsequently in policy in Slovakia, as we have already shown (see more on official 
position of the government, in Bolečeková and Olejárová 2017: 209-211). The Slovak 
government (joined by Hungary) filled a case to the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg 
in 2015 against compulsory relocation of refugees (case C-643/15), under which Slovakia was 
expected to accept 802 asylum seekers, although there was a very low chance to be successful 
with this legal lawsuit (see Mikušovič, 2015). The government instead agreed to give refuge to 
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149 Christians cherry-picked from internally displaced camps in Iraq (Kurdistan). The lawsuit 
was eventually dismissed by the Court of Justice. 
Slovakia avoided the 2017 (ultimately successful) legal action of the European Commission 
against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Rios, 2020) on reallocation of 
refugees/migrants when it decided to accept instead of allocated 902 refugees from Italy and 
Greece, only 16 refugees from Greece (Geist, 2017). The Government promised to accept 100 
refugees from Greece (this time focused not at religion but “at the most vulnerable people”), 
and supported 500 stipends/fellowships for students from Syria. In addition, the ministry of 
interior offered temporary accommodation for asylum seekers in Austria (more than 1,200 
refugees). (Zachová, Zgut, Kokoszczynski and Gabrižová: 2017). 
Ironically, it was the Slovak government that initiated or at least coordinated the rejection of 
the quota system by the V4 countries in 2015.165 
Furthermore, the “ambitious plans for the harmonization of the asylum system according to the 
proposals of the EC “seemed to be far beyond what the country´s politicians could imagine.”166 
Instead “flexible solidarity” or as it was re-designed and re-named, “effective solidarity”, was 
intellectual contribution of the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half 
of 2016. It was presented in mid of November 2016 (see Nielsen, 2016).  For some, this was by 
and large just nickname for an effort to avoid allocation or acceptance of what was seen as too 
large number of migrants/refugees (Tóda, 2017a; see also Végh, 2017), although it also helped 
a bit to ease negative emotions within EU. There wa ssome positive assessment of this proposal 
by some, e.g. by Heijer (2017). Nyzio (2017: 73) argued that, in addition to political marketing 
function, this proposal sent a signal that solution to refugee crisis should be found from bottom 
up. Finally, the tacit message was that the key decisions should be carried unanimously and not 
by the majority voting, concluded Nyzio (2017: 73). Yet the rules of decision-making had been 
agreed already before the voting took place. 
The plan introduced three different mechanisms dedicated to dealing with three stages of 
immigration: normal, deteriorating and under severe circumstances. Under normal 
circumstances, the mechanism would be regular one. Under deteriorating circumstances, the 
M.S. would be required to relocate a well-defined proportion of applicant for asylum or to help 
the state affected by a problem in different way. This could include financial contribution to 
tailor made wider contributions relevant for both internal and external migration field (e.g. joint 
return operations, joint processing of applications, sharing reception facilities). During severe 
circumstances, the Council of the European Union should decide on additional supportive 
measures on voluntary basis. The plan was supported by V4 countries (Nyzio, 2017: 72). 
However, it is strange to observe that this plan was not present in a coherent form in the initial 
36 pages long Programme of the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the European Union – it 
simply did not exist at that time. 
The Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU managed to make a deal on Eurodac database 
and on enabling the start of negotiations with the European Parliament on some aspects of the 
European Asylum Support Office regulation and in finalising the establishment of the new 
European Border and Coast Guard (Gabrižová, 2017: 13-14). 
The Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU actually stated its initial vision in tackling 
migration at the EU level in two sentences: “Schengen strong from outside and without doubts 
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from inside. Regulated flow of migrants” 167, or, as it was put at another place: “Sustainable 
migration and asylum policies”.168 In case of “unregulated migration … (SK PRES) confirms 
a need for complex solution […] SK PRES will enforce measures aimed removing causes of 
illegal migration and to helping countries of origin and their transit [...]”. It is important to make 
closer cooperation with relevant international organisations...including NATO [...]” (p. 7 + p. 
15). Moreover, SK PRES was rather skeptical about topics that will be relevant during its 
presidency within refugee/migrant context. The document only “assumed” that these topics may 
include: effective policy of return, implementation of readmission agreements, strengthening 
of cooperation with EU agencies entrusted with returning unsuccessful applicants, cooperation 
at state level in human trafficking and human smuggling. Moreover, the document also expected 
possible suggestion of revision of the mandate of EASO and introductory or advanced 
discussions on Common Asylum Codex (p. 35).  
Apparently, there was no specific plan how to tackle migration issue in February 2016.169 
Instead of having a clear and efficient plan, Slovakia with other V4 countries supported ad hoc 
cooperation with third countries (following example of migration compact with Turkey) and 
showed willingness to support strengthening of border protection financially or personally 
(Zachová, Zgut, Kokoszczynski and Gabrižová, 2017, see more specific proposals in Nyzio, 
2017: 82-83). This meant, for example, that the Slovak police/army units were patrolling at 
Southern border of Hungary. Or, for example, Slovakia together with other V4 countries 
supported (or promised to support) financially the implementation of the Project led by the 
Italian government in cooperation with the Commission aimed at protecting the borders in 
Libya in 2017.170 There was some cooperation and help coming from the Migration Office 
within EASO – e.g. asylum supporting teams in Italy, Greece and Cyprus in 2017 (MV SE, 
2018). 
However, this probably did not mean moving from being “policy-takers” to become 
constructive “policy-makers” in the EU. As put by Tabosa (2018), V4 countries are too much 
legally and institutionally constrained to become policy-makers on their own, or as a group. 
Thus, Tabosa (2018) argued, although the political elites can use strategies of securitization of 
migration that may lead to a “partial” identitarian shift, the V4 countries are still strongly 
constrained by the EU and the discourse will most likely keep not being translated into actions. 
Well, one can argue that even resistance to policy proposals or not abiding rules of the game 
can seriously impact policy choices. 
Be that as it may, Slovak government was satisfied with the migration policy agreed at the EU 
summit in June 2018.171 
                                                     
167 Source: Governmental Material UV-9777/2016, 23.02.2016, I. Slovenské predsedníctvo v Rade Európskej únie 
v kontexte súčasného diania The Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU in the context of contemporary 
events), p.1, https://rokovania.gov.sk/RVL/Material/12707/1. 
168 Priorities of the Slovak Presidency, https://sk16.eu/m4/en/programme-and-priorities/priorities-of-the-slovak-
presidency.html, See 1 July - 31 December 2016 Programme of The Slovak Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, https://sk16.eu/m4/data/documents/presidency-programme-eng-final5.pdf. 
169 Source: Governmental Material UV-9777/2016, 23.02.2016, I. Slovenské predsedníctvo v Rade Európskej únie 
v kontexte súčasného diania The Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU in the context of contemporary 
events), https://rokovania.gov.sk/RVL/Material/12707/1. 
170 See Statement of the Visegrád 4 countries on 14th of December 2017,  https://bit.ly/2LhEI21, ČTK (14 
December 2017), Visegrad Group to give EUR 36 million to protect Libyan border, 
http://praguemonitor.com/2017/12/14/visegrad-group-give-eur-36-million-protect-libyan-border. 
171 SITA (2018, June 29). Nová európska dohoda o migrácii je dobrá pre Slovensko aj Úniu, vyjadril spokojnosť 
Pellegrini (A New European Agreement on Migrtion is a Good News for Slovakia as well as for the Union, 





For illustration, official development assistance (ODA) was 78 mil. EUR in 2015. The main 
target countries included Ukraine, Kenya and Moldova. This is a bit strange from perspective 
of migration policy, considering that, with exception of neighbouring Ukraine, neither Kenya 
nor Moldova seemed to be primary source of illegal migration to or just passing through 
Slovakia (but these were Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan). Moreover, although the country has 
increased ODA by more than a quarter on year-to-year comparison (mainly due to migration 
crisis), still, this was well below official target (0.33% of GDP versus 0.103% GDP).172 Thus, 
in spite of all this rhetoric, on the one hand, Slovakia did not live up to its long-term 
commitments. On the other hand, there was some increase in spending during crisis and 
some help provided. 
 
4. Immigration as a legal issue 
4.1 Brief description of the applicable legal framework in Slovakia together with the 
analysis of its actual implementation 
Divinský, an expert on migration/refugee issues, argued that one of the reasons why the number 
of illegal migrants had increased in period 2001-2004 was actually due to “the liberal spirit of 
the asylum law” (cited in Bolečeková and Olejárová 2017, p. 193). 
However, at the same time, Bargerová (2016, p. 26) argues that Slovak law and migration policy 
is confusing – there are more than 30 categories or definitions used according to specific legal 
status. Moreover, she claims that these categories and definitions are used inconsistently and 
not always in line with established international customs or these are too descriptive.  
The key legal document is the Act on Asylum (Act 480/2002). This law has been changed four 
times in the period 2015-2018 (and twice since then). The act actually does not use terms 
“migrant”, “immigrant” or “refugee” but instead a “foreigner” or “alien” and only occasionally 
“asylant – asylum seeker”. Foreigner is anybody who is not a citizen of Slovakia.  
As already mentioned, there are three types of protection granted to “foreigners”: asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary refuge/shelter for “leavers” (azyl, doplnková ochrana, 
poskytovanie dočasného útočiska – odídenci). A “leaver” is a foreigner whom the ministry of 
interior granted, following decision of the Government (as discussed, the government shall pass 
a measure which defines beginning, conditions and end of temporary “shelter/refuge”), 
temporary “shelter” (“dočasné útočisko”). This is the main difference from asylum status which 
grants a permanent stay. 
Subsidiary protection can be given to foreigners if they did not succeed in getting asylum. Still, 
there must be serious reasons to believe that an applicant would be persecutated upon return or 
face threats from internal or international military conflict. Subsidiary protection is provided 
for a year with possible extenstion to two years. A temporary “shelter/refuge” for “leavers” is 
meant for foreigners who come from war-torn countries, or where there is massive breach of 
human rights. In such cases, the government in line with decision of the Council of the EU shall 
pass a measure which defines beginning, conditions and end of temporary “shelter/refuge”. This 
measure/decision should be backed by appropriate money allocation. In case of relocation of 
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Christians from Kurdistan, it is not clear whether this was based on decision of the government 
or decision of the ministry of interior.173 
 
Chart: Scheme of Asylum Process 
 




The changes in the Act 480/2002 (as well as, simultaneously, in the Act 404/2011 and some 
other laws)  specified details of various forms of protection of refugees, as well as incorporated 
two additional EU regulations (2013/32/EÚ L 180, 29. 6. 2013, and 2013/33/EU L 180, 29. 6. 
2013). The first change in 2015 reflected transposition of provisions of the (recast) Asylum 
Procedures Directive. Such an update was according to plan outlined in 2014 year.174 Thus, it 
did not reflect refugee crisis. The second and third change impacted the Act 404/2011 indirectly, 
through a new Civil Administrative Code. Neither these changes reflected ongoing crisis since 
the validity of accepted changes was postponed to December 2018 or to later period. 
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The 2018 changes in the Act 480/2002 specified some details related to administrative-
procedural aspects, including extending already mentioned a list of bodies that can provide a 
legal help or advice (Act 198/2018 Z. z).175 Neither these changes were reflection of experiences 
with refugees. In fact, the official explanation provided argued that the main goal of this 
legislation was transposition of section 31, subs. 3-5 of the Directive 2013/32/EU.176 The 
Asylum Act states that the time limit for processing applications for international protection is 
six months, which can be further extended in specific circumstances. The Act also requires to 
request an opinion on the asylum application of all applicants above 14 years from the Military 
Intelligence, and not only from the Slovak Intelligence Service (state intelligence). The time 
limit to reply to this request was extended from 10 days to 20 days. 
In summary, one could not find harsh measures in the update of relevant legislation as a result 
of refugee crisis (with exception of indirectly related the Anti-terrorist Act and the Act on 
Freedom of Religious Faith discussed at another place and changes in the Act 404/2011 
discussed further). On the one hand, Androvičová (2017: 213) believes that “the partial 
improvement of the legislative conditions of so called “foreigners with supplementary 
protection” was probably also the result of efforts by NGO’s who draw attention to the very 
complicated situation of this vulnerable group of migrants.” Yet we do not know whether this 
is true or not. 
The second relevant document tackling legal immigration is the Act 404/2011 on the Residence 
of Foreigners. It defines details of migration policy, including entry requirements, visas, 
expulsion, and immigration detention. Article 88 of the Act on the Residence of Foreigners 
provides grounds for immigration detention (zaistenie). Amendment by Act 179/2017 
introduced restrictive measures for international students. Temporary residence for the purpose 
of study can now only be acquired by students who are younger than 20 years on the day of 
submitting the application. An update in 2018 introduced limitation of “permanent” stay to five 
years for persons without state citizenship. Previously, it was an unlimited term. 
There are some related legal acts such as Act 327/2005 on providing legal help to persons in 
material deprivation. One can perhaps include here also a new law on the Developmental Aid 
(392/2015). Also, there was prepared an updated National Plan of Management and Control of 
Borders for 2019 – 2022 period. Finally, for integration of foreigners it is relevant the Act on 
State Citizenship 40/1993.  
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4.2 Existing and potential conflicts between national law and legal practice of a relevant 
country and applicable EU rules 
In general, any asylum seeker has the same rights as citizens, with some exceptions (e.g. 
regarding voting and participation in elections). Thus, what could be noticed was a subtle 
difference in (more informal than formal approach) towards asylum seekers and migrants in 
general as a problem. Indeed, the judiciary noticed that sometimes it looked like civil servants 
prioritised negative approach rather than positive approach when considering whether or not to 
provide asylum (Berthotyová in Prušová, 2015). As mentioned, the law does not differentiate 
between migrants and refugees in case of the Act of Asylum. It is by definition something else 
when somebody claims to be an economic migrant (a right to asylum in such cases does not 
guarantee any international covenant), or asks for permit to stay in a country as a guestworker. 
We have also discussed different types of protection given (or not) according to the Act on 
Asylum. The law also gives to a foreigner a choice. However, obviously, foreigners in most 
cases have no idea about local legislation. Thus, it all depends on an advice given by a lawyer 
provided or funded by the state or, since 2018, it is possible to get involved a representative of 
NGOs dealing with refugees in this administrative process. 
4.3. The High-Level Judiciary and Refugees/Migrants 
There is an interesting positive contribution of the high-level national judiciary towards 
regulation or supervision of asylum processing administration. The verdicts of Constitutional 
Court and (qualitatively less so, but still) of the Supreme Court, have defended rights of 
refugees/migrants against too narrow-minded approaches of the Migration Authority and other 
law enforcing bodies already before the 2015 refugee crisis and increasingly since then. In 
doing so, both courts referred to the common EU migration regulations or, more often, to the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights or to the Covenant.   
In general, judiciary navigated migration officers towards issues that should be of their interest 
in order to correctly assess asylum request during an interview. These included consistently 
claiming the same identity, to check whether there are no internal contradictions (minor 
contradictions should not be considered against interest of an applicant). Neither a lack of 
evidence or documents that could prove persecution should be taken in account. It was often 
the case that migration officers were biased towards negative information. This was a major 
reason why courts so often cancelled decision of migration authorities (Berthotyová in Prušová, 
2015). 
However, the judiciary tried to keep balance in mutual obligations. Thus, the Migration 
Authority is not obliged to seek arguments why an applicant asks for an asylum. The burden of 
proof is, in that sense, fairly divided among both sides. However, there is a slight advantage 
given to an applicant. An applicant can just claim but he does not have to prove his claims. It is 
the task of the Migration Authority to find contradictory information. If there is no contradictory 
information, if there is no proof that applicant has lied, it must be considered that he is a 
trustworthy person (Berthotyová in Prušová, 2015). The story must include aspects of 
persecution, as defined by the law: race, religion, political affiliation or membership to a certain 
social group. The right to asylum is not a universal tool for protection against any persecution 
but only selected ones (Berthotyová in Prušová, 2015). 
There were some other interesting examples how the administrative judiciary defended rights 
of refugees. For example, the Constitutional Court criticised (III. ÚS 110/2011 41/2011) the 
Supreme Court and found its verdict in breach of an international Covenant. The case concerned 
an Afghan refugee who was to be extradited to Greece for further asylum/extradition 
proceedings. The Constitutional Court argued that it was based on too formalistic decision. In 




Greece, although there was official information about imperfect asylum proceedings in Greece 
and unhuman conditions there in asylum camps.  It was not sufficient to argue that the local law 
did not request to check situation there. In the view of Constitutional Court, the Covenant may 
not cover all details, and, in any case, it has priority before local legislation. 
Similarly, the Constitutional Court criticised (III.ÚS 717/2016-28) the Supreme Court for 
verdict 1 Sža 26/2015 which was lacking arguments related to decision to continue in 
internation of an asylum seeker.177 
The case IV. ÚS 308/2011 12/2012 also concerned an Afghan refugee. The issue was that 
decision of the Migration Authority did not mention clear arguments that it considered in 
general and that it considered as legally relevant in particular, for not extending subsidiary 
protection. 
The case II. ÚS 147/2013 48/2013 tackled a man who asked for asylum in Slovakia 8 times and 
then fled to Austria (he was repeatedly extradited from Austria back to Slovakia, or entered 
Slovakia from other country, between 2004-2009).  When he was prison in Slovakia for theft in 
2010, he asked for asylum again. When he finished his prison term, the police put him in jail 
again for maximum 180 days allegedly in line with the Asylum Act. However, the 
Constitutional Court argued that judicial review (posúdenie zákonnosti zbavenia osobnej 
slobody súdom) of this jail sentence was too slow. 
Nonetheless of criticism of verdicts by the Supreme Court (or maybe as a result of this 
criticism), the Senate of Administrative Collegium of the Supreme Court lead by Elena 
Berthotyová was awarded “the Best 2017 Verdict” for its verdict (10 Sza 12/2016).  This ruling 
protected rights of a female asylum seeker from Afghanistan and her three minors. The case 
concerned confinement of this family. The court argued that this can be seen as a legal tool, 
however, the law allows to use less harsh measures. In that particular case, asylum seeker 
mother declared that it had in possession 6,500 EUR. Thus, financial deposit was possible 
instead of confinement. When issuing the verdict, the court also stated that minors should not 
be punished for immigration status (and failures) of their parents. 
Furthermore, a judge Berthotyová (2019) explained that an asylum seeker usually is not able to 
provide any evidence, often not even an ID card. An asylum seeker can usually just claim hat 
he was persecuted. However, it is not a duty of an asylum seeker to prove his or her statement. 
Until the court has issued such verdict, an asylum seeker was positioned in disadvantageous 
situation which usually resulted in dismissal of his or her request for asylum. Slovak judiciary 
has passed a number of such ground-breaking decisions, e.g. concerning definition of asylum, 
regarding checking the real conditions and facts (k zisťovaniu skutkového stavu, k zásade tzv. 
materiálnej pravdy, k štandardom a rozloženiu dôkazného bremena), regarding individual 
reasons of persecution, on definion of an asylum on humanitarian grounds, regarding asylum 
seekers “sur place”, etc. 
There is ongoing rather significant asylum-related case. It tackles issue whether it is right to 
check at an asylum seeker, who converted to Christianity in Slovakia, how strong or honest is 
his new religious faith. The Migration Authority, supported by regional court, argued that his 
knowledge about Christianity were too low. The Supreme Court argued that it is absolutely not 
acceptable to demand from a converted person rather encyclopaedic knowledge about religion 
or checking how often that persons visits a church (Berthotyová in Prušová, 2015). Moreover, 
this lawsuit raised an issue what is the role of the court – typically, asylum seeking process is 
seen as an administrative procedure. Therefore, normally, an appeal court may only check 
whether formal, administrative criteria were upheld. It is not expected from the administrative 





court to review the content or an issue at stake. This particular lawsuit lead court to believe that 
decision of the Migration Authority was contradicting the EU law. The Supreme Court asked 
for opinion the Court of Justice of the EU in 2017 (Prušová, 2017). 
There are these the most recent selected examples of verdicts that tackled rights of 
migrants/refugees, as presented by the Supreme Court and lower courts, for 2019.178 The case 
R 61/2019 (10Sžak/18/2017) - if a request for asylum is submitted by a mother of minors, of 
whom one suffers from a serious illness, this should be considered on humanitarian grounds - 
10Sžak/18/2017). The case R 62/2019 (1Sžak/3/2018) referred to Dublin Procedure (17- 
604/2013). The court argued that although there is no legal entitlement (nie je právny nárok) to 
this protection under its wordings, nonetheless, even when deciding a case on ad hoc basis, the 
administrative officer must decide in a way that there is rule of law and expected precedens-
based decisions.179 
However, there were cases when the Constitutional Court turned down constitutional 
complaints such a case tackling extradition to Russia or alleged illegal internation of returned 
refugee from the UK once he landed on the airport (II. ÚS 129/2018).  
An overview of case law on migrants´(asylum seekers) detention was prepared by the Human 
Rights League.180 
4.4. The Border and Foreign (Alien) Police Force and Migrants 
The Report by the Ombudsperson on the Border and Alien Police Force performance (KVOP, 
2015), highlighted many problematic aspects in the work and approach of the Office of the 
Border and Alien Police Force towards migrants in general. This was related mainly to reception 
conditions in which administrative procedures related to providing temporary permits were 
held. 
Foreigners waiting for processing their requests faced in many cases low quality level 
administrative environment – in some places without access to basic level social services 
(toilets) at appropriate hygienic level. This meant that in some cases an applicant had to ask for 
a key to the toilet. In other cases, there was no sufficient room for all applicants to have a seat, 
or a table for comfortable filling in requested forms, or proper air-conditioning.  At some places, 
there was no so called intimate zone available. The report argued that when taking into account 
time spent in such conditions of waiting, the conditions may be considered as breaking the right 
to human dignity and as breach of the right to protection against denigrating (ponižujúcim 
zaobchádzaním) attitude on the side of authorities. 
As far as the administrative process was concerned, foreigners complained about impartial or 
incorrect information provided by the police. 
The recommendation included to change administrative process from the police force to other 
part of public administration as well as that all concerned authorities should have publicly 
available text on the Act on the Residence of Foreigners in the English language. 
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The mainstream media have reported on these issues relatively often (see Dugovič, 2015; 
Vražda, 2016; TV Markíza, 2017; Šnídl, 2019; Dobrovicsová, 2019c Knapko, 2019; TV Joj 
(2020).181  
As put by Bargerová (2016, p. 34), “available data suggest that Slovakia does not fully 
comprehend its own interest in integration of foreigners. It is especially surprising that the 
Ministry of Interior is not interested in integration of foreigners to such level as it was shortly 
before joining the EU.”  
 
5. Synthesis 
Moral panic manufactured through securitisation of an issue of migration characterised 
Slovakia in 2015 year. In this discourse, nominally social democratic Prime Minister and social 
democratic party that was in a single party government throughout 2015, played the key, by 
and large negative role. Yet there was a very low number of illegal refugees apprehended. The 
discoursive context was nourished by generally suspicious attitude of local publics towards 
foreigners, paradoxically, by and large caused by little interaction with foreigners in general or 
refugees in particular. At the same time, the number of legal migrants, mainly guest workers, 
was increasing shortly before the 2015 crisis. This contributed to negative image of migrants 
among some parts of the public. Be that as it may, there was only one relevant parliamentary 
party that defended openly and without restrictive conditions rights of refugees/migrants -  
Most-Híd. The second best position was of the OĽaNO movement that was ambivalent on this 
issue, while Christian Democratic Movement referred to the cultural and society-wide questions 
instead of threats and terrorism (although some of its representatives, e.g. acting as minister of 
interior, put emphasis on security-related issues in the past). Among other political actors, the 
most visible welcoming actor was then the President Andrej Kiska. It is true that the Parliament 
also expressed “a deep concern and regret over the tragic situation of migrants” and “the need 
for solidarity with other EU M.S.” However, this solidarity should be based on “voluntary” 
principle, “geographical balance, as well as reflecting potential security risks and taking into 
account the cultural, historical and socio-economic specificities of each M.S.”  
Nonetheless, one can wonder, why there was so much negative attitude towards refugees in 
social democratic party that single-party ruled the country? The key explanation is possibly to 
be found in party position on political-ideological spectrum. As put by Marušiak (2010, p. 6), 
Smer-SD met the standards of the Social Democratic identity only in the social and economic 
affairs, while cultural and human-rights dimension, supra-national dimension and the 
dimension of equality and freedom “Smer-SD” met only partially or not at all. This was 
apparently still true in 2015 year. Clearly, Smer-SD was still maneuvering between 
“pragmatism” and “social democracy”. This could help to explain “Janus faced” position of the 
Slovak government and Parliament during refugee crisis. However, for example neither 
“liberal” SaS party could be seen as truly liberal from cultural and human rights values 
perspective. In fact, there emerged more than constitutional parliamentary consensus rejecting 
the quota on migrants/refugees and constitutional majority rejecting the UN Global Compact.     
Additionally, long term cultural traits that may have influenced slow and unfinished 
“socialdemocratisation” of the Smer-SD party was a legacy of ethno-centricism, populism and 
                                                     






illiberalism in political spectrum and society at large.182 Yet there also was some logical-rational 
argument using recent experience with migrants/refugees who actually were not interested in 
getting asylum in Slovakia and in majority of cases left detention centers on their own, not 
waiting for the decision about asylum request.  
On the positive side, the mainstream media, typical with liberal ideology, attempted to remain 
less passionate about refugee crisis than politicians or even the public at large, or media in some 
other countries. This was clearly noticed when one compares their framing on this topic 
internationally. 
Thus, in this moral crisis, both already present (rapid increase of legal migrants in the past years 
and reported experience with “disappearing” migrants from detention centers) and ongoing 
wider social trends and legacies, as well as rhetoric of politicians, but also of some conservative 
civic voices, played the key roles. This was actually shown in ultimately unsuccessful 
referendum on “The Protection of Family” held in early 2015. This referendum discourse 
already introduced into the discursive cleavages of the dichotomy of “depraved Europe” and 
“traditional/pure Slovakia”. Moreover, the negative frames used were quite adaptable to 
discourse during refugee crisis which was ongoing about the same time and culminated (with 
at least two peaks) a few months later. Thus, public was already accustomed to emotional 
negative rhetoric that fitted perfectly to negative refugee rhetoric narratives. This narrative was 
found useful as a key message for almost all political parties before the early 2016 general 
elections. Securitisation of migration thus lead (or contributed) to Janus-faced policies of the 
Slovak governments throughout 2015-2016 period. As a result, social distancing among 
population towards migrants and Muslims has increased. 
Indeed, Slovak government´s attitude towards migration policy can be characterized with 
double standards both externally and internally: externally, there was internationally (and 
internally) declared solidarity with the situation of migrants/refugees and a call for (different 
way of) cooperation and (more) coordination within EU. The Slovak plan (supported by V4 
countries), presented during its Council of the EU presidency in second half of 2016, called for 
“flexible solidarity” or as it was re-designed and re-named, “effective solidarity”. However, the 
listed alternatives were not viewed as helpful by the frontier states in particular. One can wonder 
whether “flexibility” approach did not find some inspiration in overall longer cooperation 
within Visegrad 4 countries. As put by Strážay (2018, p. 58): “the idea of flexibility [...] has not 
only become a characteristic working strategy for V4 that distinguishes it from other regional 
cooperation formats in the EU ... but it is also ... the groups´ survival strategy.” In other words, 
a lack of common interests, or a lack of useful alternative policies, may be covered by 
“flexibility” vocabulary. 
Yet it should be also stated that virtually all governmental documents produced before the 2015 
crisis indicated that the country wants to be selective in accepting migrants/refugees, while it 
also called for cooperation with partners within the EU. This certainly can be seen as a puzzling 
approach. 
Furthermore, the government sponsored relocation of some 150 local Christians from 
Kurdistan, as well as provided assistance to Austria. Yet at the same time there was a unique 
(with Hungary) open legal action (ultimately unsuccessful) against majoritarian decision 
challenging pre-agreed rules of decision-making in the EU regarding relocation of refugees. 
Furthermore, although Slovakia initiated and coordinated some limited international diplomatic 
public and legal protests, the country also accepted some limited, really symbolic, number of 
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additional refugees from Greece within EU relocation scheme. The country also showed some 
additional effort towards helping countries that tackled refugee crisis (Libya, Hungary, 
Slovenia, etc), including helping international organisation in long-term programme on 
refugees relocation. Thus it avoided successful lawsuit initiated (in a sort of ironic but 
unintended reciprocity) by the European Commission against some other neighbouring 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) on this issue. 
The legislation on asylum and on “aliens”, although subject to revisions during period in 
question, by and large did not reflect these external and internal processes and challenges. It 
included only aes few changes that could be seen as worsening position of refugees, as a result 
of securitisation of public discourse, while at the same time eased some regulations especially 
of humanitarian/health related types. Ironically, it was because during this period that Slovakia 
actually transposed new EU legislation on this issue, according to officially planned timeline. 
Although legislation is rather complicated and strict, it allows fast humanitarian gestures, if the 
Ministry of Interior (the Migration Authority) or the government wishes to do so.  
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court and then Supreme Court played important role in making 
more human and easier accessible access to justice and conditions related to asylum seeking for 
refugees. 
It should be mentioned that tacit anti-migrant rhetoric and policies could be found implicitly in 
another legislative acts: the Anti-terrorism Act and an update in Act on Freedom of Religious 
Faith that have been updated during the period in question, too. 
Similarly, the ombudsperson pointed at some complications that faced regular migrants when 
tackling the Border and Foreign Police. With exception of some progress in increasing the 
quality of equipment and premises of the Border and Foreign Police, there seemed to be 
persisting problems in quality of services provided to foreigners (KVOP, 2020). There was 
controversial reaction of authorities to the latest report by ombudsperson (see Gucký, 2020 and 
Števulová, 2020). 
Internally, Slovak governmental position was also “dual” (Janus-faced): on the one hand it 
showed a strong anti-migrant rhetoric, including passing strict anti-terrorist legislation (when 
refugees were linked in public discourse with Muslim religion and then implicitly or sometimes 
explicitly183 with terrorism), while on the other hand there was a special declaration of the 
Government that provided huge resources to NGOs who were helping refugees and some other 
pro-refugees measures. Moreover, Slovakia at the same time passed a new law on international 
developmental assistance. The Ministry of Foreing and European Affairs established a post of 
ambassador-et-large for migration (HRL, 2020, p. 13). Yet the idea of “Immigration and 
Naturalisation Authority” as well as Integration Programme for Persons with International 
Protection have not materialised. This half-baked approach is somehow typical for Slovak 
bureaucracy – there is often discrepancy between wording of policies and laws, and actual 
policies and approaches.  
It should be little surprising that in late 2018, on the statement: “It is our duty to welcome 
refugees fleeing war and affliction into our country", a third of Slovak respondents answered in 
affirmative (agree and strongly agree), while two thirds disagreed (including strongly 
disagreed). This was exact opposite as in case of Switzerland or Bosnia and Hercegovina. In 
fact, it was exact opposite as an average of all surveyed countries (Ispos/Fondpol, 2019). 
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Ultimately internally, unfinished “socialdemocratisation” of a Smer-SD party and in general not 
quite developed political party system (with too big role of leaders), as well as externally, ad 
hoc coalition policy tradition within the V4 called “flexible approach”, lead to Janus faced 
policy of the Slovak government(s) during 2015 refugee crisis as well as during its Presidency 
of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2016. In background, this approach had deeper 
roots – Slovak political elites by and large prefer integration and cooperation within EU and 
thus do not want to be seen as too much uncooperative. As put by Najšlová (2011) at related 
and earlier example, Slovakia’s efforts to shape the EU’s Eastern policy have been a blend of 
solidarity and pragmatism, a permanent renegotiation between ‘the logic of appropriateness’ 
and the ‘logic of consequentialism. Najšlová calls this approach “Pragmatic Follower, 
Occasional Leader.” She explains this attitude towards EU’s Eastern policy further that: 
“the solidarity dimension of this relation has drawn on Slovakia’s transition experience 
and a certain similarity between Slovakia’s historical experience and that of the EU’s 
Eastern neighbors. The pragmatic dimension has been motivated by a national interest 
that prefers a democratic and better governed neighborhood, and, at the same time, by 
Slovakia’s need to be respected and recognised as a relevant international player. At the 
same time, Slovakia as a small state has been using the EU arena to promote its foreign 
policy priorities and has selected the Eastern neighborhood as one of its contributions to 
the EU policy.”  
Moreover, in case of migration crisis, there was a call for cooperation from other Visegrad 
countries, as well as pressure from the local population that is by and large afraid of anything 
foreign. 
There is a little hope that new immigration policy will be different. The old idea of “Immigration 
and Naturalisation Authority” is mentioned only as an option in the Manifesto of the 
Government for 2020-2024 period. Moreover, the Government promised to prepare new 
Migration Policy of Slovakia for 2021 – 2025.184 In general, the new government seems to be 
equally ambiguous on solutions to migration policy as the previous governments: it points at 
risks associated with “unregulated migration flow and uncoordinated EU approach” while at 
the same time demands “to take into account legitimate interests of Slovakia” (p. 24). 
Be that as it may, it is expected that Slovakia will face labour shortage of 37% in 40 years from 
now (Baláž and Karasová, 2016: 53).185 Similarly, the population may decrease from 5.42 
million to somewhere between 3.8-4.3 million in 2100 (Bleha, 2020). The issue of 
migration/refugees may be seen rather differently from this long-term perspective.  
 
6. Policy recommendations 
1. It would be useful to support political party system development in Slovakia that 
would be more compatible with the European political party families. This may be 
challenge since the party system is in flux globally. We mean here that if a party 
claims to be belonging to a certain ideological camp, it should follow key principles 
of that ideological camp. 
2. It would be useful if the key policy documents (e.g. Migration Policy, Integration 
Policy, Asylum Policy or prognostic materials) would be written with a more practical 
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focus and with specific aims but also including some visionary aspects (e.g. possible 
negative scenarios with alternative approaches). These documents beg for revisions. 
Currently, (as of October 2020) there is ongoing process of public consultation of a 
new draft of LP/2020/385 Migration Policy of Slovakia – Outlook 2025.186 
3. Assessment of key policy documents should be double checked by external assessors 
(both current versions and annual assessment of their real application). 
4. The key positive actors should be appreciated or supported locally and internationally 
(e.g. the mainstream media, ombudsperson, the high judiciary, selected academia, 
former leadership of party Most-Híd). 
5. It should be developed a narrative why it is useful or necessary to help refugees, if 
clear majority of them really does not want to stay in the country and leaves the 
country for their final destination before asylum procedure is completed. 
6. Administrative aspects of regular migration should not be tackled by the Police but 
by civil authorities. This change was actually already introduced to some degree in 
the summer of 2020. For that purpose, already planned central Migration and 
Integration Authority should be established or based on merging existing authorities. 
7. There should be easily available online and in hard copies basic information for 
migrants and refugees not only about key legislation but also about cultural specifics 
in all languages of expected migrants/refugees. The authorities should monitor 
developments and be ready to prepare new language versions, if needed, within weeks 
(also HRL, 2020” 6-7). The current version is available from 2018 year and is 
available only in five languages.187 
8. We also support recommendations suggested by Human Rights League, namely: 
a) to establish protected housing for vulnerable refugees (HRL, 2020: 6).  
b) to consider providing temporary shelter in not sufficiently utilised objects to 
specific individuals or groups awaiting extradition (HRL, 2020: 6).  
c) to introduce into legal system “administrative procedures for state-less persons” 
(HRL, 2020: 6).  
d) to establish state integration system for persons with international protection 
(HRL, 2020: 6).  
There are quite many additional detailed suggestions for im/migration policies produced by 
HRL (see HRL, 2020: 33-57). 
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Table 1 - Number of valid residence registrations (stock) 
 Third country 
nationals 
EU nationals Total 
2015 35 261 (42%) 49 526 (58%) 84 787 
2016 41 232 (44%) 52 015 (56%) 93 247 
2017 50 395 (48%) 54 056 (52%) 104 451 
2018 65 381 (54%) 55 883 (46%) 121 264 
 
 
Table 2 - Number of EU nationals with valid registration for residence (Top 3 
nationalities) 
 1st 2nd 3rd Total 
2015 CZ – 9 927 (20%)* HU – 7 593 (15%) RO – 6 573 (13%) 49 526 
2016 CZ – 10 317 HU – 7 813 RO – 6 907 52 015 
2017 CZ – 10 663 HU – 8 057 RO – 7 149 54 056 
2018 CZ – 10 970 HU – 8 503 RO – 7 420 55 883 
* The share among these three countries does not change during the period 2015-2018. 
 
 
Table 3 - Top 3 nationalities with valid residence permit among 3rd country nationals: 
 1st 2nd 3rd Total 
2015 Ukraine – 10 706 (30%) Serbia – 5 528 (16%) Russia – 3 532 (10%) 35 261 
2016 Ukraine – 13 024 (32%) Serbia – 7 232 (18%) Russia – 4 035 (10%) 41 232 
2017 Ukraine – 16 102 (32%) Serbia – 10 608 
(21%) 
Russia – 4 331 (9%) 50 395 
2018 Ukraine – 24 913 (38%) Serbia – 14 208 
(22%) 






Table 4 - Number of residence permits granted to aliens (inflow) 
 Third country 
nationals 
EU nationals Total 
2015 17 397 (73%) 6 388 (27%) 23 785 
2016 17 434 (70%) 7 299 (30%) 24 733 
2017 22 912 (78%) 6 601 (22%) 29 513 
2018 32 048 (83%) 6 633 (17%) 38 681 
 
 
Table 5 - Top 3 nationalities whom the residence permit was granted 
(3rd country nationals): 
 1st 2nd 3rd Total 
2015 Ukraine – 6 103 (35%) Serbia – 2 776 (16%) Russia – 1 541 
(9%) 
17 397 
2016 Ukraine – 5 808 (33%) Serbia – 2 362 (14%) Russia – 1 702 
(10%) 
17 434 
2017 Ukraine – 8 036 (35%) Serbia – 4 654 (20%) Russia – 1 835 
(8%) 
22 912 





Table 6 - Illegal migration on the territory of Slovakia by nationality (top 5 nationalities)  
and the number of asylum requests 
  2015 2016 2017 2018 
1st 
Ukraine – 867 
(34%) 
Ukraine –  
1 234 (57%) 
Ukraine –  
1 786 (66%) 
Ukraine –  
1 934 (69%) 
2nd Syria – 582 (23%) Iraq –145 (7%) Serbia – 227 (8%) Serbia – 207 (7%) 
3rd 
Afghanistan –  
265 (10%) 
Serbia –  
123 (6%) 
Vietnam –  
160 (6%) 





4th Iraq – 146 (6%) 
Afghanistan –  
114 (5%) 
Iraq – 108 (4%) Moldova – 66 (2%) 
5th Kosovo – 120 (5%) Syria – 82 (4%) 




Total 2 535 2 170 2 706 2 819 
Number  
of asylum  
application
s 
112 (4%) 78 (4%) 119 (5%) 134 (5%) 
 
 
Table 7 - Overview of asylum applications submitted 
 1st 2nd 3rd Total 
2015 Iraq – 172 (52%) Afghanistan – 37 
(11%) 
Ukraine – 25 (8%) 330 
2016 Ukraine – 25 (17%) Afghanistan – 16 
(11%) 
Syria – 14 (10%) 146 
2017 Afghanistan – 23 
(14%) 
Vietnam – 21 (13%) Iraq – 12 (7%) 166 
2018 Afghanistan – 31 
(17%) 
Iraq – 24 (13%) Yemen – 20 (11%) 178 
 
 


















1993 96 41 20 - 25 0 
1994 140 58 32 - 65 0 
1995 359 80 57 - 190 0 




1997 645 69 84 - 539 14 
1998 506 53 36 - 224 22 
1999 1320 26 176 - 1034 2 
2000 1556 11 123 - 1366 0 
2001 8151 18 130 - 6154 11 
2002 9743 20 309 - 8053 59 
2003 10358 11 531 - 10656 42 
2004 11395 15 1592 - 11782 20 
2005 3549 25 827 - 2930 2 
2006 2849 8 861  1940 5 
2007 2642 14 1177 82/646 1693 18 
2008 909 22 416 66/273 457 4 
2009 822 14 330 98/165 460 1 
2010 541 15 180 57/101 361 3 
2011 491 12 186 91/47 270 7 
2012 732 32 334 104/153 383 0 
2013 441 15 124 34/49 352 7 
2014 331 14 197 99/41 163 12 
2015 330 8 124 41/24 148 5 
2016 146 167 82 12/13 35 3 
2017 166 29 77 25/16 73 6 
2018 178 5 128 37/23 69 18 
2019 232 9 93 19/33 178 9 
  
Source: Ministry of Interior of Slovak Republic, 2020 
 
 
 
